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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

Social Science and Police Studies
Social scientists examining the police role have typically
assumed that the individual police officer or department is
relatively free to implement social policy as he/she or it sees
fit.

This assumption is reflected in many police studies which

stress the importance of police chiefs, police discretion, and
police personalities as being the decisive factors in police
behavior.

Nonetheless, it is rather incredible that social

scientists have believed that a highly stratified society would
permit people drawn from the working class such as the police to
formulate and to control major social poliCy.l
A more tenable approach to studying the police would be to
examine police behavior in terms of the place of the police in
class conflict.

This approach would focus mainly on how conditions

outside of police organizations have shaped police response.
Sidney Harring has emphasized the importance of conflict in historical studies of the police:
An historical analysis of the police institution must
begin with a specific understanding of power relations,
economic interests, and class conflict within particular
communities. • . . The structure of the police institution,
the ways in which it is controlled, and the policies that
it adopts change over time as the interests of those in
positions of power change. 2
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To date there have been few attempts to systematically collect
and analyze data on the police role in any kind 0f class conflict.
A potentially rich area of study involves the police response to the
pitched battles fought between labor radicals and the dominant
political and economic interests.
area are:

Two key empirical 'issues in this

1) What do the police do in times of worker rebellion and

revolution? and 2) Why do they act the way that they do?
These type of queries have rarely been subjected to critical
examination.

Such a task was undertaken in this dissertation.

More

specifically, this dissertation was an exploratory study of the
response of the urban police to labor radicalism. The purposes of
the inquiry were to develop a conceptual framework that allowed for
a more precise examination of police response than is currently
feasible and to apply the framework in a comparative analysis of the
responses of the city police in Portland, Oregon and Seattle,
Washington to radical labor unrest during the period of 1912-1920.
An exploratory approach was necessary because the theoretical
work pertaining to police response is not sufficiently developed yet
to generate rigorous hypotheses for testing.

Additionally, the

literature on this subject is limited and widely spread about in
articles and books in the fields of labor history, policy history,
urban history, criminology and criminal justice; these studies have
yet to be combined into a single conceptual scheme.

Hence, it was

imperative to first systematize the knowledge of the area and to
formulate "working" pY'opositions; this made it possible to then
conduct a more definitive investigation of the cases of the Portland
and Seattle police.

4

The product of this approach is a dissertation in three main
parts.

In part one, a theoretical frarrework is explicated for the

analysis of the police response to labor radicalism. The second
part consists of an empirical study of the response of the Seattle
and Portland police to the protest and unrest of labor radicals in
1912-1920.

Finally, in the concluding section, the theoretical

concepts and propositions in the first part of the dissertation are
checked in terms of their applicability to the empirical data in
the second part.
construction of a Theoretical Framework
By combining

~·1arxian

theory with some empirical evidence from

the scattered information on the police and labor, a framework was
constructed for the analysis of the police response to labor radi·calism. The framework was labeled IIneo-Marxian since it drew
ll

heavily from the conceptual work of Roberta Ash Garner, Charles Tilly,
Harvey r,10lotch, and others who have revised and expanded on

~1arx's

writings in the area of political economy and social control.
~·1arxian

The

theory of class conflict, in particular, was relied upon

heavily in the development of the framework.

The version of the

r·1arxian theory of class conflict used in this dissertation stresses
that conflict between social classes is rooted in contradictions
in the capitalist mode of production.
capi ta 1i srn 'j s

th~

The chief contradiction of

contradi cti on between IIsoci ali zed product; on II

(i .e., production by a collectivity of \'1orkers as opposed to
production by individuals) and IIcapitalist appropriation

ll

(i .e., the

owner of the means of production appropriates to himself/herself the
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product and most of the profits derived from it, even though the
product was produced through the labor of other persons}.

This

contradiction is manifested in the conflict between the working and
the capitalist classes.*
In addition, some ideas in the framework \'/ere borrowed from
the resource mobilization perspective of tl1ayer Zald, John t1cCarthy,
and Anthony Oberschall and from the police studies of James Q.
Jerome Skolnick, Samuel Walker, and Donald Black.

t~ilson,

The resource

mobilization perspective is an approach to the study of social movements which emphasizes the social process by which a discontented
group or organization assembles and utilizes resources in the pursuit
of collective goals.

As for the empirical research on the police

that was utilized in the construction of the framework, it pertained
to police professionalism, police-community relations, and the
mobilization of the law.
The focus of the framework developed in this study was on
improving the capacity to foretell the police response to labor
radicalism and on enhancing the understanding of processual relationships between the main conceptual units.

Given the exploratory

nature of this study, high precision in prediction and powerful
explanation were neither sought nor achieved.

Rather. the conceptual

part of the dissertation explicated a theoretical base upon which
others can build.
*For a more detailed conceptualization of this version of
Marxist theory, see Charles H. Anderson, The Political Econo~ of
Social Class, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 974),
pp. 46-75.

As a whole, the framework was organized in the following way.
First, the main units of analysis, namely police response and labor
radicalism, were defined.

A conceptualization of four pivotal areas

of inquiry--1inkages between class power, state power, and police
response; patterns of labor discontent and police response; community
influence on police response; and the factor of the police in police
response was then developed.

Finally, 22

1~lOrking"

proposition were

stated.
Application of the Framework
The cases of the Seattle and Portland police and their response
to the activities of labor radicals in 1912-1920 were examined in the
second part of this research.

In light of the fact that the police

response to radical labor movements is a relatively unexplored area,
the in tens i ve study of these two cases seems to be a useful \'/ay to
check the propositions in the framework and to stimulate the creation
of new propositions.
The discussion of police actions vis a vis labor radicals in
Seatt1 e and Port1 and begins \'/i th a broad overvi ew of the organi zati on
and functioning of the police in both cities along with a brief
description of the Wobb1ies* and the other labor radicals with whom
the police dealt on a regular basis from 1912-1920.

This chapter is

followed by six chapters which focus on different time periods and
explore various facets of the relationship between the police and
labor radicals in Seattle and Portland.
*Wobb1y is a nickname for a member of the Industrial Workers
of the World labor organization.
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It should be stressed at the outset that the type of study
conducted in the second part of the dissertation mainly leads to
insights; it does not "test" hypotheses.

Among other things, the

cases of Portland and Seattle may not be entirely representative of
the police response to labor radicalism.

Other police encounters

with labor radicals in other cities, and in other time periods may
not have been so intense, colorful, and violent as the clashes between
the police and the Wobblies in Seattle and Portland.

Then, too, data

from only two cases provide an inadequate basis for drawing conclusive
generalizations about any kind of social phenomena.

Hence, the reader

should keep in mind the proviso that more carefully controlled studies
will be needed to determine whether the findings that emerged have a
more general applicability than for Portland and Seattle and for only
the period of 1912-1920.
Summary
In this brief introduction it has been contended that a perspective emphasizing class analysis is necessary in order to adequately
study the police.

Also, it has been suggested that the foundation for

this perspective should be Marxian social theory and that many of the
building blocks can be drawn together from a number of areas of study.
In short, the position taken in this dissertation is that a synthetic,
for
multidisciplinary approach is most useful
,

i~quiries

into the

police response to labor radicalism.
This chapter also included a delineation of the basic features
of a comparative study of police response \vhich constitutes the
second part of the dissertation.

An unstated, yet implicit point in

•
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the conduct of this inquiry into the actions of the Seattle and
Portland police is that social scientists must perform more empirical
analyses of the police as well as other functionaries of the criminal
justice system if they are to make more substantial contributions to
the understanding of societal reactions to protest, crime, and other
forms of soci a'l disorder than they have made in the past.
In general, the thrust of this introductory chapter is that
there is little solid information on how the police respond to
challenges to the social order by labor radicals.
of what

\'Ie

Furthermore, much

think we know about the police comes from studies that

underestimate the importance of political, economic, and social
factors in influencing police behavior.

The way to resolve these

problems is not for all social scientists to convert to Marxism.
Rather, the best approach seems to be for social scientists to begin
to critically grapple with the subject matter in some of these
inchoate areas, such as the police response to labor radicalism,
whi ch seem to fall between or at the -i ntersecti ons of academi c
disciplines and intellectual fields.

9
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THEORET! CAL

FRM~EWORK

CHAPTER I I
A NEO-r~ARXIAN FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSE
OF URBAN POLICE TO LABOR RADICALISM

Definition of Terms
Those who have investigated police encounters with labor
organizations largely have ignored the problems associated with
defining key terms.

These scholars have been more given to

narrating and recording police involvement in labor conflicts than
to dissecting the conceptual units used in their analyses.

Yet,

some attention must be paid to definitional matters in the study of
police-labor interaction.

"Police response" and "labor radicalism"

are two terms that must be defined before one can even commence a
serious exploration of the police and labor.
Let us begin with police response.

This term embraces both

the mobilization of resources by the police and the collective and
individual actions of the police.

The distinction between mobiliza-

tion and collective action should be underscored.
tion involves the
needed for action.

p~ocess

Police mobiliza-

of acquiring and marshalling resources

An example of the mobilization of resources

would be the police petitioning the city council to authorize the
hiring of more police officers for the purpose of maintaining order
at demonstrations.
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The mobilization of the police can be broken down into these
components~

a) accumulating resources (e.g., labor power, weapons,

goods, etc.) and b) increasing claims on resources.
apply to the mobilization of any group.l

These components

Accumulating resources

consists of aggregating manpower, money, and other resources in a
police department.

The second component includes reducing competing

claims on resources, altering the organization's program of action,
and making police workers more satisfied with their job in order to
build comnlitment to the police occupation.
Besides mobilizing resources, the police may use resources
and act together in the pursuit of a set of interests.
action by the police can be analyzed on three levels:
and tactics.

Collective
policy, strategy,

Like other authorities, the police take at least three

policy stances vis a vis labor and other contenders for power. These
are: a) facilitation; b) toleration; and c) repression. 2 A policy of
facilitation lowers the contenders' costs for mobilization and
collective action and makes it easier for the contenders to achieve
their goals.

An example of a facilitative policy would be the dis-

arming of strikebreakers by the police.

When a policy of toleration

is in operation, the police are neutral and impartial in their actions.
Allowing strikers to picket while at the same time protecting strikebreakers exemplifies a tolerant police policy.
Repression merits special consideration since it is a term
that frequently has been used to describe police behavior in situations of conflict between the forces of capital and labor. With a
repressive policy, the police check, subdue, or put down labor unrest
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through the use of force or other types of pressure.

If the police

are bent on repressing radical labor or other contenders for power,
they have the option of working on an organization's mobilization
processes or on its collective action. 3 ~1easures such as suspending
newspapers and forbidding assemblies exemplify the anti-mobilization
approach.

Enforcing oourt orders which outlaw particular organiza-

tions and arresting participants in demonstrations are ways of
raising the costs of collective action.
With regard to police strategy, police organizations possess
certain general ways of coping with the crime problem.

Policing

strategies refer to an orientation toward allocating resources to
afford the maximum support to police policy.
John Van

r~aanen

Peter f1anning and

among many others have i denti fi ed II reacti ve, II

IIproactive,1I and IIpreventive strategies as being basic forms of
police work. 4 Reactive strategies are the most commonly employed
ll

by the police. S In these, the police respond to a citizen complaint
after the crime or the trouble has already occurred.

Conversely,

police action happens prior to or simultaneously with crime
commission in proactive strategies.

Proactive police strategies

are initiated by the police themselves. The utilization of decoys
and drug raids are two examples of proactive police \'Iork.

Preventive

strategies are siMilar to proactive ones in terms of the timing of
police action.

Yet they differ from proactive strategies in that

preventive strategies are geared toward anticipated acts of lawbreaking.

The hardening of the potential targets of criminals through

the use of locks, alarms, and other hardware is a prime example of a
preventive strategy.
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How do policing strategies relate to labor unrest? Basically,
law enforcement personnel use the same strategies to police conflict
between capital and labor except that in dealing with labor they may
prohibit or prevent citizens from behaving in legal ways, whereas in
fighting crime they control and/or prevent
illegal ways.

cit~zens

from behaving in

The work of reserve and auxiliary police reflects a

reactive strategy for handling labor disturbances.

These police wait

until a labor disturbance breaks out before taking action.

Regular

or full-time police can also be reactive in responding to calls for
assistance from either labor or management.

Proactive strategies

are exemplified by police raids on labor union halls and po1iceinitiated riots that disrupt or end meetings of workers.

Intelligence

gathering operations that are geared to allow the police the
opportunity to forestall, defuse, or delimit the actions of labor
and/or management and special police activities that are aimed at
controlling working class youth are representative of preventive
strategies.
Tactics are another aspect of police response.

A poi ice tactic

is a specific method for accomplishing an intended effect. Some
examples of tactics that have been used in situations involving labor
are as follows:
1.

Isolate and ignore protesting workers.

2.

Divide off areas that might be used by workers to
meet, to protest, etc.

3.

Deny workers access to an area.

4.

Disperse workers at a rally or other gathering.

5.

Arrest leaders at a gathering of workers.
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6.

Search premises without warrants and arrest workers
on suspicion.

7.

Assault and/or shoot participants in meetings, riots,
demonstrations, etc.*

Turning to IIlabor radica1ism,1I it also must be addressed in
specific terms.

Historically, radicalism has been the exception

rather than the rule over the course of labor relations in the
United States.

Reformism

;!;.':;

been the nonna1 course of labor

affairs as union representatives have adjusted to the prerogatives
of capitalist management and have been interested mainly in piecemeal, pragmatic gains rather than in drastic social change.
In spite of the reformist character of the labor movement, there
have been roughly three phases of labor radicalism in the United
States. 6 The first phase extended from around 1870 until the early
years of the twentieth century.

A hodgepodge of industrial armies,

\'Iorking class political parties, industrial quasi-unions, and
anarchist groups formed the backbone of this first current of labor
radicalism.

The marches for jobs and food as well as the other

agitational activities of these pro-labor collectivities often were
crushed by the combined power of the militia, federal troops, private
vigilantes, and city police.
The second phase of labor radicalism started around 1909 and
continued through World War I.

Labor radicals, who were active in

this phase, sought to replace the capitalist system with a cooperative
*t1any of these examples have been borrowed from Raymond ~·1.
Momboisse's Riots, Revolts, and Insurrections (Springfield, Mass.:
Charles C. Thomas Publisfier, 1967) and modified to fit the situations
in which the police and labor radicals have encountered one another.
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or socialist system.

The Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.)

stands out as the archetype of working class radicalism in this
perioci.

The I.H.W. held that any step taken by the workers at the

point of production that improved wages, reduced hours, or otherwise
brought about a transfer of power from the dominant class to the
working class should be a vital part of labor's arsenal.

Direct

action took a variety of forms, including free-speech fights* and
general strikes.** The ferment of radical activities in this period
was snuffed out, in part, by the actions of federal, state, and
local police forces.
The third phase of labor radicalism followed on the heels of
the Depression when workers in the mass production industries formed
industrial unions.

Their efforts in various cities coalesced in the

organizing drive of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.).
Formed in 1935, the C.I.O. involved approximately half a million
workers in "sit down strikes'.'*** and organized about four million
\'/orkers into unions in the years 1936-1937.

By the end of World t1ar II,

*Free speech fights consisted of Wobblies standing on top of
soap boxes or on street corners, haranguing working class crowds
about the inequities of capitalism. Police attempts to stop Wobbly
speakers often were foiled because as soon as one speaker was taken
into custody another would take his or her place in spouting ideas
on the injustice of a private property system.
**The I.W.W. 's notion about a general strike was that when a
sufficient number of workers had been organized, it would be possible
to seize an entire industry by striking.
***In a sit down strike the workers stop work but stay in the
workplace instead of picketing outside of the plant or mill.
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however, the militancy of the C.I.D. had faded.

The police appear

to have been connected with the demise of C.I.D. radicalism just as
they were with the termination of other forms of labor radicalism
in earlier phases.*
Generalizing from these three phases of radicalism in the
labor movement, labor radicalism may be defined as a nonconventional,
militant approach to economic and industrial problems characterized
by extreme dissatisfaction with the status quo.
state~

This definition is

in general terms in order to encompass the actions of labor

radicals in all three phases.

It must be recognized that this

definition stresses the approach or the method used by labor radicals
to achieve their goals.

This emphasis upon "means" in defining

radicalism is in contrast to the usual emphasis that has been placed
upon "ends." Typically, social scientists have defined radicalism
as a desire to make extreme or fundamental changes in the social
structure of society.
With regard to the phenomenon of labor radicalism, the traditional
attention paid to ends does not seem to be entirely appropriate
because the repertoires of action of early pro-labor collectivities,
the I.W.W., and the C.I.O. appear to be the most useful characteristic
in distinguishing labor radicalism from labor reformism.

In point

of fact, it seems that the most significant difference between labor
radicals and labor reformers has been that the marches, general
*The deradicalization of the C.I.D. also was partially due
to the C.I.D.'s own organizational goals and its relationship to
big business and government. For a more complete discussion of
this point, see C. Wright Mills, The New Men of Power (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1948).
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strikes, and sit-down strikes of the radicals have taken place outside of the acceptable limits of protest, whereas most of the
practices and actions of the A.F.L. and other reformist organizations
have occurred within institutionally legitimate channels. This
emphasis on means rather than ends is not meant to discount the
anarchist, syndicalist, socialist, and communist ideas have been part
of the thinking of labor radicals; instead, this emphasis is
necessary in order to capture the actual importance of action in
the history of labor radicalism.
Linkages Between Class Power, State Power, and Police Response
In analyzing the police response to labor radicalism it is
imperative'to include a theoretical conceptualization of the police
function.

In general, the police function in the United States has

been described in police studies as consisting of the components of
"order mai ntenance" and "l aw enforcement. II The former term refers
to peace-keeping activities, while the latter relates to crimefighting activities.

James Q. Wilson was the first social scientist

to identify these two functions as being central to the police role. 7
Numerous other classification schemes have been devised to capture
the essence of the police function since the publication of his
Varieties of Police Behavior, but most of these differ only slightly
from Wilson's original work.
In terms of the sources of influence on the police, a substantial portion of the police literature has been devoted to examining
phenomena such as discretion, subcultural values, attitudes, administrative ethos, and styles of police work which pertain to law
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enforcement personnel and organizations.* In addition, the idea that
the police are subjected to pressures from a host of special interests
has been a standard feature of most of the theoretical work on the
police •. The influence of political parties and racketeer organizations has often been stressed in this regard, while the power of
legitimate economic interests over the police has been given short
shrift by conventional or non-r·1arxist scholars.

Still another cOll111on

feature of police studies is the recognition that the police operate
in a governmental framework whose purposes are diffuse and often
contradictory.

This is held to be the case because a variety of

public institutions operating at different levels of government and
possessing conflicting goals have some influence on the police role.
A Marxian position on the police function is similar to the

traditional perspective in some ways, yet markedly different from
it in other respects.

Marxists, while conceding that there is a large

amount of routine peace-keeping involved in policing, maintain that
the requisite of defending the class system is at the heart of the
police function.

Stated another way, a Marxian conceptualization

of the police posits that the class system is at the core of
capitalist society protected, in part, by the armor of the state
through the capacity of the police to use force. 8
What is most unique about a Marxist analysis of the police is
that class relations are singled out as being the preeminent force
involved in the structuring of the police function.

From a Marxist

*A useful summary of some of the most important studies on these
topics can be found in Don C. Gibbons' Society, Crime, and Criminal
Careers, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977),
pp. 49-78.
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perspective, social classes are largely determined by the productive
relations into which human beings are either born or enter with
little freedom of choice. 9 Crucial, insofar as the police function
is

conce~ned,

are the relations among social classes and the

relations between specific classes, the government, and the police.
The pivotal ideas of t1arxian social theory can be developed
more concretely by examining some of the ways of looking at the
relationship between the capitalist class, city government. and
police response to labor unrest.

To begin with, it appears that

police intervention has been to the detriment of labor and to the
benefit of the capitalist class.

A review by Philip Taft and

Philip Ross of American labor-management disputes makes it clear that
the police, troops, and plant guards have done the bulk of the
killing and wounding.

In a sketch of the usual circumstances in

which persons died in labor violence during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, Taft and Ross summarized their findings in
these words:
Facing inflexible opposition, union leaders and their
members frequently found that nnthing, neither peaceful
persuasion nor the heads of gO/ernment, could move the
employer towards recognition. Frustration and desperation impelled pickets to react to strikebreakers with
anger. ~·1any violent outbreaks followed efforts of
strikers to restrain the entry of strikebreakers and
raw materials into the struck plant. Such conduct,
obviously illegal, opened the opportunity for forceful
police measures. In the long run, the e~ployer's
side was better equipped for success. The use of
~orce by pickets was illegal on its face, but the
action of the police and company guards were in
vindication of the employer's rights. 10
Why have the police so often sided with the capitalist class?
A number of studies have addressed this question.

In some cases, the

21

question is at least implicitly raised, but no evidence is presented
to resolve it.

Dubofsky's treatment of the response of the

~elvyn

Paterson, New Jersey police to the I.W.W.,ll indicated that the
police arrested three

I.l~.W.

leaders and closed every hall in town

to the strikers only one day after the start of the city's silk mill
strike.

The next, day the police arrested Frederick Sumner Boyd, a

socialist, for having read the IIfree speech clausell of the New Jersey
state constitution at a strike meeting.

When Police Chief Bimson

asked Boyd \tJhat law he had been reading, Boyd informed him:

1I~~hy

chief, that was the Constitution of Ne\'~ Jersey.1I12 r10reover,
during the same strike, Big Bill Haywood, the fabled

I.l~.rJ.

was denied the right to speak in Paterson by the police.

leader,

Haywood

and approximately 1,000 men and women marched to Haledon, a small
township outside of Paterson, in order to hold a meeting.

A few feet

short of the Haledon line, the marchers were met by the Paterson
police who improperly arrested Haywood and another I.H.H. member for
disturbing the peace, acting disorderly, and holding an unlawful
assembly.
Dubofsky depicted the police as acting in accordance \'Iith the
interests of the employing class.

Still, the reader is left up in

the air over the burning question of, IIwhat forces influenced the
police to behave the way that they did?1I

Did the police receive

their marching orders from a mayor who was beholden to the
capitalist class?

~~ere

some of the police under the employ of the

mill owners? Dubofsky never tells us.
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Explanation by accusation is another way of dealing with the
relationship between the capitalist class and the police.
~·1ortimer's

Wyndham

description of the "Battle of Bulls Run" in 1937 between

the officers in the Flint,

~1ichigan

police department and the

members of the United Auto \~orkers Union exemplifies this approach. 13
According to t40rtimer, the Fl int pol ice preci pitated the fi rst
violence during a sit-down strike when they stopped a truck carrying
food to the strikers inside Fisher Plant Number Two.

Next, the

police attempted to force their way into the plant, thus starting
the "Ba.ttle of Bulls Run." The strikers inside the plant responded
by drenching the police with high-pressure fire hoses and by pelting
them with bottles, automobile door hinges, and other objects.

After

several charges by the police and six hours of water-fighting by the
strikers and some gun-play by the police, the Flint police \'/ithdrew
from the scene.
The reason for the police behavior in the "Battle of Bulls
Run," in

~~ortimer's

view, was the the police and the entire city

government were "subservient" to the General ~10tors Corporation. 14
Rather than supporting his explanation by limning the facets of the
rel ati onshi p between the pol i ce and General Motors,

~'ortimer

allowed his accusation to stand unsupported.
A third approach to studying the influence of the capitalist
class on the police might be termed the "personnel-overlap view."
Proponents of this view hold that the linkages between the economically dominant class and the state lie in particular positionholders. 15 Sidney Harring and Lorraine ~4cr4ullin utilized this
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approach in their investigation of the Buffalo, New York police. 16
They argued that the business-related occupational backgrounds of
the mayors and police commissioners in Buffalo accounted for the
police repression of labor unrest.
By itself this approach provides only a partial resolution to
the issue under consideration.

Once the investigator ascertains

that the position-holders are members of the dominant class, he/she
still must

exa~ine

their behavior in regard to issues and conflicts

in order to determi ne whether or not pm<ler was actually exerci sed
in accordance with mateY'ial interests. Then too, the researcher
must also find out how often the position-holders have been successful in overcoming opposition from other groups.17
Despite the limitations of the personnel-overlap approach, it
is very useful in ferreting out the

~aterial

interests of those who

are responsible for the formulation of police policy.

Hence, the

following proposition seems suitable for exploration:
I.

Police policy-makers, who have business occupational backgrounds, are predisposed to
favor a policy of repression of labor
radicalism.

A fourth way to look at the relationship between the capitalist
class and the police is to search for ideological convergence between
the two.

This approach assumes

t~at

if the police and the dominant

class share the same attitudes, then police actions will benefit the
capitalist class.

A prime example of this approach can be found in

Herbert Gutman's inspection of the causes of the Tompkins Square
Riot in New York City in 1874. 18 The New York police, under the
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direction of conservative businessmen and powerful political figures
who were serving as Police Commissioners, attacked a rally in
Tompkins Square of workers who were calling for enlarged public
works to aid the increasing numbers of jobless workers.

Gutman

reported that mounted police charged the peaceful gathering of
workers repeatedly, riding down and clubbing men, women, and children
in a very brutal display of the abuse of police power.
To explain the riotous behavior on the part of the police,
Gutman stressed police attitudes toward urban workers.

His thesis

was that both the police and the propertied urban classes adhered
to the belief system of laissez-faire capitalism.

One drawback of

Gutman's work is that he did not provide any evidence that the
rank-and-file police who administered the beatings to workers subscribed to the notions of a free market and individualism and
opposed the concept of public responsibility.

Instead he presented

only pro-capitalism statements from high ranking police officials
and newspaper reporters.

In addition, Gutman neglected to identify

the criteria he used for deciding that ideology was the crucial
factor underlying police behavior.

Although he indicated that the

Police Board was mainly comprised of wealthy entrepreneurs and
powerful political figures, Gutman implicitly relegated material
interests to secondary importance and elevated ideology to the level
of being the primary cause of the riot without providing a justification for his choice.
Notwithstanding the pitfalls of the ideological convergence
approach, it seems plausible

that~
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II.

The more siMilarity between the belief systems
of line police officers and the capitalist class.
the more likely that the police will implement a
policy of repression of labor radicalism.

In addition to these first three approaches to the study of the
relationship between police behavior and the capitalist class, there
are other ways in which the interests of the dominant class can
influence police response.

The political party affiliation of

elected officials in city government is another bridge between the
capitalist class and police operations. 19 Political parties have
served as mechanisms through which both the capitalists and the
workers have sought to control the mayor's office and the city
council.

Controlling these areas, in turn, has meant that a social

class possibly could exert influence on the police since the mayor
in many cities has had the formal responsibility of making police
policy and the city council has typically allocated resources and
drafted ordinances defining illegal conduct.
~Jith

regard to the Democratic Party, Roger Lane indicated that

there was a split on the Boston City Council in 1878 over the practice
of allowing police officers to be contracted out to employers during
strikes. 20 Lane reported that the workers' influence in the
Democratic Party was responsible for the divisions on the Council.
The working class had a fairly strong hold over the police and
other municipal agencies in cities where the Socialist Party was
powerful in the first part of the twentieth century.

James Weinstein

found that in 1912 alone Socialists held "some 1200 public offices in
340 municipalities from coast to coast, among them 79 mayors in 24
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states. 1121

One of the distinguishing marks of these socialist-run

cities was the curbing of police hostility toward strikers.

The city

government of i1i1waukee, Hisconsin in 1910-1911 is an example of
w6rker influence on police practices.

Labor gained access to the

police when Emil Seidel, a Socialist, and a Socialist-dominated
administration were elected to office in 1910.

During his term as

mayor, Seidel made it a point to see that the police respected
strikers' rights. 22
As for the Republican Party, it has commonly been presumed that
police operations are most likely to favor the capitalist class when
the Republican Party dominates city government.

However, studies

that support this assumption are difficult to uncover.

In fact,

Gutman found that a Republican mayor refused to heed the demands
from the business community to suppress labor disorders in Paterson,
New Jersey in the l870s. 23 r·10reover, the findings from Harring
and

study of Buffalo police seem to show that political
party was not an important determinant of police behavior. 24 Instead,
~1d1ul1in's

they asserted that political power shifted between Republicans and
Democrats regularly, but power was always held by businessmen and
police response was always somewhat repressive.
In view of the findings from these empirical studies, a
rather pessimistic assessment of the effects of the major political
parties on police policy seems in order. This assessment can be
expressed in the form of a nul1 11 statement.
II

III.

There will be no major differences between the
police policy pertaining to radical labor in a
Republican-controlled municipal administration
and police policy in a Democratic-controlled
municipal administration.
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Another linkage between class interests and the police derives
from the way that municipal

gove~nment

is structured.

Cyril Robinson

presented a sophisticated explanation of why the police, who have
been drawn from the working class, supported labor at times in the
nineteenth century, but were so often used by the capitalist class
to put down strikes and other types of action sponsored by the
working class in the twentieth century.25 According to him, at one
time the working class, through its ability to capture electoral
majorities, was able to exert considerable influence on the mayor
and, in turn, on the police who were under the mayor's authority.
Robinson took the position that the structural aspects of police
reform contributed to the tendency of the police to side with the
capitalist class.

Specifically, he stated that the creation of

civil service and administrative police boards weakened the control
of the mayors over the police and, in effect, insulated the police
from the working class.

Robinson's explanation is supported in

James Richardson's analysis of civil service, municipal reform, and
the po1ice. 26 Richardson cited civil service, the city manager and
commission forms of government, and at-large elections as all
reducing the capacity of the working class to direct police actions.*
*The working class did not passively allow their political
power to be taken from them. In the early 1900s Socialists
opposed attempts to institute city manager or commission forms of
government and attempts to substitute nonpartisan city-wide
elections for ward-based elections to city councils and school
boards. For a more complete description of working class
resistance to the municipal reform movement, see Bruce Stave
(ed.), Socialism and the Cities (Port Washington, N.Y.:
Kennikat Press, 1975).

28
Based on the thinking of Robinson and Richardson, it can be
expected that:
IV.

The process of institutionalizing reforms in
municipal government promotes a police policy
of repression of labor radicalism.

Up to this point, the discussion has dwelled upon the dependence
of municipal government on class interests.

This is only a partial

explanation of the relationship between class and state power.

A

first step toward a more flexible description of the interplay of
class and state interests is to realize that municipal authorities
may possess and exercise power that is relatively independent of the
capitalist class even though the general purpose of the state is to
preserve the coherence of capitalist society as a whole.

Stated

another way, there are times when the political power of the state
is lIendowed with a movement of its own. 1I27
Andrew Hopkins has gone so far as to state that big business
has had to give ground to lIother" interests under some circumst.anccs.*28
He made this assertion in connection with a discussion of the problem
of accounting for criminal laws such as antitrust la\'Is which are
inimical to the interests of powerful groups.

According to Hopkins,

the way to deal with this problem is simple--admit that business
interests can be and sometimes are over-ridden by other classes,
°
toions, ~n d lns
°
tOt
organlza
1 Uto10ns. 29
*Stephen D. Krasner's interpretation of U.S. oil policy toward
the Middle East supports the view that the state can be an autonomous
force. Krasner's analysis of four select episodes involving the U.S.
government in the t·1i ddl e East duri ng the peri od of 1951 through the
1970s indicated that the government has endorsed policies that have
been opposed by the oil industry. For a more detailed account of
the state as an autonomous entity, see Stephen D. Krasner, IIA
Statist Interpretation of American Oil Policy Toward the r~iddle East,"
Political Science Quarterly, 95 (Spring, 1979), pp. 77-97.
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This same line of reasoning is applicable to understanding the
po 1i ce response to 1abor unrest.

~Ihen

one di scovers instances where

police policy and actions are harmful to the capitalist class, there
should be a search for antagonisms between class and state interests.*
Clashes between the capitalist class and governmental authorities can
be expected to have a moderating effect on police policy.

The

following relationship between class-state conflict and police
response should hold:
V.

A high level of conflict between class and state
interests promotes a police policy of toleration
of labor radicalism.

Patterns of Labor Discontent and Police Response
Collective action by radical labor unions and other organs of
the working class has probably affected police organizations and
behavior in a variety of ways.

For one thing, the modern urban

police system in the United States was created partially in reaction
to the labor-related disorders of the 18305, 18405. and 1850s.
Beyond this fact, however, not much attention has been given to
studying the ways in which working class organizations have altered
the structure and activities of police institutions.
In part, this void in our knowledge about the impact of
working class collective action on the police is due to the "fallacy
of elitism"** which is reflected in many police studies.

This

*A more fully developed discussion of state activities that
may threaten the class system can be found in Roberta Ash Garner's
Social Change (Chicago: Rand McNally Publishing Company, 1977),
pp. 259-262.
**The fallacy of elitism consists of conceiving human groups in
terms of the upper strata. See David Hackett Fisher, Historians
Fallacies (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 230-232.
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fallacy has been prominent in the writings of police experts such as
August Vollmer, O. W.

l~i1son,

and James Q. Ui1son.

These authors have

tended to conceptualize the development of the police in terms of the
ability of police administrators to dominate all aspects of police
work.
To counteract the elitism in police studies, scholars need to
look into the ways in which the power of an insurgent, organized
working class can be a determinant of police response.

Charles Til1y·s

observations on the relationship between the power of movement
organizations and the actions of authorities provide some insight
into this matter. 3D He averred that power begets respect from
authorities.

In other words, if a labor union has a considerable

amount of power (i.e., a large membership and/or the ability to
exercise major say on issues deemed of importance to its interests),
the authorities will at least tolerate the union·s activities for
fear of incurring losses or costs from confrontations.

Conversely,

if organized labor is weak, it is likely to receive the "fu11
force of the 1aw.

II

Data from at least two studies suggest that the type of policy
the police follow may be related to the perceived likelihood that
labor can apply its resources to make its interests prevail over
those of the capitalist class.

C'laude Hoffman discovered that
there was an "amassingll of police during a "reign of terror ll against
the United Auto Workers· local 663 in Anderson, Indiana in 1937. 31
One gets the impression from reading Hoffman·s narrative that a sort
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of "Thermidorian reaction"* took place in Anderson at a time of
retrenchment for labor following the defeat of local 663's sitdown strike.

A similar situation has been described by Gutman in
his treatment of the Tompkins Square outrage. 32 Gutman portrayed
the period after the Tompkins Square Riot as one of extreme police
repression.
The main theme in the empirical research as well as in Tilly's
conceptual work can be expressed in this hypothesis:
VI.

A dramatic decline in the power of a radical
labor organization can lead to a police
policy of repression.

A qualification should be added to this discussion of police
response and labor power.

Police response may depend on the stability

of the political-economic system.

While certain policies, strategies,

and tactics can be anticipated \'/hen a system is stable, other types
of police response may occur during a "revolutionary situation." A
revolutionary situation or a state of "dual power" might begin when
a government previously under the control of a single, sovereign
polity becomes partially controlled by workers who mobilize into a
power bloc that rivals the official government. 33 In a revolutionary
situation labor itself may exercise enough control over the state apparatus to determine police policy.

Under a state of dual pOIJ/er, police

policy may be markedly different from \'Jhat it is under usual conditions.
*The term "Thermidor" is the name given to the warmest season of
the year by the leaders of the French Revolution. On 9th Termidor of
the second year of the French Revolution (1794), the revolutionary
leader Robespierre was deposed. The next day he was executed, thus
ending one phase of revolution and commencing another phase. The
period involving the suppression of radicals has been referred to
as the "Thermidorian Reaction." See Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick,
Sociology, 5th Ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 599.
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VII.

Toleration and/or facilitation are likely to
become adopted as police policies in a
revolutionary situation.

Moving from poi ice policies to police strategies, it should
be stressed that social action by the working class may be a decisive
force in molding police response.

Donald Black's writings on the

impact of social conflict on policing strategies provide an idea as
to how labor-business conflict may be related to police strategy.34
He proposed that "government-initiated" or "proactive" strategies
are disproportionately used by police when there is a high level of
conflict between the "authority system and those subject to it.,,35
According to Black, this is so because proactive strategies contribute
more to the perpetuation of systems of social stratification than do
"citizen-initiated" or reactive strategies.

He asserted that ideally

decision-making in the form of citizen complaints cancels itself out
in reactive strategies (i.e., citizen complaints are evenly distributed
across groups in a stratified order), while a decision by the police
to initiate action reflects police biases and to some extent the
interests of those in superordinate positions of authority over the
police.
With respect to labor-business conflict, some historical evidence
lends credence to Black's predictions.

There have been several recorded

instances where the police have concentrated on weakening labor's
capacity to mobilize resources.

For example, the police illegally

confiscated a sound truck belonging to the United Auto Workers in
Anderson, Indiana during one of the heated battles between the C.I.O.
and the auto industry.36 Police also worked on labor's ability to
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mobilize resources during the prelude to the Tompkins Square affair in
New York. 37 The New York police first went on the offensive by turning
down the parade route proposed by the organizers of the demonstration.
Also, the Police Board ordered the patrolmen to arrest anyone trying
to persuade workingmen to participate in the parade.

After the

parade was cancelled and a site was chosen for a street meeting, the
Police Board intervened again by convincing the Department of Parks
to void the permit to meet in Tompkins Square.

Besides these

examples of proactive strategy, police raids following the riot
influenced workers to stay away from other meetings and organizing
drives.

All of these proactive efforts by the New York police

occurred at a time of intense conflict involving labor radicals and
big business.
By translating Black's authority-relations terminology into
the language of class analysis and by extrapolating from the data in
two related studies, the following proposition has been formulated:
VIII.

The higher the level of labor unrest, the more
likely it is that there will be an emphasis on
proactive strategies.

Reactive strategies are also likely to be employed in times
of worker dissatisfaction and agitation.

These types of strategies

tend to favor the dominant class because the creation and application
of many laws that stipulate the forms of behavior that the police
must deal with in reactive police \'1ork reflect the interests of the
capitalist class.

The historical record is replete with instances

where the pol i ce have enforced "speci al" 1aws that \'lere desi gned to
break strikes and to undermine community support for organized labor.
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Criminal syndicalism 1aws* and city ordinances prohibiting freedom of
speech are two blatant examples of these types of laws.
As for the application of laws already in existence, it is
important to remember that discriminatory law enforcement is a result
of differences in po\'/er and that decisions as to \'/hose behavior is
criminal are expressions of power.38 The extent to \oJhich some laws
are enforced more frequently or more rigidly in regard to a given
social class is, however, an empirical question.
To analyze the process whereby reactive strategies are brought
into use, it is beneficial to take the t·1arxian thesis of the "criminalization of surplus

1abo~~*into

account. Marxists contend that

the capitalist class depends upon the existence of a relatively free,
apolitical surplus labor force in order to break strikes and to keep
wages 1m'l.

It follows that attempts by radical labor unions to

broaden the scope of their mobilization efforts and, as a consequence,
to politicize portions of the surplus labor force are likely to be
opposed by the capitalist class. This opposition may be reflected
*Criminal syndicalism laws defined almost every basic tenet of
I.W.W. ideology as a crime. Hence, anyone who advocated l~obbly ideas
by speech, writing, publication, or display became ipso facto a
criminal. For a more complete discussion of criminal syndicalism
laws, see Eldridge F. Dowell, "A History of Criminal Syndicalism
Legislation in the United States," The Johns Hoekins univerSit"
Studies in Historical and Political Science Serles, LVII, No.
(Baltimore, 1939).
**For a more thorough explication of the idea of the "criminalization of the surplus labor force," see Richard Henry Ta\,/ney,
The A rarian Problem in the Sixteenth Centur (New York: Harper and
Row, 1967. Steven Spitzer a so stated a rief argument of this
kind. See Steven Spitzer, "Toward a t·1arxian Theory of Deviance,"
Social Problems, 22, 5 (June, 1975), pp. 638-651.
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in the enforcement of laws covering types of behavior in which some
people in the surplus labor force tend to engage.

More

specifica1~y)

the police may begin to treat potential union members who are also
part of the surplus labor force as being criminals in order to impair
the mobilization efforts of radical labor.
Sidney Harring conducted one of the few inquiries into the
phenomenon of the criminalization of surplus labor. 39 Harring
described how the Buffalo police, acting under the Tramp Acts of
1885, indiscriminately arrested tramps, beggars, hobos, vagrants,

unemployed persons, and workers.

~10re

importantly, he claimed that

the Tramp Acts served as a tool for the police to repress Count
Rybakowski's tramp army* which appealed to many of the groups whose
members were arrested under the Tramp Acts.
Harring and McMullin's analysis of labor unrest and the efforts
of the police to control workers in Buffalo, New York from 1872-1900
contains empirical data that bear on the issue of discriminatory law
enforcement. 40 They discovered that the level of strike activity was
positively related to the proportion of laborers arrested as opposed
to persons of other occupations.

Arrest rates for "pubiic order

offenses,"** in particular, were reported to have been affected by
fluctuations in the level of strike activity.
*Count Joseph Rybakowski's army consisted of Polish and
Bohemian canal workers from Chicago, Illinois, who marched from
there to Buffalo, tJew York, demanding jobs and public relief.
**Vagrancy, tramps, disorderly conduct, and the like are
examples of public order offenses.
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The following propositions summarize the relevant features of
the conceptual and empirical work on the police and the utilization
of reactive strategies in dealing with radical labor:
IX.

x.

A broadening of the scope of mobilization by labor
is likely to be countered with the criminalization
of segments of the surplus labor force by the police.
A high level of labor unrest is likely to be met
with the criminalization of segments of the regular
labor force.

The relationship between labor unrest and the use of preventive
strategies appears to be quite different from the relationship between
labor actions and other types of police strategies.

Since a pre-

ventive strategy often involves police intervention into aspects of
the lives of human beings--especially working class people--that had
not previously been under the watch of the police, it is possible
that there will be resentment and opposition on the part of the group
or class of persons whose lives will be more closely regulated. 4l
Hence, a time of labor unrest is hardly the most propitious moment
to introduce preventive strategies.
XI.

Rather, it is probable that:

The lower the level of labor unrest, the greater
the emphasis on preventive strategies.

Like collective action by the police, police mobilization may
be affected by labor unrest.

It is logical to assume that unrest

may lead the police to accumulate more resources, to devise special
plans, and to institutionalize organizational arrangements which
facilitate the rapid deployment of police to the scene of labor
problems.
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Harring and

r1c~1ullin's

study of the Buffalo police is one of the

few sources of information on the interaction between labor's activities
and police mobilization. 42 Their research highlighted the fact that
the size of the Buffalo police department increased as more men and
money poured into the agency to fight labor wars. They reported that
"labor problems" were repeatedly cited as the reason for providing
more resources to the police.

Additionally, Harring and McMullin

noted that there was an emphasis on a platoon system with a reserve
to handle riots and labor disputes rather than on a patrol system
for crime control.
To ascertain the generalizeability of findings from Harring and
r~d·1ullin's

research, these two propositions need to be explored:

XII.

The higher the level of labor unrest, the larger
the size of the police department.

XIII.

Special modifications in the organizational
arrangements and practices of police departments
are likely to accompany high levels of labor
unrest.

Community Influence on Police Response
Community influence may be transmitted to the police through
individuals, groups, or organizations.

Norms and standards, expec-

tations about the selective enforcement of laws and pressures for
changes in operating procedures, and input about the creation of
laws and ordinances are all components of community influence.

The

community influences the police either directly as in the situation
of corporations paying the salaries of "special police"* or indirectly
*Special police were sworn and uniformed police with the full
powers of the r."lunic;pal police. They \'/ere hired, paid, and directed
by private concerns.
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through the mayor's office and other units of government that are
instrumental in determining police functions.
A key issue in the study of police-community relations centers
on the relationship of community to other sources of influence on the
police.

Gutman emphasized that many historians have subscribed to

the view that from the start, industrialists and big businessmen have
had the social and political clout and prestige to match their
economic power and that they controlled towns and police forces. 43
Stated another way, it has often been proposed that from the beginning
in America, there has existed a close relationship between social
status, political power, and economic class and that business interests
have been able to direct police operations according to their every
whim.
Two recently published studies cast doubt on the validity of
this view.

In one of the most comprehensive analyses of police--

community relations in American Cities, Richardson identified the
climate of community opinion toward a labor dispute, not economic
class, as being the key factor in determining whose side the police
44
were on.
Gutman reached a similar conclusion in his more general
inquiry on class, status, and community in industrializing America. 45
He summarized his findings in the proposition that economic power
was

n~:

easily translated into social and political power in the

nineteenth century.
Another important issue in police-community relations involves
the areas of policing that are most likely to be affected by community
expectations and pressures.

Wilson, in his classic study of police
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behavior. indicated that community choices tend to have a great effect
on police personnel. budgets, pay levels, and organization. 46 He
strongly implied that, in general, the community exercises more
influence on police mobilization than on police policy regarding
collective action by the police.
In another study, Hilson stressed that there is apt to be some
conflict or difference of opinion about police operations in heterogeneous communities. 47 For example, racial or ethnic minority
citizens may feel differently about proposals to add more police or
to allow the police to use more powerful weaponry than white AngloAmerican citizens.

The implication of this observation, while not

entirely clear. may be that there is "strength in numbers" so far
as the likelihood of minority groups influencing police functions
is concerned.
Some data bearing on the subject of heterogeneous communities
and influence over the police can be found in Gutman's research on
Paterson, New Jersey.48 He described the curious situation in
Paterson where Benjamin Buckley, a Republican mayor, used his po\'1er
over the police to suppress only violent labor disorders in the
1870s.

This upset members of the economically dominant class who

tried to pressure the city authorities to enlarge the police force
and to limit the strikers' use of the streets and their freedom of
action.

But the Democratic Board of Aldermen upheld the Republican

mayor on both counts.

~1ore

than that. respected and powerful groups

in the ethnically mixed Paterson community refused to support the
industrialists in labor disputes.

The "bottom line" in the case of
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Paterson seemed to be that the existence of vital subcultures among
the immigrant and native American poor served as a source of staunch
opposition to the power of the emerging upper class.
Based on the work of Wilson and Gutman, it can be expected
that:
XIV.

In heterogeneous communities, the presence of
large numbers of economic and ethnic minorities
may limit the capacity of the police to mobilize
resourcas to use against labor.

One of the more interesting facets of the relationship between
the community and police response involves the use of violent tactics
by the pol i ce.

Oberscha 11 predi cted that ci vi 1ian casua 1ti es wi 11 be

high during periods of "red scare" when public opinion favors the
repression of discontented groups.49 He implied that more civilians
are ki 11 ed in these s i tuati ons because soci a1 control agents know
that they will not be held accountable for their actions by the
community.

Harring, Platt, Speiglman, and Takagi offered another

explanation of police killings.

According to them, political/power

variables account for fluctuations in the rates of police ki11ings. 50
To support this claim, they cited the dramatic increase in the
number of civilian deaths (especially of black citizens) caused by
the pol ice beb/een 1962 and 1969, a peri od of i ntense pol i ti ca 1
struggle.
Both of these explanations have direct and clear applications
to the study of the police response to labor problems.

Although

neither explanation is necessarily incongruent with the other one,
each explanation emphasizes the importance of a certain type of
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factor in influencing police violence.

The following proposition

needs to be examined before any judgments can be made about the
adequacy of the positions of Oberschall or Harring and his
colleagues:
XV.

The level of police violence against radical
labor will be higher during periods of intense
1 abor unrest than during peri ods of "Red Scare"
(\'Jhen public fear and hysteria about radicalism
encourage repression.)*

The community's reaction to police violence is another
potentially important aspect of community influence.

Hilliam

Gamson indicated that the best way for the authorities to maintain
community support is to match their means of social control with the
"trust orientation" of the opposition group.51

He postulated that

if the authorities use persuasion when dealing with groups that
trusted them, sanctions and inducements with groups that were neutral,
and insulation or repression with alienated groups, then the
authorities would minimize the chances of adverse community reaction.
Conversely, when the authorities select means of social control that
are incongruent with the status of the opposition group's trust
orientation, then it becomes more costly for the authorities to deal
with the oPPosition group because of negative community reaction.
What costs are likely to accrue to the authorities? Ted Gurr
provided some ideas on the costs of choosing incongruent means of
social control. 52 He maintained that inappropriate means of control,
*Labor unrest and public fear about radicalism may exist
together. Hence, those interested in examining proposition 15
may need to search for periods when one of these phenomena was
present and the other was not present.
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if used by the authorities, will enhance the legitimacy of discontented groups and detract from the legitimacy of the authorities
in the eyes of the community.

Some community groups, according to

Gurr, may even respond to unnecessary police violence by assisting
or joining in with the opposition group.
At least one piece of evidence seems to support the "sketchy"
notions of Gamson and Gurr.

From Irving Bernstein's account of the

police response to the Ford Hunger March* in Dearborn, Michigan on
March 7, 1932, it appears that police actions brought a result
opposite to that which was planned. 53 After a crowd of approximately
3,000 unemployed workingmen had peacefully paraded from do\'mtown
Detroit to the Dearborn city line, Dearborn police blocked the road
and tried to stop the marchers with tear gas.

Returning the fire

\,/ith stones and 1umps of frozen di rt, the demonstrators advanced
further down the road until they reached an open field where speakers
addressed the crowd.

The police, licking their wounds, opened point-

black fire on the demonstrators with pistols and machine guns,
killing three marchers and seriously wounding about 50 others.

The

Communist leaders of the March capitalized on the police "overkill"
by producing a funeral extravaganza for the four martyrs.

A band

played the funeral dirge of the 1905 Russian Revolution, a cortege
of 10,000 persons participated in a march to the cemetery, and a
crowd of 30,000 gathered to hear Red orators verbally blast
capitalism.
*The Ford Hunger t4arch was a demonstrati on in favor of jobs,
higher wages, fewer hours, and other improvements in working
conditions.
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Research on the effects of the excessive use of police force
on student demonstrators and others has documented similar outcomes.
One study of Kent State University students' protest and sociopolitical activity before and after the "Kent State

~1assacre"

on

~·1ay 4, 1970 lends support to the ideas of Gamson and Gurr. 54

Utilizing self-reports of students' political activity, Raymond Adamek
and Jerry Lewis collected data that indicated that exposure to extreme
social control violence may have had a "radicalizing" effect on
participants.

In another study of the police and student demon-

strators, Allen Barton found that the use of excessive force at
Columbia University increased the sympathy of "third parties"
(i .e., faculty and students) for the demonstrator's tactics. 55
For situations in which the police utilize incongruent means
of control that are overly coercive, the net effect probably is to
make the police task of controlling labor unrest more difficult.
The next proposition, however, deals with an "intermediate" phase
in the interactive process which links excessive police violence
to the aggravation of police problems in dealing with labor.
XVI.

The use of excessive force is likely to
radicalize third parties to the class struggle
between the capitalist and working classes.

But what if the community never learns about the police use of
incongruent means of control or is misinformed about how social control
is carried out? This is where the communications media come into the
making of police response.

Michael Lipsky has emphasized that the

media are an extremely powerful community institution that affect the
authorities' actions. 56 The media grant or withhold publicity on
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police activities, select the information that most of the community
will have on police-related issues, and decide what alternatives
the conmunity \'/i11 consider in response to civic affairs.
t~hat

determines the ideas, issues, and choices that are

presented by the media?

From a strict t1arxian vieNpoint, it might

be held that newspaper editors and other media representatives
produce news that augments their own material interests.
a somewhat vulgar and overly-deterministic stance.

This is

Harvey Molotch

has developed a plainer conceptualization of the class bias of the
· POSl. t lon
. lS
. th at th ere are severa 1 reasons why
. 57 HlS
. b
me dlao
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the mass media in the United States have been under the control of
the capitalist class.

First, the owners of the newspapers and the

television and radio stations are themselves either members of the
capitalist class or aspire to such membership.

Second, the revenues

of the media are heavily dependent upon advertisements and grants
from the capitalist class. Third, the capitalist class is the single
most important social influence on the national government which,
through its regulatory agencies and through the courts, controls
the media.

Fourth, the capitalist class is the most important force

in structuring the national ideology through mechanisms such as
education, voluntary associations, religious organizations, theatre,
etc.--the other media that socialize news producers and news
consumers.
In addition to material interests, community responses to
media content must be examined if a full account of the relationship
is to be given of the impact of the media on the police.

While a
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newspaper may share the capitalist class's belief in the "free enterprise system," this belief may not become articulated in print.

Then

too, community members may not respond to a news article or an
editorial in the manner desired by the editor.

In short. the

community or parts of it may resist manipulation by the media.
Donald Sofchalk's analysis of the interplay between the police,
the press, and the community following the Chicago r1emorial Day
Incident* is instructive in the regard of media influence. 58 Prior
to the Incident, public opinion favored labor.

Yet. the public's

reaction to the Incident was to hold the strikers and their C.I.O.
leaders responsible for the violence that occurred.

Sofcha1k

attributed this shift in community attitudes to the news media1s
unbalanced accounts of the event.

The picture painted by the

Chicago Daily Tribune and other local papers represented only the
police version of what happened.

Headlines such as "Riots Blamed

on Red Chiefs" served to concentrate public attention on "outside"
agitators and other "radicals" who had allegedly planned the entire
affair.

When one places the media's biased performance in historical

perspective, the "power of the press" appears somewhat staggering.
If Sofchalk's analysis is correct, then the decade's most spectacular,
single occurrence of industrial war failed to provoke any support for
labor, in part, because of the fallacious and misleading content of
the Chicago newspapers!
*The Chi cago ~1emori a1 Day Inci dent i nvo 1ved a c1 ash between
1,500 workers on strike from the Little Steel plant and 300 members
of the Chicago Police Department on Memorial Day, 1937. ~Jhen
several stones were thrown at the police, they responded by shooting
6 persons dead and by brutally attacking the workers with enough
force to wound 58 persons.
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Another example of the ability of the press to shape public
opinion is the encouragement offered for acts of police violence
against tramps by the papers in Buffalo, New York in the 1890s. 59
The Buffalo media were at least partially responsible for the public
clamor for strengthened and more repressive anti-tramp measures.
Still another case in point is the propaganda contest waged between
the established newspapers and the Arbeiter Zeitung, an Anarchist
paper, in Chicago in the 1880s.

While the larger newspapers damned

the A.F.L.·s campaign to win the eight hour day as IIcommunism, lurid
and rampant,II60 the Anarchist media fanned the flames of worker unrest and denounced the police for shooting strikers. 61 In the end,
the major press seems to have been more successful since public
sentiment was polarized against the Anarchists after the Haymarket
Riot.*
The main themes of the above analysis of the media and police
response can be expressed as a set of propositions.
XVII.

XVIII.

The more the media is dependent upon the
capitalist class, the more likely that the
media content will be supportive of police
policies, strategies, and tactics that
benefit the capitalist class.
The more biased the media content in favor of
the capitalist class, the more supportive the
community is likely to be of police policies,
strategies, and tactics that benefit the
capitalist class.

*The Haymarket Riot took place May 4, 1886 in Haymarket
Square in Chicago. Police killings outnumbered citizen killings
of police about two or three to one, after a bomb was thrown at
the police.
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XIX.

The more strongly the community supports a police
response that serves the interests of the
capitalist class, the more likely that such a
response will be implemented.

The Factor of the Police in Police Response
Besides class interests, state interests, and community
influences, the police themselves shape police response.

Role

conflicts, police organizational characteristics, and police attitudes
all affect police behavior.

Generally, these aspects of police

response have been dealt with separately by students of the police;
there have been few attempts to develop a conceptual framework that
links psychological and organizational variables to broader social
structural bases of action.*
~'larxian

social theory, with its emphasis on structural environ-

ments, allows for the incorporation of empirical data from some of
the benchmark studies of Wilson, Skolnick, and others, while it
directs attention to social class as a determinant of police response.
With regard to role conflict and police response, the interface of
class and occupation as sources of identity for police officers
seems to be a useful but overlooked area of inquiry.

A central

contradiction of police work is that even though the police have
been recruited from the working class, they have been saddled with
the task of policing the \'1orking class.

It is reasonable to expect

*One of the few attempts to develop such an analytical framework was made by Clayton A. Hartjen. Hartjen abstracted findings
from criminological research on the police and reinterpreted them
from a perspective of social order and interpersonal interaction.
See Clayton A. Hartjen, "Po1ice-Citizen Encounters," Criminology,
10, 1 (r1ay, 1972), pp. 61-84.
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that when an officer, who views himself as being a IIworker as well as
ll

a police "professional" intervenes into a labor dispute, he/she may
make certain compromises, accommodations, or even concessions to
organized labor.
From the point of view of police administrators and other city
. authorities, it may be necessary to thwart these tendencies by
building the officer's commitment to the police occupation.

How can

occupational commitment be increased for those working in police
organizations? Harring found that high salaries, military discipline, and an emphasis on neutrality were used to encourage loyalty
among rank and file police officers in Buffalo, New York during the
labor strife of the late 1800s. 62
In order to guage when commitment mechanisms such as those
identified by Harring and

~1c:-.1ullin

are likely to be stressed in

police departments, it is useful to explore the applications of the
concepts of "alienation and "dual power structure.
ll

II

In regard to

these concepts, it can be postulated that a person is most apt to
change role affiliations after he or she becomes alienated or withdraws from an established social system and after he or she becomes
aware of the existence of a competing system that has about the same
amount of power (i .e., a dual power structure).

The implication for

police mobilization is that commitment to the police occupation may
be in jeopardy when the police become alienated from their \'wrk and
when labor organizations accumulate sufficient power to compete for
their loyalties.
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The following relationship is predicted

bet\~een

the amount of

power possessed by labor and police mobilization:
XX.

In situations where radical labor has amassed
a considerable amount of power, there is likely
to be an emphasis on "convnitment mechanisms"
(e.g., salaries, discipline, neutrality ethic,
etc.) in police departments.

In terms of organizational characteristics, professionalization
should make a difference in police response.

There are bolO con-

trasting positions on the effects of professionalization on response.
Oberschall suggested that a professional police department is less
likely to engage in unnecessary violence than is a non-professional
one. 63 He reasoned that if a department has clearly spelled-out
guidelines for the use of force and its leadership exercises control
over rank and file officers, then the department will be more
accountable.

A high degree of accountability, in turn, should reduce

the level of police violence, according to Oberschall.
The Center for Research on Criminal Justice assumed a different
posture. 64 It contended that the introduction of police reforms such
as professionalism has not diminished the importance of the "iron
fist" side of the police function.

Instead they viewed profession-

alism as being the "velvet glove" side of policing, the side that
serves to obscure and to legitimize the violent, coercive aspects
of the other side of the police role.

In sum, the Center's position

is that a professionalized police force is not less violent than an
unprofessionalized one.
The relationship between professionalization and violence is
probably more complex than either position indicates.

Perhaps the
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most critical issue has been all but ignored.

That issue revolves

around the notion of the "locus of control" over the police.* It is
logical to think that the nature of police response depends, to some
degree, on whether control is "internal" or "external."

In fact,

the writings of several police experts suggest that police violence
can ,only be reduced when the pol ice are controll ed by forces outsi de
of police organizations.

Skolnick, for one, criticized the idea that

the answer to the problem of accountability lies in the improvement
of internal police administration. 65 Instead of internal control
over the police, Skolnick opted for external control in the form of
the "rul e of law."** In a similar manner,

~Ja1ker

argued that

external means of control (e.g., community control and civilian
review boards) promote public accountabi1ity.66
If we accept the line of reasoning advanced by Skolnick and
Wa 1ker, the key questi on becomes, "ho'l' is pol ice profess i ana 1ism
related to the institutionalization of external mechanisms for
controlling police behavior in police departments?" Judging from
the historical development of police professionalism, it does not
appear that the professiona1ization has been accompanied by the
introduction of external means of control.

To the contrary, controls

over the police have developed largely within the structure of police
departments. 67 This should not be surprising given the "manageria1"
*Oberscha11 made a passing reference to this issue. See
Anthony Oberscha1l, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 338.
**The term "rule of 1aw," as used by Skolnick, refers to the
rights of individual citizens and the legal constraints upon the
police. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 6.
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conception of professionalism that was promoted in the early battles
against police corruption. To translate this managerial view of
professionalism into actual police practices, efficiency-minded
IIprofessionalizers attempted to enhance the power of police
li

executives, to install centralized rational administrative procedures,
and to improve the quality of the police officer. 68
One of the costs of developing a professional code based upon
a model of administrative efficiency has been the increasing insulation of the police from the community.

Hhereas the centralization

of power and authority and the use of impersonal management techniques may have improved the efficiency of police departments!
these same features have tended to cut the police off from the
influence of the working class and the labor movement. 69 On a more
general level, it appears that the professionalization of the police
may have so undermined the capacity of the police to be accountable
to external controls that in the year 1979 it has become exceedingly
difficult to provide a solid answer to the question, IIwho controls
the police?lI*
Returning to the matter of the relationship between police
professionalism and the level of police violence, a proposition
specifying the type of control seems to be in order.
*The police are not unique in terms of being relatively
immune from external regulation. Magalf Larson's account of the
process by which professions emerge illuminates the fact that all
professions seek autonomy; this autonomy tends to insulate them
from the public and from political authorities. See Magali
Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociolo ical Anal sis,
{Berkeley, Ca 1 .: nlverslty 0 a 1 ornla ress,
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XXI.

No marked differences are expected in the level
of police violence against radical labor between
professionalized police departments in which only
internal controls are present and non-professionalized police departments.

A final factor that shapes the police response in human
volition.

The attitudes, values, and experiences of individual

officers are important in determining how the police react to strikes,
parades, and other contentious gatherings sponsored by organized
labor.
How does one go about studying the role of individual police
officers in labor wars? To study the human factor in any kind of
situation, Frederick Teggart, the noted philosopher of history,
stressed that mental and physical activity are, in large part, due
to the occupational, social, and geographical surroundings in which
one finds himself or herself. 70 Skolnick's investigation of how
the occupational environment of policing molds a set of cognitive
tendencies among police exemplifies the approach suggested by
TeggartJl

One of Skolnick's main contentions \oJas that police

officers become very supportive of the status quo by virtue of
enforcing the law.

He argued that to believe in their task and to

appear consistent to themselves, police become extremely conservative.

For some officers who rigidly adhere to conservative

ideas, it may be necessary to view the proponents of opposing
ideological positions such as radicals as being "dangerous, immoral
devils." Walter t1iller labeled this as constituting a mental state
of "fdEm logi ca 1 i ntens i fi ca ti on. 72
II
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In a similar \'1ay, the police occupation seems to foster antilabor attitudes among patrol officers.

In fact, Skolnick maintained

that handling labor disputes is one of the best examples of situations
inclining the police to support the status quo. 73 In these situations,
the responsibilities of their job lead the police to see striking,
picketing, militant workers as disturbing the order that they are
charged with maintaining.

Some rare bits of information on the anti-

labor bias of police have been recorded by Harold Ickes, who was an
attorney in Chicago for part of his career.

Here is how he described

the handling of clashes between employers and workers between 1886
and the 1930s by the Chicago Police.
The Augean stables emanated delicate perfume compared
with some of the odors that have been redolent in this
Department in the past. From the time of the Haymarket
Riots (1886) in Chicago, police always justified the
brutal invasion of civil rights by calling those whom
it manhandled lanarchists."74
Besides the studies on the anti-radical and anti-labor attitudes
of police, other research has documented the ethnic and racial prejudice of some officers.* Interview data collected by the "LaFollette
Committee,"** for instance, indicated that the police in the late
1930s regarded participants in picket· lines and C.I.O. demonstrators
as being either "misguided" foreigners or Conmunists. 75
*For an overview of the literature on racial attitudes in
police departments, see Don C. Gibbons, Society, Crime, and Criminal
Careers, 3rd. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1977), pp. 75-76.
**The LaFollette Conmittee was a subconmittee set up by the
Senate Conmittee on Education and Labor to counteract illegal interference with worker's civil rights through espionage, provocation,
and organized violence. The subcommittee was chaired by Senator
Robert M. LaFollette, Jr. of Wisconsin.
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How do police attitudes relate to police response? They are
related in that the police may overreact in handling events of
collective action, if they hold erroneous views about the workers,
radicals, or ethnic group members who are participating in the
actionJ6 Furthermore, police behavior may become particularly overzealous and unwarranted if the targets of police reaction possess
the combined characteristics of ethnicity, union membership, and
radical politics.
The police activities in Weirton, West Virginia on October 7,
1919 offer an illustrative example of what can happen when there is
a confluence of these factors.

Weirton police rounded up 150

Finnish Americans, marched them to the public square, and forced
them to kneel and kiss the United States' flag; then, the police
drove them out of town.

Police authorities justified their actions

by pointing out that the 150 persons were the chief agitators in a
steel strike and were suspected of being members of a radical group
in Finland. 77
The type of overreaction exhibited by the Weirton police would
definitely classify as the use of "incongruent means of social
control.

It seems that attitudes may be an important factor in

II

determining inappropriate and seemingly irrational responses by the
police.

Based on the above-described ideas about police attitudes

and on Gamson's conceptualization of incongruent means, it is
anticipated that:
XXII.

Police who possess erroneous and extremely
biased attitudes against an ethnic group, a
labor organization, and/or a particular
political ideology are more prone to utilize
incongruent and excessively violent tactics
than police who do not possess such attitudes.
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Conclusion
This framework may be considered to represent one theoretical
orientation to the study of the police response to labor radicalism.
In the course of developing the framework there has been an attempt
to avoid some of the pitfalls of "vulgar" r·1arxism. The state has
been viewed as the terrain on which struggles between classes and
groups are fought, rather than as the always faithful servant of the
capitalist class.* Then too, there has been a recognition of the
ways in which the community as \'1ell as the police themselves may
affect police response.

As a whole, the frame\'1ork is intended to

be a more encompassing and nuanced view of the police role in class
conflict involving labor radicals than has been constructed
heretofore.

*David Greenberg criticized Richard Quinney, the ~1arxian
criminologist, for failing to appreciate the fact that stateorganized crime control policies may be adopted in response to
pressure from classes othe~' than the capitalist class. See
Greenberg's review of Quinney's Class, State, and Crime in
Crime and Delinguency, 25, 1 (January, 1979), pp. 110-113.
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THEY SHOOT WOBBLIES, DON'T THEY?

CHAPTER III
THE SEATTLE AND PORTLAND POLICE AND
THE LABOR RADICALS, 1912-1920
The Research Problem
Nobody appears to know why the average officer can't
keep his temper in dealing with crowds, but he can't.
There was no need to club anybody; there was no need to
curse anybody; there was no need to shout and rave and
kick and pull and yank, for that crowd was willing to
do what the officers ordered it to do, but the officers
went wild, as they have done before ••. 1
This excerpt from a newspaper editorial on the subject of a
police attack upon free-speech fighters in Portland on October 29,
1913 is indicative of the disquietude of laypersons and academicians
alike over the apparent irrationality and inexplicability of police
behavior in encounters with radicals.

Some scholars have even

suggested that police violence is both arbitrary and personalized. 2
Another point of view on police encounters with labor radicals
has been explicated in the theoretical framework of this dissertation.
A central contention of this perspective is that the urban police
function is best understood in terms of political and economic
interests, power relations, and class conflict.

Then,too, it is

assumed that police actions are, to a large extent, structured by
the political nature of the police institution as it exists within
municipal government and by the class position of the police as
workers.

Implicit in this perspective on police behavior is the
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idea that seemingly irrational police actions are in fact, rational
responses to the police-community situation.
The purpose of the present inquiry was to explore and to
analyze the phenomenon of the police response to labor radicalism
in Portland, Oregon and Seattle, Washington during the period of
1912-1920.

Although it was assumed that political, economic, and

social factors shaped the ways in which the police in these two
cities dealt with members of the Industrial

I~orkers

of the World

(I.W.W.) and other labor radicals, the question of whether or not
this was the case \'1ith regard to the actions of the Seattle and
Portland police in the early twentieth century is an empirical issue.
It is hoped that some light can be shed on this issue by searching
for the social forces that influenced the police response to labor
radicalism from 1912-1920 (the period which included highest levels
of class conflict involving the I.W.W. in Seattle and Portland).
In addition, this investigation involved an attempt to identify
details pertaining to the police response to radical labor unrest
that are generalizable to the police activities in other cities
and in different periods of history.

At the same time, it should

be recognized that portions of this study can only be

understoo~

in

relation to the particular events occurring in the world, in the
United States, and in Portland and Seattle during a specific period
in history.
The main objectives of this part of the dissertation were
as foll ows:
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1.

Describe the police response to labor radicalism
in Portland and Seattle from 1912-1920.

2.

Identify the changes and continuities in the
police response to labor radicalism within the
Portland and Seattle city police departments.

3.

Ascertain the similarities and differences in the
police response between the Portland and Seattle
city police departments.

4.

Explain the variations in police response both within
and between the Portland and Seattle city police
departments in terms of particular social forces.

The Methodological Approach
To realize these objectives, the following data sources were
utilized:

1) archival data (e.g., annual reports of Portland and

Seattle police departments, mayor's correspondence, police payroll
records, city auditor's reports, city council papers, manuals of
standard operating procedures of police departments, and notebooks
of police detectives), 2) personal documents (e.g., manuscript
collections of former members of the Portland and Seattle police
department,

I.t~'\~.

organizers, fonner mayors, fonner police chiefs,

and I.W.W. lawyers), and 3) public documents (e.g., Portland and
Seattle daily newspapers, union newspapers, histories of the cities
of Portland and Seattle, histories of the police departments of
Portland and Seattle, and taped interviews with former police
offi cers).
The selection and operationalization of the specific variables
on which data were collected was based on the propositions identified
in the conceptual framework.
the following areas:

These include variables that relate to

a) linkages between class power, state power,
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and police response, b) patterns of labor discontent and police
response, c) community influence on police response, and d) the
factor of police organization in police response.
Whenever it was possible, primary sources of data were used.
However, reliance often had to be placed upon secondary sources
because of the lack of primary sources in some parts of the inquiry.
Extensive use of secondary sources was made in studying the police
response in Seattle since many valuable police records were destroyed
several years ago.
A variety of techniques was used to collect data from the
above-mentioned sources.

First, a document schedule was used for

recording data obtained from Portland and Seattle daily newspapers.
Appendix A contains a copy of the document schedule.

Second,

several focused interviews of former police officers were conducted.
During these interviews, former police officers were asked a series
of general, open-ended questions that focused attention upon their
handling of labor disputes involving the

I.W~W.

Questions were

derived from the conceptual framework and combined into the form
of an interview guide.

Appendix B contains a copy of the interview

guide.
Besides these data collection techniques, there was a considerable amount of general information gathering.

Arrest data, for

example, was gleaned from the annual reports of the Portland and
Seattle police agencies.

Information from daily newspapers was a

most important source of data.

Additionally, there was a certain

amount of pouring over old manuscripts left by the police, city
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authorities, and members of the I.W.W. in an attempt to ferret out
personal interpretations of clashes between the police and the I.W.W.*
Turning to the matter of data analysis, data from personal
documents, and public documents were analyzed qua1itatively.** The
management and organization of these non-quantified data was
accomplished through the use of some basic historiographic techniques.
Lengthy passages copied from published and non-published materials,
chronologies of key events, and sketches and diagrams of relationships tentatively posed between variables were all utilized.

In

*l4ith regard to the use of the above-discussed sources and
techniques, several methodological concerns need to be addressed.
As in all historical research, a major problem in this study lies
in the inaccuracy and bias of some of the documents. Typically, the
reports of local government agencies su§h as police organizations
To deal \'1ith this problem,
are biased in favor of the authorities.
alleged facts in government sources were cross-checked with other
primary sources authored by I.W.H. members or with secondary sources
such as newspapers that are somewhat more neutral than the I.l4.14.
However, another problematic area involves the extreme bias of some
newspapers. The Portland Oresonian, for instance, has historically
slanted its news toward the Vlew of business interests in the community.
Information from newspapers was validated by cross-references to
primary sources when they were available and to other newspapers if
primary sources were lacking.
There were also limitations on the availability of subjects for
interviews. Almost all of the prospective interviewees could not be
interviewed due to a variety of reasons, including death, failing
health, recent changes of resi dence to other reg"ions of the country,
and personal feelings of shame. !·Jith respect to the last reason,
two former members of the Seattle Police Department declined an
offer to be interviewed, stating that they were "too ashamed of
what they had done to the l~obbl ies to go through an interview.
Thinking that these refusals may have been due to the author's own
status "outside" of police circles, two active members of the
Portland Police Bureau were trained as interviewers and sent into the
field. They also were turned down by the same two former Seattle
police officers as well as several other ex members of the Seattle
Police Department. The interviewers from uinside" the police
occupation, however, did manage to complete b/o interviews with
former Seattle police officers.
II

**The use of quantitative forms of analysis was precluded due to
limitations in the scale and the amount of data that was available for
this research.
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analyzing all of this information there also was an emphasis upon
examining data along a temporal dimension.

Hhen data from different

time periods were available, within and between departmental
comparisons were made in order to detect changes in relationships
that occurred over time.
The Setting for Police-Radical Labor Interaction
This investigation of the encounters between the police and
the labor radicals in Portland and Seattle focused on one constant
and one variable.

The constant is the fact that labor radicalism

posed a significant challenge to the leaders of American corporate
capitalism from the early 1900s down through World War I.

One of

the main organizational vehicles for the expression of this radicalism was the I.W.W.

With its preamble proclaiming that the working

and employing classes have nothing in common, the I.H.W. seemed to
many employers of this time to be an incarnation of

!~arxian

prophecy.4 From the woolen mills of Lawrence, ~assachusetts to
the i ron ore mi nes of the Mesabi Range i n

~·1i nnesota

to the wheat-

fields, shipyards, sawmills, and forests of the Pacific Northwest,
the Wobblies presented a militant threat to the basic fabric of
American society.
Throughout the entire period of 1912-1920 the specter of the
I.W.W. loomed large in the cities of Portland and Seattle.

Not only

were these cities the sites of I.W.W. action, additionally both were
centers of anti-union activities directed at the

I.W.t~.

and other

radical organizations which aided the cause of militant working men
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and women.

r·1i 11 owners, 1oggi ng entrepreneurs, shi ppi ng company

magnates, and similar types of employers played a key role in planning and organizing activities to suppress the labor radicals. The
reason for the opposition of these employers to the I.W.W. was a
contradiction of interests.

Whereas the I .~J.\~., with its' advocacy

of worker control and revolutionary union tactics, challenged the
existing distribution of wealth and power in society, these employers,
with their monopoly control over the extractive industries upon
which the economies of Portland and Seattle were dependent, were
part of the most privileged group in the Pacific Northwest.

In

short, the interests of these two groups predisposed them to be
antithetically opposed to one another.
Additional to the actions of the employers and the labor
radi ca 1s, the course of the confl i ct bet\oJeen these groups appears
to have been affected by the sometimes shifting allegiances of
IIthird parties

ll

that were mainly based in Seattle and Portland.

media was one of these parties.

The

The content of Seattle's major news-

papers, namely the Seattle Times and the Seattle Post-Inte1ligencer,
and Portland's largest newspapers, the Portland Oregonian and the
Oregon Journal, were extremely biased in favor of business interests
throughout the period of 1912-1920. The biases of the Seattle Star
and the Port1 and News, two Scripps * owned newspapers ,seemed
to change during this period.
World

~lar

*E.

Both papers were pro-labor prior to

I, but they shifted to an anti-labor position during the
l~.

Scri pps was the owner of both the Star and the News.
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war. 5 Labor's main supporters among the medi a were the Seattle Uni onRecord, the first labor-owned daily newspaper in the U.S., and the
Industrial Worker, the I.W.lL newspaper.

Both of these papers

remained loyal to the labor radicals from 1912 through 1920.
Menbers of the Socialist Party* and the Socialist Labor
Party** joined the Wobb1ies in skirmishes with employers and city
authorities in 1912 and 1913 and in some major confrontations with
the dominant economic and political interests in 1917 and 1919.
~4embers

of 1oca 1 uni ons affi 1i ated wi th the Ameri can Federati on of

Labor (A.F.L.),*** the

I.W.~I.'s

strongest competitor in terms of

labor organizing, also aligned with the I.W.W. several times between
1917 and 1919 in what amounted to class war between the working
class and the economically dominant class.

For the greater part of

the period of 1912-1920, however, the A.F.L. assisted in the efforts
to crush the I.\LW.

Finally, members of the Corrmunist Party**** and

the Communist Labor Party***** became entangled with the I.W.W. in
*The Socialist Party is a political party that vias formed in
1901. The Party's basic strategy has been to work for nimmediate
demands" or rea1izeab1e reforms, while its ultimate goal has been
to create a socialist society.
**The Socialist Labor Party was a political party organized in
1874. The Party took the position that reforms should not be sought
within the context of the capitalist system, but only as part of a
socialist revolution. For a more complete delineation of the ideology
and goals of the socialist Labor Party, see Sidney Lens, Radicalism
in America (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969).
***The American Federation of Labor is a national labor organization that was founded in 1886. The A.F.L. organized workers on
the basis of crafts in the early 1900s.
****The Communist Party was organized in the U.S. in 1919. It
was composed primarily of foreign-born persons who belonged to
Communist foreign language federations in the 1920s.
*****The Communist. Labor Party \lIas also organized in 1919.
Initially it was made up mainly of American intellectuals.
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Seattle and Portland in 1919-1920 when the repression of radicals was
extraordinarily severe.
With regard to the demographic characteristics of the two
ci ti es, it does not appear that these types of factors "'/ere 1i ke ly
to have had much of an effect upon the police role in the class
struggle in Portland and Seattle from 1912-1920. The size of the
populations in both cities, for example, was roughly the same in
1912 (i ..e." over 200,000 inhabitants in each city) and in 1920 (i.e., over
250,000 inhabitants in each city).6 It is conceivable, however, that
a study more specifically focused on the impact of physical characteristics on police-labor radical relations might uncover evidence on
the ways in which demographic factors affected police actions in
regard to labor radicals.
As for the variable or varying force analyzed in this study,
it is proposed that the actions of the Seattle and Portland police
vis a vis the Wobblies and other labor radicals changed in response
to shifts in social forces that were themselves in motion.

Police

mobilization and collective action in both cities was inextricably
bound to the origins, organization, size and previous history of
handling labor unrest of the Seattle and Portland police departments.
In terms of the origins of the police in Seatt"· and Portland,
the police forces in these cities assisted in the process whereby
the vast natural resources of the Pacifi c

~orthwes t

\'/ere

trans-

formed into capi ta 1.1 Then too, the fi rs t mode rn pol ice depa rtment
in each city was established, in part, as response to the need to
protect private property from being destroyed by the riots of the

71
1870s. 8 Given these origins, it appears that the Seattle and Portland
police mainly functioned as the defenders of economic interests in
their earliest years of existence.
Since the time of the official formation of police departments
in Seattle and Portland, the organization and function of the police
in these cities has been influenced by political as \ole" as economic
interests.

Local political control has been a predominant force in

the history of both police departments.

In particular, the Seattle

City Council exercised authority over the police for the entire
period of 1912-1920.

The Portland City Council formally controlled

the police in that city in 1912 and a Commissioner of Public Safety
(i .e., the f4ayor under the cOl1111ission form of municipal government)
directed the police in Portland from 1913 through 1920.

State

control over the Seattle and Portland police departments existed in
the form of the power of the Washington and Oregon state legislatures
to enact criminal laws which the police were responsible for
enforcing throughout the period of 1912-1920.

Even some degree of

national political control over these police departments was present
during World War I.
With regard to the city police departments per set the Seattle
and Portland police departments featured two major branches and
several special units during the years under consideration. 9 Most
of the police in both departments were part of patrol divisions.
These officers wore uniforms and were assigned beats to patrol.
Other police officers wO'rked in detective divisions.

~4any

of

these officers wore plain clothes and conducted criminal investigations.
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In addition to the departments' major organizational components, each
department had specialized units.

The existence and operations of

these units largely seems to have depended upon prevailing social
conditions.

Red squads, for instance, emerged within the Portland

and Seattle police departments when radicalism became an important
problem for the economically dominant class and for the larger
society.
Size was a point of dissimilarity between the two departments.

In 1912 the Portland Police Department had a total of 292

sworn officers, while the Seattle Police Department had a total of
3290fficers. 10 By 1920 the total strength of the both departments
was approximately 400 police officers. ll Besides the regular police
force, both cities utilized auxiliary police forces at different
points in time between 1912 and 1920.

These auxiliary police were

often referred to as "special" police because they were hired for
riots, major strikes, and other special situations.
With respect to the handling of labor unrest by the Seattle
and Portland city police prior to 1912, the available information
pertains to police involvement in a few, possibly unrepresentative
events.

In part, this lack of information has stemmed from the

low 1eve 1 of organi zed 1abor acti vi ty that ex; s ted before the 1. ~l. w.
had firmly established itself in Seattle and Portland.
The anti-Chinese incidents of 1884-1886 are perhaps the most
frequently cited of the early police encounters with militant workers
in Seattle. 12 The Seattle police "distinguished" themselves in one
of these incidents when they refused to break up a mob of native-born
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laboring men who attempted to forcibly depor't a large group of
Chinese to San Francisco.*13 Since the police did not intervene
into this disturbance, it has been alleged that they were in sympathy
with the mob. 14
One of the most famous of early police contacts \'1ith labor
radicals in Portland was the 1907

I.~~.W.

sawmill strike. The

relatively controlled behavior of the Portland police was evidenced
by

the absence of any police-initiated violence and

by

the fact

that there was only one strike-related arrest during the 40-day
strike. 15 The Portland police behaved,·somewhat differently during
a 1910 strike of iron workers.

Responding to a call about a "free-

for-all fight" between pickets and scabs, the police dispersed the
combatants with the use of clubs and arrested a leader from each
side of the brawl. 16
Although it is not known whether the inaction of the Seattle
police or the well-controlled manner of the Portland police were the
normal responses of these police forces to labor unrest before 1912,
the above-cited instances at least provide an idea of what early
police-labor relations were like in Seattle and Portland.

It must

be reiterated that the Seattle and Portland police did not have a
great deal of experience in dealing with labor disputes prior to
1912.

~·'oreover,

it should be recalled that both police departments

had been in existence a relatively short period of Lime before 1912.
Thus in 1912, though the

l~obb1ies

were emerg'f.nq as a force in the

*The reason for the mob's action was that some native-born
workers felt that Chinese workers were crowding them out of the
labor market.

74

communities of Seattle and Portland. the police in these cities
lacked tradition of coping with labor radicalism.

Just what the

police did in their encounters with labor radicals from 19121920 is the subject of the next six chapters of this dissertation.

75

REFERENCES--CHAPTER III
1.

News, October 29,1913, p. 1.

2.

Mark C. Haller, "Historical Roots of Police Behavior: Chicago,
1890-1925," Law and Society Review, 10 (Winter, 1976), p. 318.

3.

George Rude, The Crowd in History (New York:
Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 12.

4.

Staughton Lynd (ed.), American Labor Radicalism (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973), p. 3.

5.

Roger Sale, Seattle: Past and Present (Seattle:- University of
~Jashington Press, 1976), p. 121.

6.

Ibid., p. 51.

John

l~iley

and

7.

8.

Tracy, Ope cit., p. 5; Kahlo, Ope cit., p. 67.

9.

Ma or's r~essa e and Annual Re ort, City of Portland (Portland,
1912-1920 ; Annual Report of the Police Department of the City
of Seattle (1912), Ope cit., p. 12.

10.

Mayor's Message and Annual Report (1912),
cit., p. 60;
Annual Report of the Police Department of t e City of Seattle
(1912), Ope cit., p. 12.

11.

~'ayor's ~·1essage

12.

Kahlo, Ope cit., p. 67; Sale, Ope cit., p. 46; r·1urray i1organ,
Skid Road: Seattle: Her First 125 Years (Sausalito, Calif.:
Comstock, 1978), p. 91.

13.

Morgan, Ope cit., p. 91.

14.

Kah10, Ope cit., p. 67.

0h'

0h'

and Annual Report (1920).
cit., p. 76;
Annual Re ort of the Police De artment of t e Cit of Seattle
920 , Ope Clt., p.

76

15.

Fred Thompson and Patrick Murfin, The I.W.W.: Its First
Seventy Years (Chicago: Industrial \~orkers of the Horld,
1976), p. 34.

16. The Evening Telegram, December 7, 1910, p. 1.

CHAPTER IV
THE POTLATCH RIOTS AND THE SEATTLE POLICE
The IIRiotsll
During the period of 1912-1913 the Seattle police related to
labor radicals in much the same way that a spoon would relate to a
hot toddy.

The police had to stir a simmering mixture of labor

radicalism, which included the

I.t~.~J.

and a strong Socialist Party.

In the process of dealing with the labor radicals, the Seattle
police were not only burned, they were scalded by the community's
reaction to their handling of a particular series of events known
as the Potlatch Riots.
The Potlatch Riots were more or less the stage upon which the
police and the I.W.W. acted out a rolicking, wild scenario, which
those wi th power and pri vi 1ege used both the I. ~I. W. and the ci ty
police as pawns in a game of power politics.

The riots themselves

were a string of collective gatherings and disturbances that happened
at the time of the Potlatch Days summer festival in Seattle in 1913.
Actually, the II r iots,1I as they have been referred to by newspaper
reporters and historians, were not riots in the precise terms of
what constitutes a riot.

A riot in the true sense of the word is

lIa situation in which a number of mobs are simultaneously active in
the same area. 1I1 None of the so-called Potlatch Riots fit this
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definition since there was only a single mob in action at one time
in each of the disorderly and violent situations during Potlatch Days.
The first violent outburst during Potlatch Days involved intoxicated sailors who attempted to break up a Socialist street
meeting on July 16, 1913. The sailors took over a soap box that
had been occupi ed by Nrs •.l\nni e r-1i 11 er and they conducted a mock
meeting.

When tks. Hiller tried to get the soap box back, one of

the sailors raised his fist to strike her.

A "l arge , well-dressed

Man, with a diamond ring, who bore no resemblance to the typical
I.WJ~.,"

stepped in and struck the sailor several times with his

fist. 2 Next, a fight started which developed into a "general melee"
wh,~n

the crowd whi ch had been 1istening to the speakers turned into

a mon, attacking the drunken sailors.

Sergeant Joseph T. Mason,

who was patrolling the area, turned in a riot call* which brought
a squad of police, a police captain, and three motorcycle police
to the scene.

The police were able to disperse the mob and to pull

the mil ita t'y men frOM under the feet of thei r as sa i 1ants.

The

police made no arrests because none of the injured could identify
their assailants. 3
Even though the Seattle police were able to rescue the sailors
from the mob, the Seattl e Times charged Seattl e r"layor George F.
Cotterill and the police with "dereliction of duty.
Times mistakenly claimed that

r~rs.

t1iller was a

II

t~obbly

Also, the
and that

*A riot call consisted of a policeman informing an officer at
police headquarters that some type of disorderly situation, involving
two or more persons, was either in progress or likely to occur. Riot
calls were often made in regard to incidents that were not riots.
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IIred flag worshippers" and "anarchistsll had beaten up two police
officers and three soldiers. 4 These details as well as other parts
of the account of the event amounted to bald-faced lies.

The lies

were exposed several days after the disturbance when sworn affidavits
of persons who saw or took part in the melee on July 16th indicated
that

Miller was not a member of the I.W.W. and that no one was
seriously injured in the fracas. 5
~ks.

Subtle threats and warnings in addition to these falsehoods
were contained in the July 17th issue of the Times.

The Times

cOMmented that its reporters had "heard" citizens state that the
II real patriots ll should rise up in wrath and do the ~1ayor's job
for him by IIcleaning out the reds.

1I

In addition, the Times

prophetically noted that the Seattle police had been notified two
times that a group of enlisted men would "circulate aboutll the
I.W.W. headquarters on the 18th. 6
Pandemonium and lawlessness reigned in Seattle on the night
of July 18th.

j·10b vi olence broke out when a party of uni formed men

entered I.W.W. headquarters while the I.W.W. was holding a street
meeting.

A street cop turned in a riot call and by the time that

a squad of police had ans\'/ered the call, the invaders had already
gained entrance to the headquarters and had begun to carry out a
scheme of destruction.

Desks were smashed, chairs hurled against
the wall, and literature was thrown out of windows. 7 The Wobblies,
upon learning of the attack on the office, ran from the street
meeting to I.W.W. headquarters in an attempt to stop the soldiers
and sailors.

The Wobblies' efforts to defend their property
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failed miserably and the military men had no trouble "do\'Ining the wage
slaves" in an exchange of fisticuffs. 8
By this time nearly 5,000 spectators had gathered about the
I.\~.~1.

headquarters. The Seattle Times described the remainder of

the riot in colorful, yet accurate terms:*
Cries of "Fourth and Pike sounded, and the little vanguard,
backed by a small number of excited civilians, shot up First
Avenue, crossed over to Second at the double quick, east on
Pike, and drew up at Millard Pricels newsstand •••. Half a
dozen hands seized the Socialist newsstand up against the
curb and in a second papers and pamphlets filled the air.
ll

The stand emptied, the soldiers and sailors of the vanguard,
numbering no more than a dozen, overturned the stand and began
to demolish it . . • . The avengers had noted that the stand
was painted red. IISmash everything thatls red,1I shouted one
of the party, as he laid the last whole board [of the stand]
on ~he curb and descended on it with his No. lOis . • • .
From somewhere about the stand one of the sailors plucked a
red fl ag. . • . Thi s \'Ias torn to tatters. Matches were
quickly applied [to the remains of the flag] and the odor of
burning rags presently told of the destruction of the I.W.W.
emblem. [Near] the Socialist newsstand stood a stand where
daily newspapers are sold . . . . A Soldier ran over to the
other cart and stuck an American flag among the papers in the
top rack. When the willing workers made for that stand too,
thinking it of the same breed as the one just smashed, they
spied the flag and promptly moved back. Heads were bared
and cheers for the flag drowned the roar of Pike Street
traffic . . • . [Next] •.• the little band broke into a run
down Pike Street to Third Avenue, thence north toward the
Socialist headquarters at 1909 Fourth Avenue. By this time
a crowd of more than 1,000 civilians trooped along to see
the fun.
The headquarters escaped with a broken window .••• A
soldier, loudly applauded by the crowd . . • climbed with an
American flag •.• to place it over the window [of the
Socialist headquarters].
The little band now headed south to Olive Street and at
Olive Street broke into a run eastward. The crowd that
*There were no major discrepancies between the Times report
of this disturbance and the Seattle Starls version of the same
event. For the Starls account, see the Seattle Star, July 19,
1913, p. 1.
--
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followed was now blocks long and included men, women,
and children. Automobiles brought up the rear.
The parade terminated at 711 Olive Street. At that
place stands a dilapidated oid church said to be used
as a branch headquarters of the "di rect action"
Socialists . • • • Rushing up the shaky steps of the
building, three or four of the leaders leaned against
the old door, and it crumbled like a rotten shingle .
. . • The door smashed in, there was presently heard
the crashing of glass in a half dozen places
simultaneously • . . . Much of the work was done with
chairs or whatever came to hand, but when one of the
more completely smashed windows burst out, a protruding foot told how the deed was done. Everybody cheered for the foot. A second later another
pane crashed, and at the open window appeared a
soldier with an American flag. Wavin~ the flag
wildly, he shouted "Hurr~h for the American flag,
down ~/i th the 1. \4. t4. 's .
II

There were no dissenting votes to the military man's suggestion
to smash the I.W.W., no mobocrats* were arrested by police, and in
general, no serious effort was made by the police to stop the
ravaging of property.
r~ayor

Cotterill, not the police, made the next move.

Asserting

the emergency powers of the office of mayor on the 19th, Cotterill
assumed control of the police department.

He then ordered the

Times to suspend the publication of all issues for the next
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days,

demanded the closing of all saloons, and called for the breaking up of
all meetings. 10 The police were an important part of Cotterill's plan.
TV/enty-five policemen were dispatched to the Times building where they
closed do\'1n

t~e

newspaper.

The pol i ce \'1ere also charged \'1i til the re-

sponsibility of enforcing Cotterill's orders regarding saloons and
street meetings."

All of this \'1as done in the name of riot prevention.

*A mobocrat is a person who attempts to accomplish an end
through rule by the mob.
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Cotterill's attempt to gain control over an explosive situation was quickly undone by a court order restraining Police Chief
Claude G. Bannick and him from preventing the printing and circulation
of Seattle Times newspapers.

Cotterill's command to close down the

saloons were also overturned by a court order.

Instead of Cotterill's

plan, the community of Seattle received United States military troops.
Shore police from a Navy fleet and military police from a nearby
Army camp were imported to assist the local police in keeping the
peace. 12 Surprisingly, order was maintained for the remainder of
the summer festival.
The absence of disorder, however, did not mean that the work
of the city police was finished.

Deciding to make "political hay"

out of the July 18th disturbance, the I.W.W. held a series of
evening meetings on the streets of Seattle.
merchant~

I.~lI.H.

who complained about the Wobblies.

This time it was the
They contended that

street meetings hurt trade in their stores.

The police

responded to the businessmen's complaints by dispersing crowds and
by arresting speakers at

I.~J.~J.

gatherings.

For example, on

July 21st the Seattle police broke up a crowd of over 2,000 at an
I.W.W. meeting. 13 Although the Wobblies persisted in holding
meetings, the constant intrusion of the police into their propogandaspreading efforts, eventually contributed to the abandonment of the
alleged riot issue by the I.!W.W.
Police Behavior in the Potlatch Disturbances
At this point a closer inspection of police behavior during
the Potlatch unrest is required in order to explain police inaction
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as well as police action.

Before, during, and after the so-called

riots, the Seattle police department \'las a focal point of attention.
To some degree, the police like the radicals, were the "victims" of
a whirlwind that swept through the city in July 1913. The police
were roasted in print by the Seattle Times and the U.S. Navy Board
of Inquiry for their neutral posture in the July 16th brawl;*14 they
were crucified in a report for being too biased in favor of the
sailors and the local mobs in the July 18th disorder by the U.S.
Navy's Board of Inquiry;15 and they were even blamed for the actual
occurrence of mob violence on July 18th by the Socialists. 16 Only
~·1ayor Cotteri 11 defended the pol i ce. 17

The Times treated the July 16th incident as though it could
have been prevented if the police had suppressed public speaking by
labor radicals and had confiscated their red flags. 18 The U.S.
Navy Board of Inquiry agreed with the Times' critical assessment of
the police role in the melee of July 16th. 19 The Board charged
that the police were lax in pennitting Socialists and

\~obblies

heap abuse upon the military in the streets of Seattle.
the Board complained that the three servicemen

to

~10reover,

involved in the

melee were taken into custody by the police without a charge and
that concurrently no charges were filed against the

I.W.I~.

In regard to the mob actions on the 18th, the Board claimed
that the small number of enlisted men in the disturbance could have
*The U.S. Navy Board of Inquiry was appointed by the Commander
in Chief of the Pacific Reserve Fleet to investigate the Potlatch
Riots.
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been checked by the police.

Exactly how many enlisted men and police-

men were at the I.H.W. headquarters is not known.

However, the Board

estimated that 20 to 30 men of the Navy and Marine Corps corrmenced
the plundering procession. 20 The Times stated that a "squad" of
police arrived at I.W.W. headquarters. 21 Given that a police squad
consisted of six to eight men in 1913, it would seem that a squad
of police, using some type of force, may have been able to stem the
tide of unrest through early intervention.
Another one of the Board's allegations was that the police \t'ere
too conspicuous in their support for actions of the mob.

According

to the Board, it was all too evident from police conduct during the
riot that the police were in sympathy with the acts of those who
were destroying property.

!·1ore speci fi cally, the Board charged that

Seattle police officers were among the crowd that followed the
military men along the path of destruction.

The inaction of these

police, in the Board's view, provided an unofficial sanction to the
disturbance.

In addition, the Board reported that no formal

complaints were made against the enlisted men by the police authorities
in Seattle.

Based upon these and other "findings," the Board

concluded that the responsibility for the mob violence on the 18th
should be placed on the police because they took no effective steps
to prevent the mob from carrying out its ruinous work. 22
The Socialist Party also blamed the police for the outbreak of
violence on the 18th. Millard Price, one of the leaders of the
local Socialist Party and the one whose newsstand had been destroyed
by the mob, declared that the police could have stopped the military
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men and thus saved his property. He told a Seattle Star reporter that
the Socialists on learning of the military men's plans in advance,
However, Chief Bannick sent only

asked for police protection.

two men to patrol the area surrounding the Socialist headquarters,
·
t 0 p.
accor d1ng
rlce. 23

Price's point about the inadequacy of the response of the police
appears to have some merit.

The complete saturation of an area with

police was the standard response of the Seattle police to predicted
mob violence or to an actual riot call.

Then, too, it seems fitting

to at least raise the question of whether or not more police would
have been dispatched if the Seattle Times offices had been threatened
and then besieged by Wobblies.

In the same vein, it can be asked,

"would the police have been more likely to use force to stop the
mob if the mob had been composed of

l~obb 1es

and the mob s target
I

had been the property of 'respectable' citizens?" Price as well
as the Board of Inquiry no doubt would have answered both questions
in the affirmative.
r,1ayor Cotteri 11 took an enti re ly di fferent and se 1f-servi ng
position in regard to police actions during Potlatch Days.

He main-

tained that a "debt of public gratitude" was due the Chief of Police
and the offi cers under hi s cOJTll1and for "tactful servi ce" performed
under "great difficulties" on extra time "beyond the regular hours
and cornpensatio;;: ,~r police \'Iork." 24 On the topic of the skirmish
on July 16th, Cotterill asserted that he would never use the police
to suppress the free speech rights of the I.W.W. or any other group.
He also pointed out that the police could not be expected to "crack

86

down on persons who waved red banners si nee thet'e was no 1aw or
ordinance prohibiting the display of any flag in Seattle. 25
ll

On the issue of police conduct on July 18th, Cotterill averred
that the police had acted wisely.

IIHad they interferred,1I he said,

"there would have been mass bloodshed."

26

In support of Cotterill's

contention, it should be noted that the Times reported that the I.W.W.
headquarters was already in shambles by the time the riot squad
arrived on the scene. 27 The~ too, it is not clear that even squads
of policemen would have matched the numerical strength of the
enlisted men in the middle and later stages of the disturbance.
Approximately 200 enlisted men of the Navy and

r~arine

Corps had

participated in the mob action by the time that it had run its course
through Seattle. 28
Even if there had been as many policemen as servicemen present
on the mob's route, the police still may not have been able to

qu~11

the disorder, given the nature of the crowd which took part in the
disturbance.

It is clear from articles in both the Times and the

Star that the crm'ld was supportive of the military men's actions.*29
"Supporti veil may be an understatement.

The Navy's Board of Inqui ry

observed that from their dress and appearance, many of the civilians
in the crowd clearly belonged to the "better class of citizens."
The Board offered these details on the activities of civilian
"1 eaders ":
*It was estimated by a correspondent of the Seattle Star that
the crowd varied in size from 25,000 to 30,000 persons, depending
upon the phase of the disturbance. In general, the crm'ld resembled
a snowball, picking up more persons as the mob rolled along its
course.
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The movement appears to have been led, or at least
guided, by the citizens of Seattle, who constantly gave
notice and passed information among the crowd as to where
the various Industrial Workers of the World and Socialist
offices and rooms were and to which place the crowd would,
after visiting one place, proceed to the next. It appears
that after arriving at each of these Industrial Workers
of the World and Socialist places the citizens in the
crowd took the lead in showing the men engaged either in
wrecking these places or in taking out the furnishings
and burning them in the street, where the entrances were and
hm'l the contents mi ght be removed. 30
Besides the rational, calculating "gentlemen of property" who
may have been the stage managers of the riot, other persons in the
crowd were very emotional.

These persons let out frantic cheers,

howls, and screams each time either something red t'las smashed or something red, white, and blue was exhalte.d to a position of prominence. 3l
Irrational behavior by some civilians in the crm'ld manifested itself
in the wrecking of a gospel mission.

The civilians discovered their

mistake before the entire mission had been plundered, hm,/ever. \'Ihen
they found that the red banners on the walls read IIGod is Lovell
instead of 1I0ne Big Union. *
lI

As well as the apparent strengths in Cotterill's defense of
t:,e police, there were at least two glaring \'/eaknesses.

In stating

that the police acted wisely by not interfering with the mob's
actions on the 18th because they wanted to avoid bloodshed.
Cotterill implied that the Seattle police recognized that the mob
was harming only property and that as a consequence they chose not
to intervene for fear of endangering the lives of persons.
*One Big Union was an I.W.W. slogan. referring to the I.~J.~I.
principal of organizing workers on the basis of entire industries
rather than on the basis of crafts as the A.F.L. did in its
operations.
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Cotterill's position was ingenuous.

On the one hand, it is true

that, for the most part, the mob attacked property rather than persons.
The total property damage resulting from the July 18th melee was
estimated to be from $3,000 to $5,000, while the only casualty
reported was a Wobbly whose nose was broken. 32
On the other hand, there is no evidence to indicate that the
Seattle police made it a standard practice to step aside when property
was being smashed to bits, justifying their inaction on the grounds
that is was "only" property and that someone might get hurt if they
were to protect that property.

Contrary to what is implied in

Cotterill's stance, part of the law enforcement activities of the
Seattle police department in 1913 were devoted to the enforcement
of laws relating to property.

Police records indicate that the

police were busy arresting thieves, recovering stolen merchandise,
and guarding stores, mills, and other business places in 1913. 13
Hence, the protection of private property was an integral part of
the day-to-day functioning of the Seattle police.

It seems exceedingly

doubtful that the Seattle law enforcement officers could have so easily
discarded a concern for defending private property when such a concern
was so integrally bound up with their role as police.
Cotterill's defense of the police was also defective on
another count.
role of the

By directing his statements exclusively toward the

polic~

in the disturbances, Cotterill was able to

abdicate his own responsibility for police policy.

Under Seattle's

council form of municipal government, the mayor was supposed to be
the elected official who was most accountable for police behavior.
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l~ith

a politician's sleight-of-hand, however, Cotterill was able to

avoid a discussion of the real issue of \>lhose interests were served
by the actions of the Seattle police during the Potlatch Day's
disorder.
Class Politics and Police Policy
Setting aside the issue of who should be blamed for the Potlatchrelated violence, it is useful to analyze police behavior in terms of
the political context of the disturbances.

At the time they \'>/ere in

full swing the so-called Potlatch Riots were billed by the Seattle
media as involving a battle to preserve the American way of life.
reality, however, this was not a fight for or against the flag.

In
The

key fact behind all of the Potlatch-related incidents was that the
city of Seattle was going through a mighty upheaval in which organized labor including its radical elements, was aligned with the
churches, the social clubs, and the civic and reform organizations
against a loosely connected network of powerful men and interests
headed by J. D. Farrell, the vice president of the Great ~Jorthern
Railroad. 34 Linkages between the legitimate business community,
city politicians, the police, and organized vice constituted the most
important aspects of this network.*
In essence, the political context of the Potlatch Riots was
the classic early twentieth century power struggle between reformers
and machine politicians.

Seattle reformers obtained a 1I\,/edge to
ll

*A similar combination of the business, political, police, and
criminal interests was discovered in a study of social life in
Seattle in 1971. See William J. Chambliss, IIVice, Corruption, and
Power,1I Wisconsin Law Review, 4 (1971), pp. 1130-1155.
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force their way into city government when a recall amendment was
inserted into the city charter in 1906; the passage of a women's
suffrage amendment in 1910 set the stage for the recall of machinesupported ~·1ayor Hi ram C. Gi 11 in 1911. 35 Gi 11, a Democrat, was
defeated by George vI. Dilling, a Progressive Republican, in a recall
election in which the point of contention was ·an "open" versus a
"closed" town.

Gill and Chief of Police Charles H.

~Iappenstein,*

who was Boss Farrell's personally selected chief of police, promoted
the unobstructed perpetuation of gambling, prostitution, and other
forms of vi ce in Seattle, whi 1e the reformers favored the suppressi on
of all vice.

The police response to Socialist and I.W.W. activities

was not an issue presumably because the patriotic passions of the
citizens had not yet been raised the the reality of war and by the
Seattle Times' propaganda.
During Gill's first term in office his tolerance for all
kinds of vice was matched by his willingness to at least put up with
the varieties of labor radicalism that existed in Seattle.

Apparently,

neither the Socialist Party and the I.W.IL nor the /\.F.L. local unions
were sufficiently enamored by Gill's position regarding labor radicals
to support him.

In fact, organized labor was responsible for the

circulation of petitions to recall Gill.**36 Ne'lJlyenfranchised
*Chief of Police Wappenstein was later tried, convicted, and
sent to the lrJashington State Penitentiary for accepting a bribe from
two operators of "Dawdy" houses in Seattle in 1912.
**The recall process in Seattle's municipal government operated
as follows: if the signatures of one-fourth of the registered voters
were collected on recall petitions, a special election would be held.
The name of the official under attack and the names of candidates
nominated by local political constituencies were placed on the ballot.
If the incumbent received more votes than any of the challengers, the
incumbent remained in office; if another canaidate received a plurality,
the incumbent was recalled. Murray r·10rgan described this process in
Skid Road: Seattle: Her First 125 Years (Sausalito, Calif.: Comstock,
1978), p. 172.
.
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women were another group that was active in the recall of Gill.

Some

political analysts have even gone so far as to claim that the female
vote was the decisive factor in the 1911 recall. 37 At the very least,
it can be stated that Dilling was elected and finished out what would
have been Gill's term in 1911, in part, because of the efforts of
Seattle women.
So far as the riots are concerned, it is essential to understand the class politics involved in the 1912 mayor'al election that
followed the recall.

The critical point ;s that George Cotterill,

"a Progressive Democrat, was able to defeat Gill, his opponent,
because Cotterill was supported by a coalition of middle class
Progressives and working class people.*38 This was an uneasy
coalition due to the antagonistic interests held by the middle and
working classes. The fundamental contradiction manifested itself
in the issue of "refontl."

Reform for the middle class meant the

prohibition of alcohol, gambling, and other vices, the abolition of
entrenched political machines, and the establishment of a middle
class dominated power base.

To a sizable segment of the working

class, however, reform meant pro-labor public policy and radical
39
social change.
When Cotterill took office, he had to maintain this tenuous
coalition as well as ward off attacks from the opposition.

The

*For an excellent analysis of the relationship between militant
workingmen and liberals in the ear'ly twentieth century, see Eugene M.
Tobin, "Direct Action and Conscience: The 1913 Paterson Strike as
an Example of the Relationship Between Labor Radicals and Liberals,"
Labor History, 20 (Winter, 1979), pp. 73-88.
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latter concern turned into a source of continual annoyance for
Cotterill.

From the beginning of the 1912 mayoral campaign through

the Potlatch Days Colonel Alden J. Blethen, the owner of the Seattle
Times and an advocate of an "open" town, utilized the pages of the
Times to make appeals to the patriotic passions of the Seattle
citizenry in hopes of weakening Cotterill's support.

In particular,

the Times criticized Cotterill for not employing the police to
suppress I.W.W.-sponsored demonstrations in early 1912.

The demon-

strati ons were for Leonard 01 sson, a Wobbly 't/ho fought to have hi s
citizenship restored by the courts.

Blethen also blamed Cotterill

for allowing the Wobblies to bear a red flag in a ~~ay Day parade in
Seattle in 1912. 40 The troubles between Cotterill, Blethen, and the
1. \~. W. became more and more rancorous unti 1 they exploded in the

face of Cotterill and in the presence of the Seattle police during
the 1913 Potlatch Days.
In retrospect, it now appears that the class composition of
r·1ayor Cotterill's political base \lIas a key factor in the shaping of
the pol i ce pol i cy toward the

~Iobb 1i es

and the Soci ali s ts duri n9

those violent and disorderly days in the summer of 1913. While the
tumultuous events of Potlatch Days were in motion, Cotterill had to
counterbalance the interests of the working class union people, who
had supported him, with the interests of the Seattle Times, which
had backed his political opponent.

At the same time, Cotterill had

to consider the interests of middle class merchants whose profits
would have been reduced if he had either locked up all of the mobocratic military men upon whose money the economic success of the
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Potlatch festival partially depended or allowed I.W.W. street meetings
to scare away middle class shoppers in the days following the mob
violence.
The end product of Cotterill's attempt to mesh these clashing
interests was a police policy of minimal intervention.

To a certain

extent, a policy of little or no police action was dictated by the
fact that the main elements in Cotterill's political base, namely
the middle and working classes, were set in opposition to one another.
In this situation of political stalemate the problem of labor radicalism presented such difficulties to Cotterill's fragile base of support
that an attempt to resolve the problem in favor of any of the
affected parties may have had disastrous political consequences for
the r··1ayor.

Ironically, the policy of minimal intervention served

to heighten the antagonisms between the middle and working classes
by making their antithetical interests more noticable.

This was

the result, even though Cotterill apparently intended to appease
both classes.
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CHAPTER V
ROHDYISM,

REFORr~,

RIOT, AND REPRESSION IN PORTLAND

Police Policy Under the Rushlight Administration
Labor radicalism became a thorny problem for the Portland
police in the latter part of 1911 and in 1912.
the

~'lobblies

During these years

and Socialists began to hold rowdy street meetings,

using abusive and profane language which brought complaints from
the "decent" citizens of the city.l

~ayor A. G. Rushlight, a

Republican by party affiliation and a plumber by trade, had to deal
with the complaints since he held authority over police officers.
To some extent, the nature of Mayor Rushlight's political
constituencies predisposed him to allow working class protest in
Portland.

His power seems to have derived, in part, from certain

\'/ea lthy

Repub 1i cans, who had close ti es to the "power broker"
element in Portland. 2 This is not to imply that he always enjoyed
complete support from the business corrmunity, but rather to point
out Rushlight's connections to the old business-political establishment* in Portland which was in a state of decline in 1912. This old

establishment had traditionally relied upon the working class as a
wellspring of its political power.

In Rushlight's case, the

*The "o1d establishment" in Portland consisted of business and
professional leaders, most of whom were members of the wealthiest
families in Portland.
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working class was a source of support, owing to his representation of
this class in his former role as a councilman for southeast Portland.
Vice interests may have been yet another component in Rush1ight l s
political base.

There is at least circumstantial evidence to

indicate that Rush1ight was linked to Portland
vice interests. 3 !~hat
\
these bits and pieces of information seem to add up to is a mayor,
styled in the genre of the traditional machine-supported official,
but lacking a finely-tuned political machine.
One of Mayor Rush1ight s first encounters with the labor
l

radicals came in the Baden-Powell affair.

Robert Baden-Powell, the

founder of the Boy Scouts, arrived in Portland in the spring of 1912
for the purpose of extolling the virtues of the scouting movement.
A public debate was scheduled between Baden-Powell and Allan McDonald,
the secretary of the I.W.H. local unions in Portland, but the full
debate never took place because Baden-Powell was heckled during his
initial presentation. 4 Unidentified rowdies shouted down BadenPowell

IS

efforts to speak; the rowdies yelled and hooted about the

militarism that allegedly inherred in the scouting movement.
The Spanish-American War Veterans and the Realty Board* were
so upset by the outcome of the quasi-debate that they passed a
resolution, blaming the Socialist Party and the

I.I~.H.

venting Baden-Powell from speaking and threatening

for pre-

~Ilayor

Rushlignt

\'/ith areca 11 if he di d not stop soap box orators from speaki ng
*The Realty Board was an association of businessmen concerned
with real estate affairs in Portland.
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on the streets of Portland.

On the other side of the controversy,

the Central Labor Council* of Portland criticized the Realty Board
for advocating the suppression of First Amendment rights, defending
Rushlight's stand in favor of free speech.

As for the I.W.tL, it

denied any responsibility for the heckling.

In a public statement

the I.W.W. pointed out that since the

secretary was invited

I.l~.W.

to be a participant in the debate, there was no reason for the
to disrupt the meeting. 5

I.IL~/.

Several days later the Portland News claimed to have uncovered
a "plot" to incite a riot at the Baden-Powell meeting. 6 According
to the News, the hecklers were hired by the Employer's Association**
and other local business interests to create a disturbance in order
to force Rushlight to use the police against organized labor.
Interestingly, the News stressed that most of the members of the
Employers' Association were "keen businessmen" who \.,rere practically
blameless in the Baden-Powell flare-up.

Those behind the plot, in

the News' opinion, constituted a small minority of "radical labor
haters" who had taken control of the Employer's Association. 7
The News' "evidence" of a plot was flimsy and not sufficient
to convince any reasonable person of the existence of a conspiracy.
Moreover, the matter of the alleged plot was dropped as an issue
*The Central Labor Council was composed of representatives
from local unions that were affiliated with the American Federation
of Labor (A.F.L.).
**The Employers Association was an organization of Portland
businessmen who formalized their affiliations in order to enlarge
their control over the local economY.
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by the press soon after it was fi rst introduced by the News.

:'lhat

pricks one's curiosity, however, is the revelation that the police
were a primary source of information for the News in its attempt to
outline the alleged plot. * The News stated that it was the plan of
the police to follow the "trouble-makers" at the Baden-Powell debate
to their rooms and to arrest them unobtrusively in order to prevent
a demonstration by people who thought that a "bona fi de Sod al ist"
was being persecuted.

Unfortunately for the police, the alleged
hecklers evaded them at the end of the meeting. 8
These types of police actions apparently were not uncharacter-

istic of the ways in which the Portland police handled labor unrest
in 1912.

In fact, the general police policy toward labor during

the early months of the Rushlight regime seems to have been one
of toleration.

Hhile Rushlight served as mayor, the police allowed

street speakers the right of free speech and permitted union pickets
to gather in front of a struck plant.

Commenting on the police

policy under the Rushlight adminstration, the Portland News declared:
• . . The police were instructed merely to preserve the
peace and order and to take the side of neither capital nor
labor, but to give each a square deal. 9
Another major event involving the Portland police and the
labor radicals was a strike of women and girls at the Oregon Packing
Company on Portland's eastside.

The strike began when from 50 to

*That the police were informants for reporters of the Portland
News should not surprise anyone who has perused issues of the paper
for the years of 1911-1913. The News staunchly supported the police,
often printing poems, letters, and other items written by street
policemen.
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to 100 of the company's 250 workers walked out of the plant on June 27,
1913 because of extremely low wages and unsanitary working conditions. 10 This dispute between the \'/ell-established fruit company
and women fruit sorters had a "David versus Goliath" scenario.

The

women were both exploited and powerless, being paid only a 10 cent
hourly wage and lacking union organization. They received a substantial amount of support from members of the I.W.W., the Socialist
Labor Party, and independent Socialists who supplied aid to them in
the form of fund raising, housing, food, and baby-sitting.

Host

importantly, the radicals organized the women workers and represented
them in negotiations with the management of the packing company.
The Oregon Packing Company, in contradistinction to the fruit
sorters, was a powerful inter-state corporation.

In point of fact,

the "Oregon Packing Company was merely a local name for the
II

California Fruit Canner's Association. This Association controlled
the market in canned goods in the West; it was a mUlti-million
dollar concern, setting prices and making substantial profits.

In

California, the majority of the fruit packing plants were controlled
by the corporation and, at the time of the cannery strike, the
Association owned plants in Portland and Salem, Oregon.

Cheap labor

was a keynote in the corporation's success. The Association made
heavy use of the cheapest type of immigrant labor in California,
whereas the corporation refused to pay the women even subsistence
wages in Portland. ll
The police became involved in the dispute between the women
and the company on the second day of the strike.

When the inexperienced
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strikers set up a picket line, some police tried to intimidate
them by zooming up to the picket line in a patrol car whose bell
was clanging.

Hhen the officers jumped out of the car hurriedly,

the women expected a raid which never occurred.

Later a police

captain explained to the press that this was only part of the routine
changing of officers from the night to the day shift. 12
Other minor forms of police harrassment were employed in the
first days of the strike.

Police Captain Moore, apparently upset

by banners reading "Forty cents a day makes prostitutes" and "A dog
wouldn't scab," incorrectly informed the women that according to
city law they could not carry banners. 13 Other police officers told
the strikers that they could picket, but that "calling anybody a
scab" would be grounds for an arrest. 14 In spite of this chicanery
on the part of the police, the strikers continued picketing in
from of the plant, occasionally mounting a tar barrel in order to
urge those still \tJorking to join them.
In contrast to these measly attempts to frighten the women
strikers, Guy Fuller, a patrolman, sided with the strikers.

Fuller

even composed the following poem which was used by the women to
publicize their situation:
I have seen men gaunt and weary
waiting for a strike to end.
Waiting for a chance to labor for
the homes they must defend.
There's a strike now in our city,
going on this very day;
A demand by girls for wages for
a soul-sustaining pay-Wages that will buy them clothing-give them decent food to eat;
Keep their souls from being bartered
to the vice clique of the street.
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This is but one strike in many on
. lithe roads that lead to Rome":
Look about you! See the menace
to your country and your home.
See the mothers bent and broken
'neath their heavy burdens bowed;
See the fathers! See the children!
It's the weary, motley crowd-Pitiful, emaciated, soul-appalling
in thei r need!
Crucified with the spikes of hunger
on the sordid cross of greed!
Know the product of such suffering
isn't all your money buys.
But the soul of the producer
is a purchase-given prize;
For whenever strikes are ordered
and the flag of want unfurled,
Human lives are being bartered
in the markets of the world. 15
The pro-labor poem by Fuller and the petty harrassment by
~10ore

and other officers indicates that the police themselves may

have been divided over the dispute at the cannery.

The important

point, however, is that the police did not forcibly remove the
pickets from in front of the cannery.

Instead they allowed the

strikers at least some degree of freedom in their protest actions.
Po 1i ce Pol i cy and t·1uni ci pa 1 Refol1l1
A dramatic shift occurred on July 1st in the police policy
with respect to the labor dispute at the cannery.

i1ayor H. Russell

Albee, a reformer, and a new administration, including a new police
chief, were sworn in; also, the commission form of city government
took effect on this date.

The first act of incoming Police Chief

John Cl ark was to order the stri kers to "qui t pi cketing • • • quit
speaking . . . quit parading, or else face a jail sentence." 16
The striking women reacted to the chief's order by issuing a
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statement of their own which read:

"Bring on your injunction, bring

on your patrol wagon and take us to jail, if that's the new police
sys t em . • . 1117
\~hat

caused the sudden change in police policy? Chief Clark

would only say that he had received his instructions from "those
higher~up."

Hayor Albee and the other city commissioners were no

doubt some of the persons to whom Clark vaguely referred as having
formulated the new police policy.

The mayor and all of the commis-

sioners were no doubt some of the persons to whom Clark vaguely
referred as having formulated the new police policy. The mayor and
all of the commissioners were at least inclined because of their
social backgrounds to favor business interests in labor disputes.
Albee himself was an insurance executive, while the rest of the
commission was composed of a manager of a type company, a civil
engineer, a manager of a department store, and an attorney.18
In addition, these commissioners were not as accessible to
the infl uence of members of the working cl ass as \'1ere the counci 1men which they replaced.

The reason for the reduction in the

political clout of the working class related to the replacement of
district or ward representation by a system in which each commissioner was elected city-wide.

The commission form of government

with its city-wide elections tended to dilute working class political
power which traditionally had a ward or precinct locus in Portland.
The decrease in working class power was revealed in the fact that
two members of the Council in the Rushlight administration represented
organized labor, whereas none of the commissioners in 1913 represented
labor's interests.

104
The sheer number of city officials may have been another
factor that contributed to the policy change.

Formerly power was

dispersed among 15 council members, but now power became concentrated
in the hands of five commissioners.

Although the mayor generally

exercised authority over the police in both the council and the
commission forms of government, there were considerably fewer
officials who could create problems for a mayor in the role of
Commissioner of Public Safety than there were for a mayor in the
role of strong executive in the council form.

In short, a mayor was

likely to have a less obstructed reign over the police department
under the commission as compared to the council type of government.
In the case of t1ayor Albee, the process of establishing a probusiness police policy may have been less cumbersome than the process
would have been with a 15-person city council.
Sources of influence besides the mayor and the
affected police policy.

co~ission

also

/\ clue as to the identity of these other

sources can be found in a conversation held between a committee
representing the strikers* and Chief of Police Clark on July 1,
1913.

The News interviewed three witnesses to this conversation

and printed this reconstructed dialogue:
*The committee consisted of Tom Burns, !1ary Schwab, and
Mrs. McDonald. The first two were Socialists, while Mrs. McDonald
was one of the striking cannery workers. Burns, a flamboyant
and independent Socialist, was known as the "mayor of Burnside"
which is an area in the heart of Port1and ' s skid road district. 19
r~ary Schwab was an organi zer for the Soci a1 ist Labor Party.20
As for r~rs. McDonald, no i nformati on on her background or
activities could be found.
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Chief Clark:
Committee:
Clark:
Committee:
Cl ark:
Committee:

"You can speak on a vacant lot, but you
can't speak on the street under the
1aw • . ."
"Oh yes we can. You had better look up
the 1aw . . .
"The girls were offered a dollar a day.1I
"They never recei ved such an offer.
"A girl can live on $6 a ~'1eek."
"A girl can't live like a self-respecting,
honest, white girl on $6 a week. You
treat us like Chief Slover* did and
you'll have no trouble in this town. You
try to shut off free speech and He III fi 11
your jai 1. "21
II

II

Clark's statement that the "girls were offered a dollar a day"
is significant in light of the fact that this offer was not publicized
until two days later.

The "offer" to which Clark made reference

was based upon an agreement between the Industrial
and the Oregon Packing Company.

~Ielfare

Commission

Since Chief Clark cited this offer

as part of the rationale for his policy, a brief exploration of the
nature of the relationship between the Industrial Welfare Commission,
the fruit packing company, and the Portland municipal government is
in order.
The Industrial

l~elfare

Commission was formed in the spring of

1913 under an act which passed the Oregon State Legislature almost
unanimously and without regard to political party affiliation. 22
The act was sponsored by the Consumerls League of Oregon** and
*E. A. Slover was the Chief of Police in the Rushlight regime.
A sort of relaxed person, Slover made a practice of napping near the
stove at police headquarters. As a police captain under the Albee
administration, Slover was dismissed because of his alleged relationships with vice interests in the latter part of 1913.
**The Consumer's League of Oregon was composed of persons
from the business and professional fields who generally shared a
progressive ideology.
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supported by the data contained in a policy research report authored
by the same group entitled "Welfare Legislation for Honen and
Mi nors ... 23
The advantages of an Industrial Welfare Commission were
stressed in the report issued by the Consumer's League.

Some of the

alleged advantages reflected a sort of "parens patrie"* perspective.
For example, the report stated that the Industrial

~lelfare

Commission

would promote the welfare of the state of Oregon because it would
"protect the women \,wrkers .

from the economic distress that

leads to impaired health and inefficiency.,,24 Other reasons given
on behalf of creating the Commission \'1ere humanitarian in nature.
It was pointed out, for instance, that the Commission \'/Ould "prevent
exploitation of helpless women" and eliminate "sweating" in the
state's industries. 25
Still other alleged advantages of the proposed legislation
involved benefits for employers.

One supposed advantage was that

a Commission would furnish women employees with a means of obtaining "the best minimum wages . . . without recourse to strikes
or industrial disturbances.,,26 In other words, a Commission would
institutionalize and routinize conflict resolution, eliminating
unexpected strikes that were harmful to employer profits and disruptive of employer planning schemes. A second advantage to the
employers, according to the Consumer's League report, \,/as that a
*Parens patrie refers to the idea that certain categories of
people, especially juveniles, require the protection of the State
which acts in the role of a surrogate parent.
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Commission would enable employers "to prevent the undercutting of
wages by less humane and considerate competitors."27 Translated into
terms that certain employes could more readily understand, this meant
that the Commission would assist the larger businesses in eliminating
the small ones.
As a whole, the report represented a blend of liberal
benevolence, welfare statism, corporate capitalism, and Christian
charity.

In addition, the report contained elements of feminism.

For example, the authors of the report emphasized that it was
unreasonable and unfair to suppose that women can be paid substandard wages because they \l/ere supported by men.

As a corrective

to this erroneous way of thinking, the authors pointed out that women
served as the main breadwinners in many families.

t1oreover, the

authors asserted that "social justice" was not served when low
wages were pai d to \'/orkers by reason of thei r womanhood and youth. 28
The Industrial Commission law itself was one of the most farreaching welfare laws in the nation.

The Commission possessed

the statutory power to fix the wages, hours, and working conditions
of all females and minors employed in any industry.29

In terms

of the membership of the Commission, common sense indicates that
industrial justice could only be served if representatives of both
capital and labor were appointed to the Conrnission.

This t'las only

nominally the case.
The first Commission consisted of Amedee M. Smith,
representing the employers,

~1rs.

Bertha

~1oores,

representi ng the
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the employees, and Edwin

\~.

O'Hara serving as Chairman of the

Commission.* An inspection of the social backgrounds of the members
reveals that labol' lacked bona fide representation on the Corrrnission.
OIHara was the assistant pastor of the Cathedral of the Immaculate
Conception; Smith was the third vice-president of the Realty
Associates of Portland; Moores, the designated representative of
labor, was the daughter of a pioneer sawmill operator, the sister
of C. B. t·100res (who was the president of Moores Motor Car Co., and
later a Republican candidate for Secretary of State in Oregon),
and herself active in lithe commercial field and a prominent clubll

woman. 30
While the original purposes and eventual outcomes of some
urban policies may be quite different, this was not the case with
respect to the Welfare Commission.
as it was planned to function.

The Commission functioned just

~~ithin

a few days after the strike

commenced, the Oregon Packing Company submitted the question of
wages to the Commission.

Acting with lightning-like speed, the

Commission announced on July 3, 1913 that it had reached an agreement with management (not labor).

The agreement was that a one

dollar a day minimum wage would IIgo into effect immediately.1I31
The Oregon Packing Company jumped at the Commission's first
offer.

As r·1anager r1cPherson of the company stated, IIwe did not

wait 30 or 40 days, but immediately agreed.

.. 32

The strikers,

*No change occurred in the composition of the Commission
from its inception to 1916.
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however, refused to agree to an arrangement to which they were not
privy.

Tom Burns, a member of the strike committee, responded to

the offer in these words:
The Industrial Commission which butted into this affair
is composed mainly of parlor reformers, and it seems to me
that their principal function is to break the strike. 33
A consequence of the Commission's offer was that it assisted
the company in managing in community's impression of the strike
situation.

By submitting the wage issue to a purportedly neutral

body for arbitration, the company made it appear that it had dealt
with the strikers in "good faith.

II

To the extent that this

impression became accepted by various segments of the community,
the company was able to increase its control over "third parties"
to the labor dispute.

Apparently, Chief Clark was one of those

who was persuaded by the company's bureaucratic strategy.
Police policy was shaped by other sources as well as the
Industrial He1fare COlTrlission.

The Portland Employer's

.~ssociation

and the Eastside Businessmen's Club* brought "tremendous pressures"
to bear upon the mayor and the police chief to prohibit speakers
from using the streets in the vicinity of the cannery.34 The
Employer's Association allegedly hired spies and detectives to ask
residents near the plant to complain about the pickets and the
strike committee to the police.

Taking a less surreptitious approach,

in a closed meeting with the mayor the Eastside Businessmen's Club
*The Eastside Businessmen's Club was made up of persons who
owned businesses on the eastside of Portland.
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demanded "definite and decisive action froM the police department to
end the meetings of the strikers and agitators and to keep them away
from the packing pl ant. 35
11

The Portland "Free-Speech Fight" and Anti-Radical Police Violence
The pressures upon the police to put down the strike brought
the first arrests at noon on July 9th.

Three Socialists were

arrested for speaking in front of the packing company; they were
charged \'Iith "disorderly conduct and "abusive language." 36 Later
II

in the day,

~~ayor

Albee ordered Chief Clark to forbid picket lines

at the site of the strike.

As a result, more women were arrested

that day, some of \'1hom were workers; t~ary Schwab was taken into
custody four separate times. 37 By July 10th it was clear that the
reform administration's police policy had ignited a "free speech
fight.

II

The first police violence in the strike took place soon after
the inception of the battle to preserve the right of freedom of
speech in Portland.

On July 13th the strikers were peacefully

picketing in front of the cannery when the order to charge was
given and six mounted officers galloped into the striking women.
Several women were knocked under the horses' hooves and trampled,
while another woman was crushed beb/een two horses.

Three vlOmen

injured in this police attack and two women were arrested by
the Portland police. 38

~~re

The following day it was discovered that 30 police officers
\'Iere hi ding in a barn close to the cannery; they vacated the barn
after the owner ordered them to leave. 39 The police showed up en
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masse again at the trial of Mary Schwab on the 15th \'Ihen a reserve
force of police met 1,000 strikers and sympathizers who had marched
to the courthouse to learn the outcome of the Schwab trial.

Po1ice-

striker contacts were peaceful on the 15th, in part, because Schwab
was acquitted of the charges against her. 40
That evening, ten speakers were arrested in do\'Into\lm Portland
in the typical I.14.W. free speech format--as one person was pulled
off the soap box and arrested, another mounted the soap box and
41
spouted ephithets damning the employing c1ass.
Mu1tnomah County
Sheriff Thomas Word was in charge of pulling speakers off the soap
box and escorting the crimina1s" to jail.
I

Tom Burns \'Ias charged

with "using profane and abusive 1anguage" and the nine other
persons were charged with "di sorder1y conduct. 1142 City pol ice
assisted Hord's deputies in clearing the streets. 43
On the 16th the police arrested three members of the strike
committee while they were standing in front of the cannery.44 The
same day, as rumors spread throughout the city that

I.!~.W.

gangs

were headed for Portland to carryon the free speech figl1t,45

~·layor Albee banned all street speaking except religious speeches. 46
Deciding to test the A1bee ' s anti-free speech rule, about one dozen

women strikers along with a few Socialist and I .W.I~. supporters
assembled downtown in the evening on the 17th lito tell t:le people
of this city something about conditions at the p1ant. 1I47 A 11arge"
crowd (of an undisclosed size) also gathered around the wor:8n
strikers, expecting to listen to the usual tirades against the
inequities of the capitalist system.
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Just before the public speaking was to conmence, the Sheri ff
and a representative of the city police notified the women that they
could not publicly discuss the strike.

When the women tried to

speak, a police riot* broke out in Portland. The Portland News
described the activities of several groups of police, totaling
around 200 men, in these colorful terms:
A solid phalanx of blue-coats, extending from curb to
curb, moved south on 6th street in close formation,
ordering the tremendous crowds onto the side\l/alks, while
at the same time a squad of patrolmen counter-marched
on each sidewalk undoing the work of the main body and
forcing the crowd off the side\'1alks again and back on
the street . . . . This maneuvering was maintained for
fully 15 minutes until someone made the discovery that
a blunder had been made in aligning the forces . . . . 49
[rlext, the mounted police] . . . advanced in tHO
straight ranks, one ahead of the other and one man to
the horse. Up 6th . . . came the 2 lines of police
cavalry. IICharge" yelled some fellow in front of the
Lotus saloon, and the mounted heroes eagerly entered the
fracas . . • for fully 30 minutes pandemonium reigned.
The police marched back and forth, the deputies moved up
and down, gBd the mounted officers galloped hither and
yon. . . .
The Oregonian described the riot in less dramatic terms:
When the police and deputies, after the first few
minutes, failed to clear the streets, they were obliged
to rush the crm'ld. ~·1ore than a score were hit with clubs.
At least 50 others were struc~lby fists in the melee.
t·1any were knocked down. . . .
*According to an authority on police violence:
An event is a police riot \'1hen roving bands [mobs] of
policemen set upon nonprovocative persons and/or ~roperty
in an excessively violent manner. When only one small
group of policemen sets upon citizens and/or property in
a single location it may be useful to call this a "police
attack.
A "police riot" is any such event involving
two or more attacks. "Nonprovocative persons are those
who represent no signifi~§nt threat to life, physical
safety or property . . •
II

ll
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Seventeen women, who were led by Dr. Harie Equi* and Mary Schwab,
stood their ground in the teeth of a storm of violence.

These women

were intent on speaking even after the mounted charge and the mass
clubbings.

When they refused to go home as ordered by the police,

Equi and nine other women were taken to the police station.

At the

station Equi stabbed patrolman Evans in the wrist with a hatpin.
Evans had the wound cauterized at once since earlier in the day Equi
had threatened to prepare such a weapon and dip it in a deadly
52
Once Equi was corralled and brought under control, she
virus.
Was held on four charges--"disorderly conduct," "inciting a riot,"
"carrying concealed weapons ," and "assault with a dangerous weapon." 53
Unfortunately for Equi, the pol ice were not finished with her.
One of the other women prisoners in jail told of Equi

IS

brutalization

by the city police:
Dr. Equi was abused most shamefully., • . . When we
arrived at the police station it seems that Chief Clark
and his men took a special delite (sic) in tormenting
her. She was roughly handled, and the language used
toward her was vile. I think the people of Portland
should know something about the way their Chief of
Police addressed this little woman while she was at his
mercy. I ne~~r heard such vile language as that man
used at her.
The aftermath of the riot was nearly as wild and unbelievable
as the police riot itself.

~1ayor

Albee strove to avoid notice of

the battle between the authorities andr the protestors three days
after the riot, announcing that he did not think there was a free
*Dr. Marie Equi was a highly competent medical doctor who
was extremely active in the class struggle in the state of Oregon.
She campaigned for \'lomenls suffrage, participated in labor strikes,
spoke out against World War I, and fought on behalf of many
progressive and radical causes. Equi served as a financial
benefactor and counsel to militant working men and \'lomen in her
later years.
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speech fight "going on,"55 Yet, on the day prior to the ~1ayor's
statement, the Chief of Police and the Sheriff passed down an order
lito arrest all men and women who were on the streets without lawful
business ,1156 r,loreover, at about the same time that the mayor was
denying the existence of a free speech crusade, the police were
busy arresting droves of men who did not have $10 and a "boi1ed
shirt" as well as men who were wearing red (I.H.l·J,) ties. 57 The
charge was the same for all of those snared in the police dragnet-"vagrancy. II
t,10st of the "vaggi ng, II as the pol i ce called it, was done by
police detectives.

On July 19th, for instance, a Portland police

detective noted in his report book that he had worked "all day
arresting I.W.W. who were vags as per orders,II58 The detectives
did not exercise much selectivity in making these arrests.

For

example, it is instructive to examine the case of Gus Molkentin,
a German workingman.

~·1olkentin

had been a Portland resident for

over 15 years, possessed a bank account of $400, and had worked as
a common 1aboret' for many years.

Like a great many Germans,

Molkentin liked his daily mug of beer.

He stepped into a saloon for

that purpose on lluly 20th and had hardly finished his brew when he
was accosted by a plainclothes policeman.

"You're an I.W.H.,

arent' YOU," the policeman stated.

Even though r·1olkentin denied
the policeman's assertion, he was arrested, booked, and vagged. 59
The free speech fight continued until the first week in
November, although the cannery strike fizzled out at the end of
July.

By late summer the fruit.packing season was passed its peak
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and the demand for labor was greatly reduced.

These factors coupled

with police repression contributed to the termination of the strike.
As for the free-speech fight, when it reached a high level of
intensity in late summer and fall, the city authorities, in effect,
suspended the U.S. Constitution in Portland by prohibiting both the
freedom of speech and the freedom of association.

Despite the

fact that the intent of this policy was to crush the free-speech
fight, the extreme repression prompted local A.F.L. unions,
influential middle class citizens, and some working class people
to align themselves with Equi and others who had initially opposed
the anti-free speech policy.GO
In fact, the heavy dose of repression touched off drives to
recall both Mayor Albee and Sheriff Word.

Worse yet from the

standpoint of the city's fiscal status, the fight against free
speech cost the city of Portland thousands of dollars, disrupted
the business of the police and other municipal departments, and
blocked the transaction of public business in general. 61 In
addition, personnel fatigue problems surfaced in the city police
Many of the policemen had little opportunity to go

department.

home and sleeps and vacations were cancelled because of the heavy
utilization of men in policing the cannery strike and the free
speech fight.

Moreover, members of the police department were

compelled by Mayor Albee to work from 10 to 14 hours daily during
the unrest of 1913-1914.

Additionally, a two-day a month layoff

which was allowed during the Rushlight administration was set aside
by Albee.

Mayor Albee was even warned about

ove~/orking

the city
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police by the Oregon State Labor Commissioner, who told Albee that he
would have to either reduce the number of hours worked per day by
police officers or go to jail for violating a state law which limited
public employees to an eight-hour work day!62
The exploitation of police workers, the fiscal "crunch" of
city government, and the growing public opposition to "police state"
methods, however, did not halt the police violence.

In fact, another

police attack took place on October 29, 1913 when the police stopped
a free speech meeting, pulling nine women off a soap box, one after
another, and arresting them.

Jean Bennett* was one of the women

who was hustled into a police auto and driven to police headquarters.
Bennett and the eight other women were held without charges and
without bail.**63
While the fracas with the nine women was occurring on a city
street, r·1rs. Schwab climbed a telephone pole at a nearby intersection to deliver a speech; this stunt brought thousands of people
to the intersection where Schwab's rhetoric was flowing freely from
atop the telephone pole.

Next, bm pol ice offi cers pulled her down

from the pole and rushed her to jail in an auto.

A large crowd

started to follow Schwab to jail, but the crowd was met by a score
of policemen who drew a rope across the street and began to club the
heads of persons in the crowd.

r10re than a dozen persons were

*Jean Bennett was a middle class reformer who played a
prominent role in the Portland free speech fight in 1913.
**According to Mark Haller, the violation of suspects' civil
liberties was a norm of police conduct in the early 1900s. See
~~ark H. Haller, "Historical Roots of Police Behavior:
Chicago,
1890-1925, Law and Soci ety Revi ew, 10 (Wi nter, 1976), p. 303.
II
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assaulted and injured by the police; most of these persons were not
free speech crusaders. 64 Evidently, many of the injured persons
were merely on the sidewalks and could not get away from the clubs.
The community was outraged by this type of police action and
Mayor Albee drew sharp criticism for the display of brute force by
the police.

Indeed, cOmTllunity "influentials" warned Albee that

more serious protests against his anti-free speech policy and
police violence were likely unless he ailowed Portland citizens
the right to freedom of speech. 65 Albee finally lifted the
restrictions on basic freedoms in early November of 1913 and the
free speech fight was won.
Police Work With Juveniles:

A Cloak for the Dagger of Repression?

It is important to appreciate the fact that proactive repression of the type that was executed by the Portland police in 1913
was only one side of the urban police function in the early
twentieth century.

Preventive strategies were not incongruent

with the police riots and the outright attacks upon strikers and
protestors.

Police work with juveniles was perhaps the best

example of a preventive activity that was conducted simultaneously
with iron-fisted, military-like police activities.
The Portland Police Department initially became involved in
working with juveniles in 1905 when lola Baldwin was hired to
handle "wayward" girls at the lewis and Clark Exposition.* A
*The lewis and Clark Exposition was a fair held in Portland
in 1905 to commemorate the exp 1orati ons of ~~eriwether lewi sand
Wi 11 i am Cl ark.
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Women's Protective Bureau was established in 1909 and Baldwin
headed this new unit. The Bureau was staffed with women who were
referred to as "operatives." Their work encompassed all requests
which pertained to the welfare or safety of girls.

The operatives

investigated crimes by girls, supervised the aftercare activities
of young women who had been processed through the justice system,
and procured short-term employment for those who either appeared to
be in trouble or who had been convicted of a crime.*66
To understand the relevance of the work of these early policewomen to the police response to labor radicalism requires that the
policewomen be recognized for \'Jhat they were, namely "child savers."**
As child savers, the policewomen were supposed to playa protective
and rehabilitative role vis a vis children.

The idea was the police-

women could save children from the criminogenic "evils" associated
\'Jith the social life of the "dangerous classes" in the city.

Hence,

the duties of policewomen included the supervision and enforcement
of laws pertaining to dance halls, skating rinks, penny arcades,
pi cture shows, and other gathering pl aces for working class youth.
The Women's Protecti ve Bureau in Portl and \'/as no di fferent
from police-juvenile units in other cities in the respect that
*Special treatment for young women was not a characteristic
that was unique to the Portland Police Department. Girls bore a
disproportionate share of the burden of juvenile justice in other
cities as well during the Progressive era. For an historical inquiry
into the practice of sexual discriMination against female juvenile
delinquents, see Steven Schlossman and Stephanie Wallach, "The Crime
of Precocious Sexuality: Female Juvenile Delinquency in the
Progressive Era," Harvard Educational Review, 48 (February, 1978),
pp. 65-94.
**For an historical account of the role of the so-called "child
savers" in the development of the juvenile court, see Anthony Platt,
The Child Savers: The Invention of Delin uenc ,2nd Ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977 .
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the Bureau exerted a wide span of control over the above-listed areas
of the social life of working class youth.

While the exact extent

to which this control helped or hindered the youth supervised by
the women operatives is not known. it would seem that at best the
work of Baldwin's Protective Bureau may have had a minimal impact
upon the lives of working class youth in view of the modest success
of even the most high-powered police juvenile programs in the 1970s.
At worst the Bureau's "protective" activities may have reduced the
chances of working class youth for participation in the labor market,
in educational institutions, and other vital areas of life.* In
the final analysis both of these outcomes would have served the
same end, namely the perpetuation of a system in which the working
class was in a subordinate position to other

~ocial

classes.

In addition to controlling the social life of working class
youth, the operatives dominated the process through which juveniles
were channeled through the justice system.

Since the policewomen

ostensibly were there to "help" rather than to punish youth who
became enveloped in "unwholesome" circumstances, it followed that
they exercised a considerable amount of discretion in handling a
child's case.

Decisions pertaining to arrest. referral, institution-

alization, and other steps in official processing of a case tended
to be governed by informal standards such as past experience and
"maternal instincts" rather than formal constitutional protections. 67
*The negative effects of the juvenile justice system upon
youth are described by Edwin Schur in Radical Non-Intervention:
Rethinking the Delinquency Problem (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1973).
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Lola Baldwin and the operatives in the

~~omen's

Protective

Bureau dispensed justice to juveniles in accordance with the abovedescribed principles.

The merits and methods of Baldwin's work went

almost unchallenged for the entirety of her career.

During her

years of service she was accorded many honors for her contributions
to both the fields of law enforcement and corrections.* Perhaps
the only time that Baldwin's performance as a juvenile specialist
was pub1ical1y criticized came in 1913, a time of labor and
political unrest.
Throughout the year of 1913 the Portland News received
complaints about her work. The first complaint to be printed was
authored by Jean Bennet, a free speech fighter.
became interested in the case of Lillian Larkin,

Mrs. Bennett
a working class

girl and one of Baldwin's "charges," after Bennett had met Larkin
in the Portland jail (where Bennett and other agitators were
confined for street speaking).

Bennett criticized Baldwin's

handling of the Larkin case in an "open letter" to the Portland
community.

Portions of this letter have been excerpted from the

newspaper and are presented here in order to show the details of
Bennett's criticism of Baldwin.
An 18-year old girl by the name of Lillian Larkin was
sentenced to 30 days in jail, in Vancouver, Washington.
After serving 15 days she was paro11ed on good behavior
and told to go to Lola Baldwin of Portland, and that she
would find work for her till she could earn enough money
to go to Spokane to her mother, who is seriously ill there.
*Baldwin was a special agent (i.e., counsel) to seven governors
of Oregon as well as a western represegtative to the national
committee on prisons and prison labor. 8
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Instead of Mrs. Baldwin getting her work, she has
sentenced her to three years, either in a home {where
they operate a laundry by using convict labor, from
8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and where these frail little girls
are forced to wash and iron for their food only} or the
state institution at Salem . . •
II

II

. . • This mere child is denied an attorney [and has]
absolutely no redress. She was g~mply railroaded, tried
and sentenced by one lone woman.
Seeking to right this alleged miscarriage of social justice,
Bennett and the I.W.W. organized a move to obtain the release of
Lillian Larkin from the Oregon State Industrial School.* Bennett,
representatives of the I .W.W., and Larkin's roother Nere granted a
hearing by the Oregon State Board of Control which was the official
body that was responsible for the Industrial School.

In a

boisterous meeting on November 21,1913 the fight for Larkin's
release developed into an effort by Bennett to discredit

Balm~in,

who at the time was both the Superintendnet of the police juvenile
unit in the Portland Police Department and a member of the
advisory board of the Industrial School.

Bennett again charged

that Ba1dltJin had "railroaded" the girl to the institution and
this time she inferred that Baldwin had certain conflicts of interest.
Bennett suggested that Baldwin was referring girls in her official
capacity as a policewoman to rooming houses and homes \>Jhich Ba1d\>Jin
either owned or in which she had some other type of interest.

The

juvenile specialist denied all of these accusations in her own
testimony. 70
*The Oregon State Industrial School was a correctional
facility for girls in Salem, Oregon. Convicted female criminals
as well as non-criminals attended the "school" which stressed
the importance of hard work and discipline.
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In spite of the serious nature of the charges introduced by
Bennett and the
parole the girl.

I.~J.W.,

the Board of Control refused to pardon or

The board justified its decision on the grounds

that the "evidence" showed that the girl was "romantically inclined,"
had Itan inclination for pi1fering," and suffered from "a craze
for soldiers. 1171

At the close of the hearing, Bennett stated that

the 1.\4.U. and herself would try to secure Larkin's freedom through
an appeal to the courts.
Three days later Lillian Larkin was released from the
Industrial School in a mysterious turn of events.

The first was

that the truth about the Larkin case was somehow revealed to
Bennett and the

I.~J.W.

They discovered that Larkin was "vagged"

by the police when she initially arrived in Portland from Vancouver,
Washington.

The arresting officer then had turned her over to

Baldwin for protection; Ba1d\'·lin, in turn, had sent Larkin'!direct1y
to the Industrial School for the purpose of detention. 72 Bennett
and the I.W.W., armed with this information, proceeded to post a
bail bond of $3,000 for Larkin's release several days after the
Board of Control hearing.

Upon receipt of the bail money. the

Board of Control officially discharged Larkin from the custody of
the state of Oregon on November 24, 1913. 73 It appears that the
Portland authorities also also dropped the case since there are no
records of other hearings, trials, or incarcerations for Lillian
Larki n.
Lola Baldwin remained "under fire" from Bennett and the
I.W.H. for the remainder of the year.

.1\

corrmittee of ten women
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presented the following petition, signed by several thousand citizens,
to

~1ayor

Albee in December of 1913:

To Mayor Albee: We the citizens of Portland, state of
Oregon do hereby demand the immediate removal from office
of ~1rs. Lola Ba 1dwi n, who has ch arge of the ~~uni ci pa 1
\~elfare of Public Safety for Young Girls.
Our reaso~s for wanting her removal from office are:
She is utterly heartless and cold blooded and not a fit
person to be judge of human flesh and blood. She makes
no attempt whatever to secure work for these girls, but
railroads them to some institution as the easiest way
out. She has never been known to make one kind remark,
but instead every word she utters makes these girls
despise her.
We feel that a motherly person would have a tendency
to make the girls better instead of worse.*74
The petition fell on deaf ears in the Albee administration.
Consequently, Bennett and the

I.t~.l~.

detennined that this was one

"windmill" that they would not continue to tilt at, thus tenninating
their short-lived crusade against Baldwin.

*It is interesting to note that the radical reformers in 1913
seem to have shared the stereotypical sex role notions of Baldwin
and other more moderate reformers in the same era.
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CHAPTER VI
POLICE REGULATION OF THE UNEf4PLOYED:
AN INTERLUDE BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL
SKIRMISHES AND CLASS
CONFRONTATION
~-1obi 1i zati

on of the Unemployed

After the riots and the free speech fights, there was no
respite for the Portland and Seattle police from having to deal
with the labor radicals.

The economic crisis of 1913-1915 and

its accompanying problems of unemployment, poverty, and hunger
engendered a great deal of turmoil; as always, the I.W.H. was at
the eye of the tornado of unrest and the police were charting and
trying to control the

I.~I.H.'S

path.

The police were faced with an entirely new set of problems
related to labor radicalism when the I.W.W. began to agitate aMong
the unemployed in 1913.

The I.W.H.'S official strategy for organ-

izing the unemployed was as follows:
. the unemployed should be organized to give them
union principles, to enable them to go after what they
need, yn~ to prevent them from being used to batter down
wages.
The Portland and Seattle

i~obblies

implemented this strategy

by:..:!rming "unemployed leagues" (i.e., informal corporations).

These

organizations were comprised of unemployed as well as employed and
non-union as well as union people.

The registered membership in the
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leagues exceeded 3,000 persons in each city by the end of 1913 which
meant that about ona-third of the approximately 10,000 unemployed
persons in each city were organized into the 1eagues. 2
The activities of these unemployment leagues reflected the
I.W.W.ls direct action principles.

The leagues served as sort of

"battering rams" that wet'e repeatedly thrust against the municipal
governments in Seattle and Portland for the purpose of obtaining
public relief for the unemployed.

!·1ore specifically, the leagues

petitioned city authorities to provide the unemployed with food,
shelter, and jobs.
Both the Portland and Seattle municipal authorities \oJere unaccustomed to dealing with, let alone negotiating with the unemployed segment of the community.

Prior to 1913 the police, for

their part, had little to do with la\tJ-abiding, unemployed persons.
City officials had provided a limited amount of public works employment and local philanthropists had contributed money and other items
as personal charity during previous periods of high unemployment. 3
In turn, unorganized and jobless persons had passiveiy accepted
doles of food, clothing, and jobs.

This sort of "riel, man -

beggar man" relationship drastically changed once the unemployed
became organized into leagues and began to assert themselves in a
forceful and aggressive manner in 1913.
At first the Seattle and Portland unemployed leagues utilized
petitions and similar institutionally-legitimized techniques in an
attempt to peacefully achieve their goals.

Neither the city

officials in Portland nor those in Seattle responded in a substantial
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way to this strategy of "working within the system.

1I

\~hat

the un-

employed received from the municipal authorities in Portland and
Seattle in 1913 was very similar to what poor people have obtained
from governments since the passage of the English Poor La\'/* in 1834-"a shabby pittance.

II

Relief practices in Portland and Seattle in

1913 and early 1914 even reflected the influence of the English Poor
Law which was based, in part, on lithe principle of less e1igibi1ity.1I
According to this notion, relief allowances should be less renumerative
and beneficial than regular wages and jobs in the private sector.
The wage scale for persons in public works jobs in Portland was
a classic example of the principle of 1I1ess e1igibi1ity.1I
City Cormnissioner
plained that

Portland

L. Brewster, a liberal Republican, comthe wages paid to the 'bums' are too high." S

~~i11iam

II • • •

So Brewster used his power as the Commissioner of Public .l\ffairs
to lower the wages of single men on public works jobs from $3.00
a \'Ieek to $l.SO a week.

H. E. Huston, an unemployed person and a

member of the Portland Unemployed League, pointed out the farcical
nature of Brewster's move in this letter to the editor of News:
. A single man living in the very poorest of rooming
houses cannot get a place to s~eep for less than a
dollar a week, which leaves the magnificent sum of
50 cents with wgich to supply the inner man and
clothing ..•.
The same principle was in operation in Seattle where many of
the public works jobs were unpaid. 7 In addition, the Seattle
*The English Poor Law or the Act of 1834 was one of the
earliest instances of state involvement in the provision of relief.
For an insightful analysis of the English Poor Law, see E. P.
Thompson, The Makin~ of t~e English Working Class (New York:
Vintage Books, 1966 .

131

authorities tried to make the terms of employment as undesirable as
possible.

Seattle r·1ayor Gill, for example, told 250 unemployed men

that the city would provide them with part-time, leaf-raking jobs,
if, in return, they would ship their families to the county poor
farm. 8
The "less eligibility" approach to the problem of unemployment
failed to appease members of the leagues. The leagues continued to
petition the city halls in Portland and Seattle, but the pattern of.
governmental response was the same in both cities: meetings between
the unemployed and the municipal authorities were held and promises
were made about the provision of relief by the authorities, yet
the promises were not kept.*
As the trust of the unemployed in the city authorities waned,
more direct and confrontational tactics were utilized by the organized
unemployed.

In Seattle a long line of 200 silent, hungry, unemployed

men, standing outside of the chambers of the city council, apparently
motivated the council to appropriate $7,500 for public works in late
December of 1913. 9 Similarly, in Portland a "mob" of 400 unemployed
men swarmed into city hall and compelled the city commissioner to
house 1,000 unemployed persons in the Gypsy Tabernacle** and to
appropriate $500 to purchase blankets and other necessities for the
unemployed persons residing at the Tabernacle. 10
*Although some part-time public employment was provided in
both cities, the number of jobs and the hours of employment fell
considerably short of what was pledged by Portland and Seattle
authorities.
**The Gypsy Tabernacle was a building where revival meetings
were held in Portland.
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Perhaps the high point of the militancy on the part of the
unemployed was the march of the "Hungry Hundred" on January 8, 1913.
The Hungry Hundred was an. army of nearly 2,000 persons who walked
from Portland to Salem, Oregon, demanding that the Oregon state and
the Portland municipal governments create jobs in the public sector
for unemployed persons.

Led by Minnie Parkhurst Rimer,* \'Iho was the

only woman in the Hungry Hundred, the unemployed started

t~eir

march

in downtown Portland; as they strode by the Portland city hall, some
of the unemployed persons yelled and jeered loud enough to interrupt
a session of the city commissioners.

After this bit of mischief,

the Hungry Hundred left the city without any interference from the
pol ice. 11
Administrati ve and Statutory r1ethods of Contro 11 ing the Unemployed
It soon became evident to municipal authorities that simply
providing a little aid to the unemployed did not stop the protest
of the leagues and armies of unemployed.

~10reover,

the authorities

began to be concerned about the I.W.W. element within the ranks of
the unemployed in mid-January 1914.

Even though the leaders of the

Hungry Hundred disclaimed any

connections or sympathies, the

I.t~.lL

Portland newspapers and the public suspected that the trek to Salem
in quest of jobs was another demonstration engineered by the loW.lL
This suspicion seems to have been justified in view of the fact
that the majority of the recruits in the army of unemployed were
*Minnie Parkhurst Rimer and Ed Rimer, her husband, were the
"commanders" of the army of unemployed.
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under 25 years of age, single, and foreign born. 12 The army definitely
fit into the Wobbly mold and city officials knew it.
As for the unemployment leagues in Portland and Seattle, the
IJ-J.W. attempted to keep a "low profile" in these organizations.

In

Portland it was clear that Wobblies were among the early leaders of
the unemployed in the Portland Unemployment League,13 \'Jhile it is
also known that the Seattle Hobblies were among the founders of the
Seattle Unemployment League.

Then, too, the radical identities of

the Wobblies in the Seattle league were exposed through the vituperati ve and rhetori ca 1 attacks that they made upon Seattle ~1ayor Gi 11 .14
Portl and Corrani ssi oner Brewster was one of those \'Jho fel t threatened by the marri age that had been consunmated bebJeen the unemployed
and the I.WJL

Brewster's views on the unemp·,loyed were made clear

in the following brief statement which he presented at a meeting \'Jhere
relief practices were discussed by city officials and the public:
. . . 1 advocate putting the "screws" on and shipping
them i.e.,[the unemployed out] .•• besides it is of
a great benefit for the community as a whole to get rid
of them, as it gives the Socialist and the I.H W.
agitators such a large field to work in • . . 15
Concerns about the

I.I~.W.

recruiting among the unemployed gave

impetus to the adoption of another strategy for dealing \'Jith the
unemployed.

Using the police as a new means of sustaining the

established order, the authorities began to apply administrative
as well as statutory methods against the unemployed.

The admin-

istrative methods were unofficial and sometimes illegal procedures
for managing the unemployed t!1at \'/ere at the disposal of the
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municipal authorities.

The statutory methods were ways cf handling

the unemployed that were prescribed in ordinances and laws.*
Three events in Portland involved the utilization of administrative methods. The first event consisted of police interference
in a protest march of the unemployed.

On January 12, 1914, a

second armY of unemployed began a march to Salem in quest of jobs
and publicity.

The armY was detained in Portland for a short time

when a squad of police rushed the armY, pushing and punching its
members in a spectacle of police brutality.16 In explaining the
behavior of the police in this encounter with the unemployed, a
Portland patrolman remarked:
. . . don't blame the officers. These Men are under
orders from headquarters to beat up the unemployed.
Blame the administration. 17
A second example of administrative

met~ods

employed who were housed in the Gypsy Tabernacle.

involved the unCity and county

police drove 1,200 unemployed men out of the Tabernacle into a
driving rain on the night of January 20, 1921. 18 The men probably
survived the night by sleeping in jails and railroad cars.

As for

food, many of the men no doubt searched for their supper and breakfast in garbage cans.

Again, the city police participated in this

rather inhumane fiasco at the behest of city officials.

Chief of

Police Clark revealed that he had initially rejected a request from
the Sheriff's office to move the unemployed out of their shelter.
*The terms "administrative methods" and "statutory methods"
were first coined by Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward in
Re ulatin the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York:
Vintage Boo s, 1 71 •
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According to Clark, he \'las forced to act later when Mayor Albee's
secretary ordered him to assist the Sheriff in the evacuation of
the Tabernacl~. 19 It can be surmised that the impetus for this
action came from

~1ayor

Albee and COl111lissioner Brewster, who earlier

had jointly issued a "work or jail" ultimatum to the Tabernacle
residents on January 14th.
In addition to the particular methods used to regulate the
poor, a special unit within the Portland Police Department was
created in response to the protest of the unemployed.

The unit

was called a "reserve squad" when it was first introduced on
December 10, 1914. This unit came to be known as the "red squad"
in 1919.?0
Originally, the Portland reserve squad featured a reactive
strategy since it remained at pol i ce headquarters ready "at a
moment's notice to quell any disturbance.

1I

Restaurant rushing

which typically consisted of unemployed men entering a restaurant,
eating a meal, and then informing the owner that the mayor would
pay for the meal was cited by Chief of Police Clark as being one
type of disturbance for which the reserve squad would be used.

The

Chief also noted that he expected that the reserve squad would be
dealing with restaurant agitators on a large scale "due to the large
number of men in town and the scarcity of work.,,21

Only a few

technical details about the reserve squad were released in 1914.
Chief Clark revealed that the reserve squad would be ample strength
to handle any thing in the nature of a riot."
II

Also, he disclosed
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that the reserve were on duty until 10:00 p.m. and that a night
reserve would be established in the future.*22
Statutory methods of regulating the unemployed were used by
both Portland and Seattle authorities.

Insofar as the police were

concerned, the power of arrest was an important way of dealing
with the unemployed.

~'Jhen

the unemployed resorted to the tactic of

restaurant rushing, for example, the police agencies in both cities
responded by arresting the consumers of "free food" on the charge
of "di sorder1y conduct. 1123
The police also arrested persons for "disorderly conduct" in
situations where they perceived that the civil order was being disrupted or disturbed.

A bizarre incident that occurred in Portland

on December 29, 1913 exemplifies this use of statutory methods.
Early in the day, a woman who gave the name of Dr. Marie Equi**
*Special details and units, similar to Portlandls reserve
squad in structure, existed in the Seattle Police Department prior
to 1914, but Seattle radicals had to wait several years for their
own red squad. As to the question of why the Portland police
formed a quasi-red squad before the Seattle police, two conjectural
points might be considered. First, the level of unrest, as
indicated by newspaper reports of restaurant rushing, demonstrators
and protest marches, seems to have been higher in Portland than in
Seattle in 1913-1915. It may be that higher levels of unrest call
forth more extreme structural changes in police organizations.
Second, a greater concern for structural reform among Portland
authorities as compared to Seattle authorities may have been
responsible for the earlier introduction of the quasi-red squad in
Portland. More specifically, r~ayor Albee and the other Portland
authorities who advocated a commission form of government, with
its stress on specialization and expertise, may have been more
inclined than the Seattle authorities to support specialization
in the police and other city departments.
**With regard to the possible role of the real Dr. Equi in the
prank, leaders of the unemployed said that they did not think that she
was the one who had sent the invitation over the phone. However,
Julia Godman Ruutilla, a labor radical herself and one of the late
Dr. Equi IS close friends, stated that she would have "to take the
fifth amendment" when she was asked whether or not such a move was
part of Equils repertoire of tactics. 25
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called the hall of the Unemployed League, promising that there would
be free meals provided for the unemployed at a local church.

Several

hundred men then marched to the church in anticipation of eating
free food.

Upon their arrival there, however, the unemployed were

told that dinner at the church had been prepared for members of the
Rotary Club rather than for members of the Unemployment League.
After the throng turned away from the church, 40 of them went to
police headquarters to demand meals.

When the police refused to

feed them, the leader of the group became noisy and was arrested for
"di sorder1y conduct. 1124
The enforcement of ordinances prohibiting vagrancy constituted
another way in which statutory methods were part of the police response to collective action by the unemployed.

Again, both the

Portland and Seattle police exercised their power of arrest in
charging unemployed persons with the crime of vagrancy.

In most

instances, the only crime committed by those arrested for vagrancy
was that they were destitute and out of work.

The case of Raymond

Crosby, who was arrested, charged, and sentenced to jail for
vagrancy in 1914 seems to be representative of the vagrancy cases
processed through the criminal justice system in Portland.

This

letter from Crosby's wife, Inez, provides insight into the administration of injustice that occurred as a result of the use of
statutory methods.
Dear Judge [Henry E.l McGinn: Little Licia is starving,
and I ain't strong enough to work. She's only 3 years old,
and it ain't good for little girls like that to starve.
11m starving too, but that don't matter any. Youlve got
my man up there in jail and he ' l1 stay there a long time
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yet if you don't help me. He ain't done nothing wrong
at all, and I know he hasn't. l~ould you take my work
for it judge and let him out of jail? Licia needs him
badly, and I need him, too. 26
The Portland police seem to have placed special emphasis upon
making vagrancy arrests to control the unemployed.

Table I shows

that vagrancy arrests in Portland increased steadily from 1912
through 19i5 and then decreased rather sharply in 1916 and 1917.
Vagrancy arrests constituted over 13 percent of all arrests in 1912,
exactly 14 percent in 1913, almost 15 percent in 1914, and over 16
percent in 1915.

Arrests for the same charge decreased after 1915

from more than 16 percent of all arrests in 1915 to slightly more
than 10 percent in 1916 and to over 9 percent in 1917.
TABLE I
VAGRANCY ARRESTS r~ADE BY PORTLAND POLICE,
1912-1917 27
Vagrancy

Year

N

%

1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917

2,190
2,254
3,319
3,314
1 ,216
963

13.43
14.00
14.96
16.12
10.09
9.70

Other Charges
%
N
14,121
13,844
18,869
17,245
10,830
8,969

86.57
86.00
85.04
83.88
89.91
90.30

N

Total

16,311
16,098
22,188
20,559
12,046
9,932

%

100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

The Seattle police do not seem to have placed as much reliance
upon vagrancy arrests as did the Portland police. Statistics from
1912 indicate that only 20 of the 17,078 arrests made by the Seattle
police \'1ere for vagrancy.28 In other words, vagrancy arrests accounted
for less than two percent of the total number of arrests made in that
year.

(Data for the years 1913-1917 were not available for use.)
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The difference in the utilization of vagrancy ordinances by
the Portland and Seattle police may have been due, in part, to the
somewhat different public relief practices in the respective cities.
Whereas in Portland, both the "criminal and non-criminal male element"
tended to be handled in a similar fashion with a lock-up in jail ,29
in Seattle the unemployed had the opportunity to \'Iork two days a
week in exchange for free room and board at a publ-ic institution.
According to Seattle Mayor Gill, the provision of public \'Iorks even
though it was unpaid work, " . . . eliminated the vagrant element
which we,;would have on our hands. 1130
Understanding Police Methods of Regulating the Unemployed
The best way to understand administrative methods, such as
those used in Portland, is to examine the functions they served for
the economic and political order.

Piven and Cloward theorized that

administrative methods operate so as to enforce low-wage work.
They claimed that authorities treat some of the poor in a degrading
and punitive manner in order to both deter other unemployed persons
from engaging in politics or idleness and to influence unemployed
persons to offer themselves to any employer on any terms. 3l
Although no data on the intentions of the Portland authorities could
be found, Piven and Cloward's functionalist interpretation of
administrative methods provides at least a plausible explanation for
the harsh and brutish behavior of the Portland police in relation
to the Hungry Hundred and the residents of the Tabernacle.
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As for the significance of statutory methods, it is again
useful to examine the larger political and economic arrangements
in Portland and Seattle.

A starting point is the realization that

the economies of both cities were dependent upon the lumber industry.32
Between 1913 and 1916 overproduction was a constant problem in the
lumber industry, causing many workers to enter the already large
ranks of the unempioyed.

The owners logging camps and lumber mills,

however, did not complain about the unemployment problems associated
with overproduction since the ideal labor force, from their perspective, was one in which many unemployed stood in reserve for work
in the lumber industry.

With a substantial number of workers held

in reserve, the lumbermen could hire employees for relatively low
wages and discharge them with relative ease. 33
From the point of view of the municipal authorities, however,
having an "industrial reserve army" was probably viewed as a IInecessary
evil

II

under normal ci rcumstances.

.l\fter all, the city coffers lost

revenue in the short run because of the practice of doling out
welfare to the unemployed.

Still, some advantages (i.e., higher

tax revenues, easier access to loans, etc.) accrued to city governments in the long run as an indirect result of the process of
capital accumulation in the lumber industry.
The problem, however, \'1as that an industrial reserve army,
especially an army headed by radicals, was

a headache for

m~inly

municipal authorities in times of economic crisis.

In these hard

ti mes the authori ti es needed more than "stop-gap, emergency
II

welfare reforms to handle the protest of organized, unemployed
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persons.

The criminal justice system was one mechanism that was

used to control the "surplus" workers.

When the criminal justice

system was invoked in Seattle and Portland as a partial solution
to the problem of unemployment, the authorities, in effect,
"criminalized" the surplus labor force by charging the unemployed
with vagrancy* and by thus handling them as if they were real
criminals.

In short, the process of arresting and jailing unemp1oy-

ed persons in Portland and Seattle for the period 1913-1915 constituted a "crimina1ization of the surplus labor force."
How well did these police methods work in terms of regulating
the unemployed? Overall, it does not appear that police repression
of the unemployed effectively accomplished the ends of the
authorities in either city.

The unemployment leagues and armies

were able to force more welfare concessions from the city officials
in a shorter period of time than had probably ever been granted
before in Portland and Seattle. Then, too, the demise of the
movement for public employment in these two cities resulted more
from tacti ca 1 errors made by the 1. W. H. than from the acti ons of
the po1ice. 34
In explaining the general ineffectiveness of police methods
in handling the radicalized unemployed, it is fitting to borrm'l a
*The application of vagrancy laws in Portland in the early
twentieth century resembled the administration of these same laws
in England from the enactment of the first vagrancy statute in
1349 to the present. In both cases the enforcement of vagrancy
laws served to protect the interests of powerful social classes
and institutions. For an analysis of the origins and uses of
vagrancy laws, see ~/il1iam J. Chambliss, "A Sociological Analysis
of the Law of Vagrancy," Social Problems, 12 (Summer, 1964),
pp. 67-77.
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phrase from R. H. Tawney's study of public relief, repression, and
the English poor in the sixteenth century.

Tawney observed that:

liThe whi p has no terror for the man who mus t look for work or
starve. 1135
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CHAPTER VI I
FROM LOCAL TO NATIONAL CONTROL OF THE CITY POLICE?
Localism and Po1ice-I.W.W. Encounters in 1916
The year 1916 was a time of testing for the Seattle and
Portland police as the struggle of the I.W.W. against the establishment order entered a more virulent phase.

At this time, war orders

ended economic stagnation and the labor market tightened.

"Mons"i:er u

mass conventions of the I.W.W. were held in Seattle and smaller
gatherings of militant workers assembled under the auspices of the
IJLW. in Portland.
I.W.t~.'s

In both cities the result was the same:

the

aggressive organizing among lumber, maritime, and a

miscellanea of other working groups produced a substantial growth
in membership in the

I.H.~J.

Lumbermen and other busi nessmen in the Pac; fi c

~lorthwest

also

developed a more organized and unified front in order to protect
their interests from the potential onslaught of the labor radicals.
Their movement paralleled the intensified organizational activity
of the I.W.W.

The

~Jashington

State Employers Association,* for

example, brought lumbermen together to discuss the

th~eat

of organized

"The ~Jashington State Employer's Association was made up of
Hest Coast emp~oyers from Washington, Oregon, and California who
organized themselves in order to fight the I.W.W. in particular and
organized labor in general.
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labor on January 11,1916 in Seattle. l

In a similar meeting lumber-

men committed themSelves to the "open shop" and founded the Lumbermen's Open Shop Association in Portland.*2
Police relations with labor radicals in Seattle and Portland
retained a localistic cast in 1916 amidst the organization-building
movements of the I.W.W. and the lumber interests.

Local economic

and social, as well as criminal interests continued to influence
police actions in both communities.

In Portland a waterfront

strike during the summer of 1916 was the most notable event
involving the Wobblies and the police.

The International Long-

shoremen's Association (I.L.A.), several Portland shipping companies,
and the I.W.W.**were the principal parties in this labor dispute.
The dispute was handled mainly by county sheriff's deputies; in
fact, it was a lisped al" deputy who became the bane of the troubles
in this strike.
The strike situation in biief was this:

the I.L.A. strikers

picketed the docks, but the employers hired "special" deputy sheriffs
to protect non-union men when they passed through the picket line.
Inasmuch as these deputies were paid by Employer's Association,
they could not be expected to impartially police the strike.

Hhen

the special deputies flourished guns. flashed badges, and taunted
*The Lumbermen's Open Shop Association was a group of Portland
lUr.1ber employers whose main goal was the establishment of "open
shop" conditions in Portland.
**The 1.\4. W. was i nvo 1ved in the capaci ty of an agi tati ona 1
"thi rd party"; the \~obb 1i es attempted to recrui t members of the
I.L.A., an A.F.L. affiliate, into the I.W.W.
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the strikers with four-letter expletives on August 4th, it became
all too clear whose side the deputies were on. 3
Not only the strikers, but Mayor Albee and Chief of Police
Clark registered opposition to this kind of behavior on the part
of the special deputies.

Albee publicly asserted that it was the
"duty of the city to police the waterfront." 4 The mayor also

disclosed that he had always been against the deputizing of company
employees as special officers.

Finally, he announced that Chief

Clark had personally informed r·1r. McCusker, the secretary of the
Employer's Association, that he would persuade the city council
to add 25 more men to the police force in exchange for the removal
of special deputies from the strike scene.

It should be noted

that prior to this time the city council had refused to appropriate
money to hire additional policemen.

However, at the council

meeting on the 19th, Albee argued that more patrolmen were needed
to police the strike situation on the waterfront.

It was only

on this representation that the ordinance appropriating money
for police salaries was passed by the council. 6
The deployment of these extra officers revealed something
about the behavior of the street policemen who had been handling
the labor dispute.

Since the beginning of the strike, the I.L.A.

had complained about inexperienced patrolmen "slugging!! and otherwise "roughing up" strikers.

Police administrators evidently

concurred with the I.L.A.'s allegations because the new men were
utilized on quiet beats, thus releasing the older and more
experienced officers for duty on the waterfront. 7
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Even after the substitution of official police for special
deputies, strike conditions sizzled on the waterfront.

The presence

of city police at the strike scene became conspicuous in the case
of a IIscab who shot and severely injured one of the strikers.
ll

The

police arrested the scab, charged him with lIassau1t with a deadly
weapon and with lIintent to ki11,11 and then placed him in jai1. 8
ll

More importantly, the I.W.W. accused the city police of allowing
scabs to carry guns. 9 The police denied this cnarge, b~t an order
by a Federal Court judge lent some credence to the I.W.W.'s claims
about IIgun-toting scabs."

In a court order pertaining to I.L.A.

picketing, the judge chastized the shipping companies for hiring
men and providing them with guns. 10
The behavior of the city police did not emerge as an issue in
the dock strike again.

It is worthy of note, however, that police

detectives engaged in a considerable amount of surveillance activity
at I.W.W. functions at the same time that patrolmen were policing
the dock strike.

The I.H.W. press reported that If1ybulls"* and

"stoo1 pigeons"**\\erenoticeab1e at a number of organizing and fund
raising meetings. 11 Since only local police were cited as being
present at these meetings, it can :be assumed that federal involvement in these endeavors was minimal in 1916.
For the Seattle police, the most significant encounter with
labor radicals in 1916 came in the police department's participation
*In i~obb1y jargon a f1ybu11 was an undercover police
detective.
**A stool pigeon is a civilian who acts as an informer for
the police.
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in the events surrounding the Everett r1assacre. * It was a Seattle
police officer who relayed information from two Pinkerton agents to
the Snohomish County officials that "a boatload of I.H.W. men and
women were leaving for Everett. 1I12 It was also the Seattle police
who handled the survivors of the slaughter that occurred in Everett.
The police took nearly 300 uninjured members of the

and 3
women organizers into custody, placing them in the Seattle jail. 13
I.~~'\L

From the standpoint of local sources of influence on police
behavior, the actions of Hiram C. Gill, who was re-elected mayor
in 1914, were more significant than those of the police.

Gill

released a statement to the press in which he exonerated the I.W.W.
for the violence in Everett and condemned the Everett authorities
on November 8, 1916. His criticism of the Everett officials was
trenchant, calling them "imbeciles" and denouncing their inconsistency in the handling of the

I.l~.l~.

Furthermore, he directed

the carrying of 300 blankets and a supply of tobacco to the loW.H.
prisoners in jail. 14
The Seattle Chamber of Commerce and some other corrrnunity
influentials took offense at this kind of treatment for the loH.IL
The Chamber and some prominent citizens formed a loose alliance
and sought to discipline Gill.

They attempted to recall him for

a second time and to discredit him by charging him with taking
*The Everett r1assacre involved the ambush and shooting of
Hobblies by Snohomish County Sheriff Donald Mc~ae and vigilantes
at the docks in Everett, WaShington on November 5, 1916. The
Wobblies had traveled to Everett from Seattle via boat for a
protest meeting.
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bribes from bootleggers. This time, however, the recall effort
failed to win the support of the community.15
Actually, the recall and the corruption matters may have
served as a guise for a larger issue which aggravated the Chamber
of Commerce, namely the conspiracy that conservative businessmen
perceived to exist between city politicians, vice operators, and
labor radicals.

The conspiracy idea consisted of the fact that

George F. Vanderveer served as the attorney for
IJ~.W.,

~layor

Gi 11, the

and local bootleggers, and the partial truth that Gill

"supported" the

I.l~J~.

after the Everett tragedy.

It was only a

small leap of faith for some persons to take the position that
vice interests, the I.W.W., and city politics were linked through
the personages of Gill and Vanderveer. 16
This conspiracy notion was logically deficient in that no
evidence was ever cited to indicate that the major, the vice
proprietors, and I.W.W. leaders ever met or plotted together in
order to further their common interests.

Whether there was a

conspiracy involving the I.W.W. or political rule exclusively by
Gill and the Farrell machine, the essential point is that local
forces shaped the operation of Seattle's municipal government in
1916.
The Great Lumber Strike of 1917 and the City Police
The localistic hue of policing in 1916 was modified in 1917.
The alteration in the traditional local character of the city police
was, in part, due to labor unrest.

The year 1917 marked the I .H.H. 's
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first real taste of power in the Pacific Northwest.
the

I.W.\~.

At this time,

focused its organizing efforts on the Northwest timber

and mill workers, launching the Lumber Horkers' Industrial Union No.
500 in

At its inception the lumber workers' union had
a membership of 11,000 persons. 17
~·1arch

1917.

Demanding an eight hour day, improved living and working
conditions, and increased pay, the

I.W.~I.

for a strike in the lumber industry.

set July 17 as the date

General unrest in the woods,

however, began in early April; by mid-summer almost all of the
members of the A.F.L.'s Brotherhood of Timber Horkers had walked
off their jobs along with the members of the I.W.H.'s Lumber
Workers' Union. The strike was almost immediately a success in the
logging camps, while only a few scattered mills throughout the
Northwest continued operations. 18 The effects of the I.W.W.-led
strike were devastating inasmuch as it virtually paralyzed the
lumber industry in the Pacific tlorthwest. 19
Even before the strike had gathered its full momentum, the
major lumber firms in the Pacific Northwest had made definite,
cooperative plans about how to cope with the unrest.

The lumber

industry's top executives determined early that they would refuse
to concede the eight-hour day.20

In order to maintain the ten-

hour day, the employers established the Lumbermen's Protective
Associ ati on. The

~Ieyerhaeuser

corporati on and about 60 other

companies joined the association, pledging to penalize any member
which granted the eight-hour day and to threaten firms which
refused to assist them. 21 Additionally, the mill owners, packing
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a fund of $500,000, met in rooms of the Industrial Employer's
Association Office in Seattle on July 16, 1917 and laid out plans
to fight the demand of an eight-hour day.22
With the aid of the county police, private police, state
officiais, soldiers, and vigilantes, the employers set out to offset
the power of the militant lumber workers.

At first, the Seattle

and Portland police played only a secondary role in the employer's
campaign to defeat the I.W.W.-contro11ed strike.

County sheriff's

departments, national guard units, special battalions of Spanish
}~erican

War Veterans, and military personnel carried out the majority

of the anti-I.W.W. missions that occurred during the early and midsummer of 1917. These forces conducted mass round-ups of Wobblies,23
carried out raids on I.W.W. hal1s,24 patrolled vulnerable sections
of railroad 1ines,25 and guarded mountain passes in anticipation of
an i magi nery i nvas i on by IIhordes of 1. t~. W. s. 26 These acti vi ti es
11

took place largely in Washington and to a lesser extent in Oregon
lumber camps and rural communities where there \'las a great deal of
unrest in the early phases of the strike.
Both unofficial and quasi-official Vigilante groups* were
also very active in this first surge against the I.l'J.H.

One

vigilante attack upon an I.W.W. hall was foiled by the Seattle
*Groups such as the Minutemen and the Patriotic League
operated in Washington with the support of Governor Ernest Lister.
The t-1inutemen consisted of 2,000 to 3,000 men, mostly SpanishAmerican l~ar Veterans, who made arrests, collected intelligence
information, interrogated I.W.W. members and other radical suspects,
raided I.W'\~ gathering places, and held prisoners for the
authorities.~7 The Patriotic League was composed of patriotic
citizens in various Washington c~Mnties. The League was not used
in any major anti-I.W.H. forays.
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police on Saturday evening, June 16th. The unusual raid-prevention
course of police action proceeded as follows.

On June 13th the I.W.W.

learned that the U.S. Marines were planning to wreck the I.W.W. hall.
Laying this information before r4ayor Gill, the I.W.W. demanded
protection.

Although Gill informed the I.W.W. that he doubted the

reliability of their source of information, a sufficient number of
police were available to repulse the attack when a "l arge number of
soldiers and marines" tried to gain entrance to the I.W'\4. ha1l. 29
In the end, however, the Wobb1 ies were the losers.
the raiders were trying to force their way into the

\~hi

I.W.\~.

quarters, one of the vigilantes was shot in the leg.

le

head-

As soon as

the shot was fired, all 51 Wobblies who were in the hall at the
time were placed under arrest by the Seattle police in spite of the
fact that the police did not know who fired the shot.

Three soldier-

vigilantes were also arrested, and all of those arrested were taken
to the city jail.

In addition, the police locked up the

for the next two days.
as well.

By halting the

I.W.~J.

hall

The Wobblies were losers in another sense
I.l~.\~.

meeting in the hall, the vigilantes

had at least hindered the planning-organizing-recruiting scheme of
the Wobblies.
On a number of other occasions the Seattle police proved to
be ineffective in preserving the labor radicals· right to freedom
of association.

On August 1, for instance, a joint meeting of the

Socialist Party and representatives of the American Federation of
Labor was broken up by soldiers.

The police were able to protect

Kate Sadler, a leader of the Socialist Party in Seattle, and the
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rest of the labor radicals at the meeting. 3D Still, the police
dispersed the entire crowd, including the Socialists and the union
leaders, thus ending the meeting which was presumably one of the
vigilantes' purposes in the first place.
The Portland police became yoked into the anti-I.W.W. campaign
when the strike activity heightened in Oregon in August. Just prior
to the time that logging operations became hampered along the
Columbia River and most of the mills closed in Portland,3l Mayor
George L. Baker proclaimed that an "iron hand" would meet the I.W.W.
in Portland.

At a conference of federal, state, county, and city

officials elaborate plans were formulated to squelch any attempt
of the I.W.W. to interfere with the operation of the mills,
factories, or ship-building plants of the city.
With regard to the police, Chief of Police John Clark
stati oned si x men at the Eastern and

\~estern

Lumber Company and

two men at the InmiJ.n-Poul sen mi 11; other mi 11 s were protected by
one policeman each.

A number of officers were also held on reserve

at the police station in anticipation of trouble.

This left only

four officers patrolling beats on the east side and five officers
on the west side in Portland. 32
In addition to this

reacti~e

strategy, the Portland police

commenced an offensive mission against the

I.W.~J.

On the streets

of Portland, a police dragnet swept through lodging houses and
various I.W.W. gathering points in search of Wobb1ies.

Scores of

workers and I.W.W. organizers were arrested and charged with petty
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offenses by the city police.

Portland police even dredged up that

"old chestnut," the vagrancy law, as one means of railroading men
to the Portland rockpile.*33 "Peddling handbills (urging mill
workers to strike) without a license" 34 and "using profane language" 35
were two of the other charges frequently employed by the police for
arresting Wobblies.
FY'om the authori ti es' poi nt of vi ew, one of the negati ve
aspects of this particular dragnet was that non-union as well as
union workers were arrested; the experience of being arrested and
thrown in jail may have antagonized some of the non-union men,
perhaps making them more inclined to join the I

.~I.W.

The case

of Valentine Adamik, an Austrian mill worker, exemplified the
indiscriminate character of the police dragnet in 1917.

Adamik

was found by police in a basement near the Eastern and Hestern
Lumber Company's mill where 50 men had walked out two days earlier.
He'was arrested, charged with vagrancy, and ordered to appear in
court.

Even though he protested to the judge that he \'1as not a

striker, but had been laid off because he was sick, the judge
ordered the police to hold Adamik until he could prove he was a
"steady worker."

t~hile

it is not known if Adamik joined the I.W.W.

later, it was noted in a report of his court hearing that Adamik was
angry and displeased with his treatment by the police. 36
*During the Great Lumber Strike of 1917 the rock quarry
at Rocky Butte (which is now the location of the Multnomah County
jail) was utilized as a "sub-jail" in order to handle the overflo\,1 of 1. W. W. pri soners.
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Federal Intervention Into the Policy of the Great Lumber Strike
Labor's solidarity remained intact despite the repressive
methods of the Portland plice and other governmental authorities in
the Pacific Northwest.

What was needed to break the strike,

according to the employers and the local patriots in Seattle and
Portland as well as the city and state political officials, was
federal intervention on a massive scale.

The owners of logging, mill,

and shipbuilding firms, who were reaping huge profits during the war,
communicated this idea to federal officials through local U.S.
attorneys who were based in Seattle and Portland. 37 Other community
influentials also called for federal assistance to crush the strike.
The Reverend

~,'ark

A.

~'1athews

of Seattle's Fi rst Presbyterian Church,

for example, wrote to Thomas H. Gregory, the U.S. Attorney General:
[the] . • . Kerensky overthrow [had been] largely
planned, schemed, and executed in the city of Seattle.
if the military authorities had concurrent jurisdiction
when the civil authorities broke down, they could
arrest these fiends, court martial, and shoot them. 38
Colonel M. E. Saville, the head of the military police at
Camp Lewis, Washington, authored a report on the situation in Seattle
which was no doubt taken more seriously by the Wilson administration,
than Mathews' letter.

Saville wrote that:

. • . a vice ring, a pro-German ring, and an I.H.W.
ring with interests interwoven and backed by political,
financial, and religious eleMents of great strength
were in control in Seattle, and that city was the
pivotal point of all I.WJ~. activities in the Northwest. 39
The significance of Saville's report is that President Wilson
read it and that Hugh Campbell Wallace, a Democratic national
committeeman from Washington and a friend of the President's, told

157
Hilson that Saville's interpretation of the linkages between
Seattle politics, vice, and the lol~.l~. was correct. 40
National and international forces also weighed heavily in the
federal government's decision to intervene into local police affairs.
For one thing, President Wilson was aware that loW.N. strikes interfered with wartime lumber production and that as a consequence, the
strikes limited the supply of airplanes and ships that could be
used to achieve war aims.

Northwest businessmen hammered away at
this fact in their reports to federal authorities. 41
Pres i dent

\~i 1son

I

s own pol iti ca 1 ideology is another factor

that should not be underestimated.

He was committed to the idea

that the spread and growth of Bolshevism and revolution had to be
prevented in order to preserve the international framework in which
the United States capitalist system could develop to its fullest
capacity.42 With the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution in November
of 1917, he resolved to fight against revolution on both the international and the domestic fronts by assisting counter-revolutionary
forces. 43
For these reasons on September 6, 1917, the U.S. government
took a major step toward trying to exert control over the poliC'ing
of labor unrest in Seattle and Portland as well as in the rest of
the country.

i10st of the loW.W. offices and halls of any prominence

throughout the United States were raided by U.S. marshals, who were
assisted by local police on this date.

Orders for the raids came

directly from U.S. Attorney General Gregory, the head of the U.S.
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Department of Justice* and a member of President Wilsonls Cabinet.

The

raids in various cities were synchronized so that they all took place
at noon; presumably, the purpose of this timing was to prevent any
warning from one place to another. 44
The I.W.W. hall, the district headquarters of the Lumber
Workers I No. 500 and No. 700 unions and the office of the Industrial
Worker in Seattle were all entered and approximately the same minute
by U.S. officials accompanied by Seattle police.
the police ordered 150 members of the
whi l.e a search was conducted.

r~any

I.W'\~.

At the I.H.W. hall

to vacate the hall

papers and other types of property

in the hall were seized by federal officials.**45
The intricacies of the raid on the office of the Industrial
Worker were described in this eye-witness account of C. E. Payne,
the editor of the I.W.W. newspaper.
Two pol ice offi cers entered the Industri a1 Worker' offi ce
with the U.S. official close behind them ••.• When the
policemen were well within the room, and it was seen that
there would be no resistance to them, the U.S. official
came from behind them and gave the editor a type-written
document of several pages and stated that he had come to
seize everything in rooms 24, 25, and 40 in the Union Block.
*The Justice Department was not the only federal bureaucracy
that triad to suppress labor radicalism at this t"ime. The Inunigration
Service detained and deported alien Wobblies, the Postal Service denied
mailing privileges to the I.~·J.W., and the War Departmentls Loyal Legion
of Loggers and Lumbermen (4 Lis) and Spruce Division increased spruce
production, and undercut the I.~J.W. IS support among timber workers. The
4 Lis was a government-sponsored uni on that was formed on November 28,
1917. The Spruce Division 'lias a corps of Army officers who acted as
recruiters for the 4 Lis and as military police to harass and otherwise discourage I.W.W. and A.F.L. organizers from recruiting ventures
in the lumber camps.
**Three weeks after the raids, the federal government arrested
a large nuni>er of I~obblies. In the time between the raids and the
arrests federal investigators had used confiscated I.W.W. literature
in order to prepare cases under the Espionage Act.
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While McDonald [the Secretary of the Seattle I.W.W.) was
reading the document and the police officers and the U.S.
official began piling letters, pictures, typewriters,
office equipment, books and records indiscriminately into
boxes to remove to the ~tfices of the United States
District Attorney .••.
There was no mention of the offices of the Industrial Worker
in the warrant, but there were several references to Solidarity, the
I.W.W. magazine, which was published in another building. 47 Yet,
both offices were indiscriminately raided.

From these facts, it

is clear that there was little heed given to the Fourth Amendment in
this raid.

Indeed, it appears that the raid was conducted under

one of the broadest search warrants ever issued by the American
judiciary.48
The raid on the I.W.W. headquarters in Portland followed the
same pattern as the raids in Seattle.

A U.S. marshal, a force of

secret service agents, city police, and deputy sheriffs entered the
I.l~.W.

headquarters, frisked the 100

l~obblies

present, searched for

seditious literature and firearms, and seized the Wobblies' I.l~.H.
membership cards. 49 The ~lobblies were ordered to leave the building
and then everything with which the I.W.W. was conducting business-account books, library printing presses, letters and office furniture,
pictures, and characters--was hauled a'l,ay in trucks. 50
After the September 5th raids, the ties between federal
authorities and the municipal authorities in Seattle and Portland
became more noticeable.

One indication of these connections is that

the police departments in both cities assisted federal law enforcement officers in a series of raids.

Seattle police detectives
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collaborated with federal officials in a raid on rooms rented by the1.t~.W.

in a hotel in November of 1917. Six thousand feet of dynamite

fuse* and a load of books, membership lists, correspondence and
other documents were seized in this raid, although no arrests were
made. 5l A similar raid was conducted on I.W.W. rooms in another
hotel several weeks later.

Federal agents, assisted by the Seattle

police, confiscated a "truckload of literature and documents" in
this raid. 52 Another raid was carried out by U.S. marshals and the
Seattle police on December 20, 1917. This time the police arrested
six persons and seized mimeographs, typewriters, and other property
that was essential to the operation of I.W.W. business. 53
Still another raid was conducted in Seattle on December 21st.
Federal and city police boarded the Russian ship, the Shilka, and
searched it for a mYthical $100,000 in gold that was supposedly to
be used in defending 1. W. W. pri soners and for muni ti ons that \'Iere
allegedly to be employed in starting a Bolshevik Revolution in the
54
In point of fact, the Shilka was not carrying anyUnited States.
thing more explosive than a cargo of licorice root, peas, and beans!55
Aside from the raids, instances of federal influence over the
activities of the Seattle and Portland police are not as easily
discerned.

Nevertheless, it appears that the tentacles of the

federal government protruded into police affairs in other ways.

To

be specific, the size, organization, and morale of the Portland police
department as well as the public's safety from criMinal victimization
*It was discovered later that the I.W.W. did not own the
dynami te fuse.
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seem to have been affected by changes in the department made as a
result of requests by the federal government.

Portland Mayor Baker

admitted that the size of the police force was increased by 75 men
in 1917 in order that the police could perform the work required of
them by the federal government. This work involved the protection
of shipbuilding plants and the other important war industries in
Portland.

From the local authorities' point of view, the industries

needed to be protected against the "sabotage" of I.W.H. organizers
who were seeking to recruit maritime workers as well as the potential
sabotage of bona fi de pro-German supporters who may have \'/anted to
destroy plants, ships, munitions, and other war-related paraphernalia.
The deployment of policement at the Portland shipyards
carried some consequences that apparently were not anticipated by
either the city or federal officials.

First, patrolmen who guarded

the shipyards began to complain about their own low pay and some
even deserted their jobs. 58 A major reason for the discontent among
the street policemen was the difference between the $100 a month
pay of patrolmen and the $40 a week pay of corrmon laborers in the
shipyards. 59 Second, the attrition in the ranks of patrolmen coupled
with the need to utilize large numbers of police at the sites of war
industries reduced the police department's capacity to perform law
enforcement and service functions.

This fact was brought out in a

newspaper expose on the police in which it was revealed that every
division of the poli.ce bureau was working "shorthanded.

II

r1any of

the beats were reported to be left uncovered or to have been so enlarged that it was impossible for a policeman to patrol them with any
degree of effectiveness. 60
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In terms of organizational change, a "war emergency squad" was
formed by the Portland police in response to requests from the
federal government.

According to Mayor Baker, the purpose of the
squad was lito r.1ake Portland clean for soldiers. 11 61 In other words,
the squad was supposed to "protect" U.S. soldiers from the lIevils
of gambling, drinking, and prostitution." 62 The real function of
the war emergency squad may have been something quite different from
the publicized purpose.

There is evidence that many officers
assigned to the squad had little conception of their duties. 63 Moreover, the names of several of the members of this squad show up consistently on the lists of police who participated in the raids on the
I.W.t~.

halls and headquarters in Portland in 1917.
Linkages between the Seattle police and federal authorities

were more tenuous and obscure than those in Portland.

Still, the

federal government emerged in an important police case against local
vigilantes, significantly influencing the outcome of the case.

A

brief digression is necessary to limn the general contours of the
relationship between the vigilantes and the federal authorities in
this case.

Beginning with the wrecking of the Pigott Printing

Concern on January 5, 1918, several vigilante attacks were made on
I.W.lL and Socialist newspaper publishing and distributing sites.

64

The self-appointed, civilian law enforcement officers wreaked a
considerable amount of property damage in each attack; no suspects
were taken into custody for any of the vigilantes were riding
roughshod over the city.

Understandably, the citizenry began to

complain about a lack of "1aw and order" in Seattle. l4hen the Seattle
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police arrested two menDers of the r1inutemen on January 12, 1918 on
a charge of being the "ringleaders" of the mob that had wrecked the
Pi gott Printing Concern,* it was clear to the people of Seattl e that
the police were attempting to regain control over the city.65
Federal involvement in the handling of the vigilantes came
in the form of Major C. P. Stearns' effort to obtain special treatment
for the two

~1inutemen

suspects.

Stearns convinced the prosecuting

attorney that the men were blameless on account of
in Stearns' own Spruce Division.

theii~

membership

Both Stearns and the prosecuting

attorney defended the men's actions, asserting that theoir crimes
were motivated by patriotism. 66 When a farce of a trial in a city
court ended in the judge freeing the suspects on the ground of their
"emotional insanity" (allegedly caused by seditious articles
published by the radical press), it was obvious that federal
tampering had influenced the verdict.**
Police transgressions against the civil liberties of labor
radicals is another area in which the federal government and the
city police had a close relationship.

Portland police working in

conjunction with federal authorities, for example, concocted an
arrangement for keeping LW'\4. members locked-up. The police would
arrest a Wobbly on an "open charge, stating that the
II

~40bbly

was

*The Pigott Printing Concern was the publishing office for
the Industrial ~/orker and the Seattle Call, a Socialist newspaper.
**r!;inutemen agents were assured that they had the Uni ted
States government and the Department of Justice behind them in their
work of ferreting out radical activities, according to Seattle
t·1i nuteman Harry S. \'Iil son. 68
.
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being "he1d for investigation" by federal agents.

If the evidence

in the case did not warrant prosecution under federal laws, the city
courts stepped in and convicted the
public order offense.

l~obb1y

on vagrancy or some other

This practice was exemplified in the case of

26 Wobb1ies who were arrested in a federal raid on the Portland I.W.W.
hall. After federal authorities determined that there was insufficient
evidence to convict the men in federal court', they were handed over
to municipal court for trial on public order offenses. 67
The Seattle police had similar relations with the federal
authorities and they were equally abusive of the civil liberties of
Wobb1ies.

Excesses of police power were evident in a po1ice-loW.lL

encounter that occurred on January 16, 1918.

A brief melee of police

brutality was ignited when a street policeman arrested two I .\~>W.
women for selling copies of the Industrial Horker.

~lhen

the news

spread to the I.W.W. hall, two other I.W.W. women and a large number
of lumberjacks went onto the streets to sell papers. This new
group of paper salespersons was met by a platoon of 32 police, who
snatched papers from the hands of news agents, tore up the papers,
and clubbed Wobblies as well as a non-union man who was wearing a
liberty bond button. 69 At the end of the fray27 of the paperdistributing Wobb1ies were arrested on the charge of "passing out
circulars without a license" (i.e., handbills were inside the newspaper), while the two women who were first accosted by the police
were held on an "open charge," pending investigation by the U.S.
Immigration Service. 70
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Police-I.W.W. Contacts in 1918: A Reexamination
This kind of blatent lawlessness on the part of city police
upset some authorities in the U.S. Justice Department. Hhen
Clarence L. Ream2s was appointed as a special assistant for all warrelated crimes in Seattle, he was assigned the twin responsibilities
of annihilating the I.H.W. and IIcleaningll up the law enforcement
operations in Seattle as ~eil as Portland. 71 Reames himself
expressed disgust over the lack of concern for even the rudimentary
elements of due process in the conduct of police business in Seattle
in the spring of 1918.
When I reached Seattle every public officer, federal,
state, and municipal, including members of the Fire
Department, and all volunteer organizations exercised the
privilege of unceremoniously arresting citizens, aliens,
and alien enemies and throwing them unceremoniously into
jail, where they were booked for investigation by the
Department of Justice. 72
Reames' first actions in Seattle were to order the tennination
of seizures without warrants and to try to induce all police organizations, official or otherwise, to make no arrests vJithout the
approval of the Seattle office of the Justice Department or the
73
Since the city police turned most of the
United States marshal.
arrested

l~obblies

over to federal authorities for prosecution, Reames

though that this order would cause the police to alter their search,
seizure, and arrest practices.
Studying the behavior of law enforcement personnel in Seattle,
historian William Preston posited that Reames thoroughly centralized
all anti-radical activities in his office. However, Preston qualified
his position, admitting that "lapses ll occurred in the implementation
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of Reames' po1iCy.74 How tight was the federal government's control
over the Seattle and Portland police during the spring and summer of
19181 While it is impossible to conclusively answer this question
because of data

limi~ations,

it is exceedingly doubtful that federal

officials exerted as much control over the city police as Preston
implied they did.
There was at least one flaw in Reames' policy. He appears
to have assumed that unlawful local police practices could be halted
merely by the withdrawal of federal support in obtaining convictions.
Implicit in this line of reasoning is the notion that the police
intervene into a situation solely for the purpose of prosecution.
Yet, the Seattle and Portland police often took action against the
I.W.W. for purposes other than prosecution in 1918.*
r~ore

important i nsofa r as Fri edhei m' s stance is concerned,

is the fact that the Seattle and Portland police continued to engage
in many of the same practices after Reames' appointment as they
did before the U.S. Justice Department tried to make Reames a sort
of law enforcement czar in the Pacific Northwest.

The Seattle

police, for instance, made numerous arrests of Wobblies along the
Seattle waterfront in r~arch 1918. 75 It was probably not coincidental
that sorre of the I.W.W. leaders, who were arrested on lIopen charges,1I
were taken into custody at a time when the I.W.W. was organizing
waterfront workers into a union.

As for the arrested rank-and-file

*Wayne R. La Fave pointed out that police make arrests for
purposes other than prosecution in his benchmark study of police
decision-making. See La Fave's Arrest: The Decision to Take a
Suspect into Custody (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965).
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Wobblies, most of them could not afford bail so they were packed like
sardines into the Seattle city jail. 76 The purpose of the arrests
in these cases seems to have been to disrupt the activities of I.W.W.
organizers and to incapacitate rank-and-file Wobblies.
Portland police also made arrests for reasons other than
prosecution.

In April 1918 an I.W.W. organizer was arrested while

he was speaking to a crowd and held on an "open charge." 77 Breaking
down the I.W.W.'s mobilization capacity seems to have been the
purpose for arresting this Wobbly leader in Portland. The police in
Portland also made arrests in order to gather intelligence information
about the I.W.W.

Wobb1ies were grilled by police interrogators in

some instances while they were held under the guise of being used
" upcom1ng
"
as W1"t nesses 1n
cases. 78

Still other purposes for making arrests were evident in the
behavior of the Seattle police.

Chief of Police Joel Warren led

series of raids that were carried out almost exclusively by Seattle
city police without the assistance of federal police.

The first

raid in the series resulted in the arrest and jailing of 213
Wobb1ies on "open charges." Chief Warren himself stated that the
objective of this police action was to assist in the "successful
prosecution of the war. 1179
Intimidation was introduced as an acknowledged purpose for
police actions in the fifth raid of the series in Seattle in June
of 1918.

Carrying carbine rifles, Seattle policemen under the

direction of Chief Warren raided an I.W.W. meeting in the woods
near Seattle.

One police officer intimated that the heavy
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artillery was necessary for a "mora1 effect." 80 The fi fth rai d may
have had other purposes as well as intimidation.

In view of the

fact that this was the fifth different meeting place raided by the
police in as many raids,8l it appears that they may have been trying
to interfere with the I.W.W. 's routine business operations.

Then,

too, the arrest of 32 persons in this raid served to incapacitate
some of the most radical workingmen in the Seattle shipyards.
To recognize that certain police practices remained intact
in spite of federal encroachment into some aspects of policing labor
wars is a necessary analytic step in unraveling the subtleties of
local resistance to the nationalization of the city police.

For

a more complete appreciation of the limits of federal control, it
is necessary to briefly explore the role of the local political
power-holders in shaping police policy.
George L. Baker and Ole Hanson were respectively the mayors
of Portland and Seattle for the period under consideration.* Both
Baker, in his roles as Mayor and Commissioner of Public Safety,
and Hanson, in his position as Mayor, had formal responsibility for
the police.

Both were "strong" mayors in the sense that they seemed

to possess informal as well as formal power in their relations
with the police.

In a word, both men "directed" the police depart-

ments in Portland and Seattle.
It was Baker who set down police policy for dealing with the
Wobb1ies when they extended the lumber strike into Portland and other
*Baker was the Mayor of Port1 and from 1917 to J.dy 1933,
while Hanson served as Mayor from 1918 to August 28, 1919 at which
time he resigned from office.
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parts of Oregon.

It was also Baker who told Chief of Police N. F.

Johnson to "handle these agitators [i.e., Wobblies] in the severest
manner possible." 82 Hence, Baker as well as the Portland police
were

r~sponsible

for the illegalities and excesses in the police

methods.
Ole Hanson exercised as much control over the Seattle police
as Baker did over the Portland police.

Indeed, the series of raids

during the summer of 1918 in Seattle appear to have been ordered by
Hanson.

Hanson publicly took credit" for the first raid, announcing
II

that it was part of his campaign promise lito rid the city of I.W.W. ' S." 83
Like Baker, Hanson apparently deserved the credit and criticism for
police actions vis a vis the Wobblies.
The immoderate police policies toward the Wobb1ies that
were devised by these two mayors between 1917 and 1919 were greatly
influenced by the ideological currents of "Americanism" which
flowed throughout the United States in the World War I period.*
Both Baker and Hanson were convinced that the I.W.W. had planned
the Great Lumber Strike of 1917 for the explicit purpose of undermining the nation's war aims.

To Baker the Wobblies were Itraitors,"84
while to Hanson they were "Red revolutionists." 85 Without question
*According to Mayor Hanson's own four-page definition of
Americanism, the tenn meant 11iberty," "self-government," "equality,"
democracy , "conti nuous progress, 111 aw, 1I1ove of fellow man ,II
"hope," "optimism," "family love and family life," "one wife and one
country," "increased production and iDcreased prosperity for all,"
"strong national government," "protection of private rights and
property," "strength," "preparedness and universal training," "morality,"
"God and good," "truth,1I IIreason," "proof by experience~" "success,"
"equal suffrage," "reward for individual effort," "full and equal
justice," "universal and free education," and "human rights." For
more of Hanson's thinking on the subject of Americanism see his
Americanism Versus Bolshevism (New York: Doubleday, Page, and
Company, 1920).
II

II

II

II
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the wartime patriotism of these two powerful local figures pushed them
in the direction of advocating and supporting repressive police methods.
While it would be a mistake to completely discount material
interests in explaining police behavior in 1918, it does appear
that purely economic forces were of secondary importance behind the
over-powering presence of the Americanism ideology.

This assel"tion

is based on the fact that no evi dence was found to support the
proposition that the excesses of city police power in 1918 were due
to the influence of lumbering or other business interests upon the
police.

Yet, the fit between the mayor's ideological convictions and

the needs of the employing class in the two cities as well as the
authorities in the federal government was so nearly perfect that
in the final analysis it must be recognized that Americanism, as it
was reflected in the police efforts to suppress labor radicalism,
assisted the economically dominant class in accomplishing the larger
goal of perpetuating the capitalist system.
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CHAPTER VII I
POLICING THE SEATTLE GENERAL STRIKE
The Problem of Defining Labor Radicalism
The Seattle General Strike in 1919 afforded the defenders of
corporate capitalism some of their most perilous moments in the
twentieth century.

The first line of defense for the forces of order

in the General Strike was manned by the city police.

From the

winter of 1918 through the summer of 1919 the Seattle police were
deeply immersed in a battle against the labor radicals who sponsored
and participated in the General Strike.
In policing the General Strike Seattle law enforcement
officers faced a perplexing situatiJon in which it must have seemed
to them that all working persons were radicals.

This was because

the term "radical" had a very broad application in the context of
the Seattle labor movement from 1918-1919.

Even members of the

local A.F.L. unions in Seattle were regat'ded as being radicals by
the national headquarters in 1919,.1

The concern about radicalism

in the Seattle A.F.L. was not without substance in fact.

It has

been estimated that 95 percent of the rank and file members in
A.F.L. unions in Seattle felt that the workers should control the
industries instead of the employers. 2 Moreover, the prevalent
sentiment among Seattle A.F.L. union members was that all working
persons had a natural relationship toward one another as "cl ass
brothers ... 3
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From the standpoint of the Seattle police, the ideological
diversity within the local A.F.L. labor movement was of critical.
importance.

Three general groupings--the "conservatives," the

"radicals," and the "progressives"--were recognized within the
Seattle labor movement.

The conservatives tended to favor a

practical, incremental approach to improving the working person's
lot, usually within the confines of the private property system.
The second group, the progressives, served as a buffer between the
~onservatives

and the radicals. The progressive's policy

stressed organizational solidarity and integration, while
reflecting elements of both the conservative and the radical
perspectives.

As for the radicals, this group of workers demanded

rapid and far-reaching changes in the position of labor in society.
The radical group itself consisted fo three subgroups:

the "free-

wheeling" radicals with no outside organizational ties; some
Wobblies who simultaneously held I.W.W. and A.F.L. cards and
participated in the actions of A.F.L. unions; and the "incipient
communists" (the CC!1i11unist Party of the United States was not
formed until August-September 1919) who had strong Bolshevik
inclinations and who were also active in A.F.L. affairs. 4
The police also had to cope with the activities of those
Wobblies who operated solely as members of the I.W.W.

Additionally,

the police dealt with a variety of socialist and anarchist groups
which often became involved with the labor movement. The situation
was made all the more confusing for the police by the fact that
many labor radicals had multiple affiliations.

For example, a

178
large number of persons were members of the A.F.L., the I.W.W., and
the Socialist Party at the same time, although the exact number of
these types of labor radicals is unknown and cannot be reliably
estimated due to the lack of data.
The Seattle Police and the Labor Radicals in the Winter of 1918
Setting aside the somewhat abtruse issue of defining labor
radicalism, it is useful to examine police actions before, during,
and after the General Strike.

This longitudinal view allows for an

appreciation of how police policy changed in accordance with shifts
in the balance of power between labor and capital.

Police behavior

in the period preceding the General Strike was much the same as
police behavior in the first part of 1918.

In line with Mayor

Hanson's campaign promise to "get rid of the I.W.W.," the Seattle
police persisted in their efforts to repress the Wobblies through
the winter of 1918.
The milder side of this repression consisted of the suppression
of the Wobblies' basic constitutional rights.

The Seattle police

has a relatively easy task in obstructing the Wobblies' freedom to
associate with one another. To bar the I.W.W. from local meeting
halls, all the police had to do was apply some pressure to the
owners of the halls.

Pressure came in the form of police threats

to arrest the owners or have their building condemned by city
officials.

This tactic worked to near perfection as many property

owners refused to allow Wobblies to rent halls for meeting purposes. S
Limiting the effectiveness of the I.W.W. press called for a
considerably greater amount of police effort than did restricting
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the I.W.W.'s associationa1 activity.

Street police were ordered

to patrol the streets, looking for Wobblies selling I.W.W. literature.
To perform this task well, patrolmen had to be able to distinguish
Wobb1ies and their printed matter from the other persons and
literature that circulated on the streets.
with which all patrolmen were blessed.

This was not an ability

On at least one occasion

a street policeman arrested a member of an A.F.L. union who was
selling the literature of his own union.

The man was charged with

"peddling I.W.W. papers," but later released when it was discovered
that he was not an I.W.W. member.
This tactic of trying to stop the distribution of I.W.W.
materials was not uncommon in Seattle.

Newsboys were often taken

into custody en masse by the Seattle police.

In December 1918,

for example, Sergeant P. F. Keefe arrested three newsboys and
three I.W.W. members in a round-up of persons se11ing the I.W.W.
newspaper.

Following these arrests, Chief of Police Warren was

asked to explain the reason for suppressing the I.W.W. 's distribution
of literature.

He stated that the cause of police action against

the I.W.W. was "sedition" by the I.W.W.7
Squelching the

Wobb1ies~

freedom of speech was an even more

onerous task for the police than trying to render the I.W.W. press
ineffective.

The main problem for the authorities was differentiating

between the words and deeds of Wobb 1i es.
a very foolish error in this regard.

r4ayor Hanson commi tted

On the evening of December 23,

1919 the General Secretary of the I.W.W. told the Mayor in a phone
call that "the battle is on." Hanson and police officials interpreted
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this to mean that the I.W.W. was contemplating an attack on police
headquarters.

Civic officials were so obsessed with this impression

of the meaning of the secretary's wrods that a force of police
reserves was lined up ready to repel mythical Wobbly marauders on
December 24th.

The r·1ayor and a bevy of city officials also were

present at police headquarters that night, waiting to witness a
battle that never took place. 8
Police methods such as amassing large numbers of reserves,
threatening the owners of meeting halls, and arresting newsboys
clearly were not sufficient for the purpose of suppressing the
Wobblies' freedom of speech.

The motor-mouth, Gatling 'gun-like

verbal skills of the Wobblies along with their tactical expertise
acquired in free speech fights, made it necessary to use more
forceful methods in order to silence them.

More harsh methods of

repression were used on the participants in an open-air rally on
January 12th. The result was that a peaceful meeting degenerated
into a violent, ugly disturbance because of overzealous police
action.
The meeting, sponsored by several union locals and the
Socialist Party, commenced with speeches supporting the Bolshevik
Revolution.

Toward the end of the meeting after five men had

spoken and a little girl had read a poem, one of the city detectives
sneaked out of the crowd and called a police inspector at headquarters.

He notified the inspector that "their language is getting

too strong." Police Captain Searing was dispatched to the meeting
place and ordered by the Chief of Police to use his own judgment
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as to whether the rally should be adjourned.

When he arrived at the

meeting, Searing announced to the crowd that the meeting was over.
As the crowd walked away from the meeti ng a rea

~lId

began to form

a parade, a wagon with a red flag attached to it drove by. Someone
raised the cry:

IIThere she is! There's the only flag!1I

In a flash,

almost everyone in the crowd took off their hats to the emblem of
Bolshevism and then the crowd began singing lithe Red Flag,1I an
I.W.W. song. 10 At this point, Walter C. Smith, an I.W.W. agitator,
and an editor of the Industrial Worker, gathered part of a throng
of five to six thousand persons around him.

Observing Smith's

success in gaining the crowd's attention, Captain Searing tried to
apprehend Smith in order to, in Searing's words, IIni p in the bud
any furhter demonstration. 1I Before Searing could achieve his
objective, he was attacked by the persons who had surrounded Smith. ll
Searing was saved from serious injury by the arrival of IIsquad
after squad of police,1I but the heads, arms, shoulders, and shins
of many persons in the crowd were not spared from the blackjacks
and sticks wielded by both city and military police; many of these
police had burst onto the scene from a hiding place in a building
nearby the meeting site. 12 By the end of this orgy of violence, the
police had broken up the parade and had arrested 13 persons for
IIdisorderly conduct. II The Seattle

~1inutemen,

who had been conducting

spy work during the meeting, helped the police in the arrest
process by determining who among the participants was the most
radical and therefore, the most disorderly. 13
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Several days later the police were again called upon to keep
down the Wobblies. This time the event was an outdoor meeting
which had been organized to protest the police tactics used at the
January 12th rally.

In preparation for this second open-air meeting,

the police reorganized three shifts in order to have a large number
of policemen available "in case of trouble."

In addition, dozens

of new clubs were distributed among the emergency details in the
Seattle Police Department. 14
Approximately 500 militants and from five to six thousand
spectators turned out for the meeting at which speakers called for
the resignation of Mayor Hanson and the removal of Chief of Police
Warren.

Once again, a parade was formed after the speech-making

and again the police intervened to stop the parade.

However, this

time the police, not the protestors, struck the first blows.

The

militants, who were leading the parade, were set upon by a small
armY of police, including 14 mounted policemen, 4 auto trucks
containing 50 police armed with carbines, and 5 squads of police on
foot with night sticks.

In addition, the city police were assisted
15
by about 300 citizens who had been sworn in as special police.
Unfortunately, the outcome of this clash of labor radicals
and Seattle police is unclear.

Newspaper accounts of this event

varied from the Times' report of no police violence 16 to the
Post-Intelligencer's ambiguous observation that the crowd was
"swept before" the police 17 to the Star's portrayal of a fullblown police riot. 18 Although there is no way to assess the relative
merits of each account, it strains the imagination to think that
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the police, given their perfonnances in handling a similar meeting
on the 12th, could mobilize such a large body of men, come face to
face with the radicals, and not club a few heads.
On the same night as the protest meeting, the Seattle Metal
Trades Council* ordered a strike by the men working in the shipyards.**
The main issue in the strike was the union's demand of an increase
in pay for unskilled workers.

Skilled mechanics and machinists,

who were drawing higher wages than the unskilled workers, joined
their less fortunate co-workers in a strike which actually began
19
on January 21,1919.
Many of the 35,000 workers who walked out of the shipyards
in this strike were extremely radical even in the context of the
Seattle labor movement.

This was because a large number of Wobblies

worked in the shipyards (because it exempted them from fighting
the

II

capitalists' war

ll

)

the metal-trades unions.

and many of these Wobblies also belonged to
The radicalism of shipyard workers was

also demonstrated by the t1etal Trades Council's sponsorship of the
Soldiers, Sailors, and Workingmen's Councils.***20
*The Seattle Metal Trades Council was composed of representatives from the local metal trades unions in Seattle.
**Although Seattle labor called upon its fellow unionists in
Portland to join the strike, the Portland Metal Trades Council did
not comply with the request from the Seattle r1etal Trades Council.
***The Soldiers, Sailors, and Workingmen's Councils ostensibly
were established to provide assistance to soldiers and sailors who
had returned from the war. It appears, however, that the Councils
were also designed for the purpose of creating ideological divisions
within the ranks of military and ex-military personnel. In effect,
the Councils were the American edition of the Bolshevik soviets.
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Following the shipyard workers' walkout, a fast turn of events
occurred within a span of 13 days.

First, the Seattle Central Labor

Council* approved a request by the Metal Trades Council for a general
strike throughout the city in sympathy with the shipyard workers'
strike. Second, the rank and file members of Seatt1e's local A.F.L.
unions voted to support a general strike.

Third, a General Strike

Committee of 15 persons was appointed to manage the strike.
Gearing Up for the General Strike
The General Strike Committee began planning for the strike on
February 2nd.

The committee transacted a heavy vol ume of busi ness

in an all-day meeting; its decisions touched upon nearly every
aspect of life in Seattle.

Such extensive planning was necessary

because the strike was not to be merely a shutdown of the city
services; instead, workers in different trades made arrangements
to provide essential services to the public.
Police protection, for example, was to be furnished by the
strikers.

In making preparations to police the city, the strike

committee had the audacity to announce that a planned increase in
the size of the Seattle police force for the strike would be
unnecessary since the strike committee had "perfected" plans to do
its own policing on behalf of organized labor.

Additionally, the

committee placed a "voluntary" 8:00 p.m. curfew on the city and
*The Seattle Central Labor Council consisted of representatives from the local A.F.L. unions. The Council was a very
powerful force in Seattle politics in 1918-1919.
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publicly warned the strikers not to cause any disturbances that
might turn the public away from the side of organized labor. 22
To work out the details of how labor would police the city,
the Committee appointed a three-person Law and Order Committee which
was headed by Frank A. Rust.

Rust, who was the manager of the

Labor Temple Association* and reputed to be a "conservative" labor
leader, may have been one of the most radical persons to ever
undertake the responsibilities of police management.

He reportedly

told C. B. Fitzgerald, who was a member of the Seattle city council
at the time of the General Strike, that:
I am not for revolution now. I am afraid it cannot win,
but if I though it could win, I would be for it down the
line. 23
Prior to the strike, Rust's most -1mportant activity

'tlaS

the

recruitment of union men, who had served in the U.S. Army or Navy,
to do police work during the strike.

These former military men

formed a group which came to be known as the War Veteran Guards. 24
While the General Strike Committee laid plans to provide
vital services, city authorities were deeply involved in the process
of making their own plans.

Mayor Hanson and Chief of Police Warren

played the most important roles in designing police policy for the
strike.

Not surprisingly, Hanson's decisions were partially

influenced by his own super-patriotism.

From Hanson's patriotic

point of view, the shipyard strike and the general strike were part
of a larger conspiracy to foment a revolution in Seattle. The
*The Labor Temple Association was a group of persons
responsible for the Seattle Labor Temple. The Temple itself was
a building dedicated to the service of labor.
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mayor believed that a "strange body of men,1I linearly half a hundred,lI
had gathered in a pool hall in the village of Linnton, Oregon and
had laid plans to overthrow the U.S. Government. According to
Hanson, the IIrevo1utionistsll had selected the shipyard strike as the
starting point, the general strike as the follow-up move, and the
revolution as the IIfina1 b1ow. 1I25 Hanson identified the conspirators
as being the members of a "secret soviet." This small minority,
in his view, exercised a disproportionate amount of power in the
Seattle labor movement.

Hanson, who often attended Central Labor

Council meetings, made the following observations in regard to the
"red" machinations in wielding power inside of the A.F.L. labor
movement:
The Reds intentionally prolonged union meetings until
almost dawn. When the home owner and the family man was
forced to go home, they [the Reds] remained and toward
morning did exactly as they pleased . . • [often passing]
revolutionary resolutions. . • At eleven p.m. the
meeting would be American, at midnight it would be fiftyfifty, while at two in the morning, only the Reds
remained, with sometimes a few so-called conservative
leaders who were too cowardly to raise their voices in
defense of their country.*26
The demands of businessmen and civic notables weighed just
as heavily upon Hanson's mind as the alleged plots of mysterious
conspirators in 1919.

Prior to the strike Seattle businessmen

called upon the Mayor to put the entire city under martial 1aw. 27
Powerful men in municipal government, such as C. B. Fitzgerald, also
pressured Hanson to take a firm stand. against the General Strike. 28
*The sans culottes used similar tactics to exercise power in
the French Sections in the 1790s. For a detailed account of how a
militant minority grasped the reins of power and controlled the
majority, see Richard Cobb, The Police and the People: French
Popular Protest, 1789-1820 (New York: Oxford university Press, 1970).
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Hanson's actual preparations for the General Strike proceeded
on a gigantic scale.

He wired the U.S. Secretary of War, asking

him to IIstand ready with government troops" in case the IIrevolutionists"
displaced the city authorities from the seats of power; he requested
state troops from Governor Ernest Lister; and he threatened to
deputize 10,000 citizens as special police. 29 As a result of his
efforts, federal troops were deployed in the following manner:

one

battalion of the First Infantry was stationed nearby as a reserve;
another battalion and a machine gun company was dispatched to an
armory, and smaller detachments were ordered to guard strategic
points, such as the electrical power-distribution centers.

State

troops that were sent to Seattle were stationed in another local
armory.30 As for the civilian or special police hired by the city,
Hanson informed a New York Ti mes reporter that:

IIWe organi zed

1,000 extra policemen, armed with rifles and shotguns, and told them
to shoot on sight anyone causing disorder . • . 1131
Actually, the plans for the utilization of special police were
somewhat more detailed than Hanson made them out to be.

Chief of

Police Warren planned to appoint special police to patrol residential
IIbeats,1I freeing the experienced policemen from these beats and
allowing them to be prepared to cope with any strike-related
emergencies.

With this type of deployment, the police hoped to

have a "man covering every street block" and to IIbreak up downtown
assemb 1ages.

II

32

Chief Warren, working behind the scenes, assumed a critical
place in the pre-strike planning.

Warren's actions, like those of
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other police officers, were affected by his personal, on-the-job
experiences.

t10st of Warren's law enforcement experience prior to

becoming Seattle's Chief of Police came in his role of a confrere
to Bat Masterson and Wyatt Earp in the frontier days of Spokane Falls,
Washington in the late 1800s. Warren has even been described as an
"old Indian-outlaw hunter" because of his dealings with various
types of frontier characters. 33
Wily, old Chief Warren may have known how to suppress labor
radicals better than any of the other city officials.

Warren

summarized his thinking on the police response in General Strike
in these words:

"I figured it out this way.

If the I.W.W. have

one gun each, we ought to have from three to thirty for each of our
offi cers. 1134
Warren devised a two-pronged "out-gL!n-em" strategy.

First,

to minimize the number of guns for the radicals, Warren comandeered
raids on pawn shops and hardware stores prior to the strike in
Seattle.

The Chief claimed that these raids netted all the guns,

the powder, and the ca rt ri dges th at had been scattered from he 11
II

to breakfast. 1135
Second, Warren stockpiled an enormous amount of military
weaponry that could be used by the city police to break the strike.
He secured machine guns, mounted them on trucks, and enlisted the
services of discharged soldiers to man the guns during the strike. 36
These IImachine guns on wheels" were a particularly ominous symbol
of Warren's draconian police planning.

These weapons were, in poir.t

of fact, motor trucks with barricaded sides, consisting of sand bags
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roped to the borders of the truck, with machine guns mounted in the
center, allowing for a complete "sweep" of the street.

The sand bags

were piled high in the front of the truck to protect the driver,
while the wagon of the truck was large enough to hold ten men. 37
The General Strike and Police Coercion
The beginning of the strike itself was low-keyed compared to
the hyperactivity of the pre-strike period.

Mayor Hanson described

the first day of the General Strike this way:
At ten o'clock, February sixth, a strange silence fell
over our city of four hundred thousand people. Street car
gongs ceased their clamor; newsboys cast their unsold papers
into the street; from the doors of mill and factory, store
and workshop,·streamed sixty-five thousand workmen.
School children with fear in their hearts hurried homeward.
The 1ifestream of a great city stopped. 38
The first major general strike in the United States was thus
set in motion by the forces of radical labor.

From the outset, the

General Strike was basically led by the A.F.L., while the I.W.W. and
the Socialist Party also participated in it.

The forces of order

also swung into action on the first day of the strike. Before
nightfall on the 6th, thousands of business and professional men
as well as non-union workers, flocked to the Seattle City Hall to
enlist as special police. 39 Additionally, the plans of the Mayor
and the Chief of Police were implemented almost immediately by the
entire 447-man city police force, more than 1,000 sworn volunteers,
and hundreds of county, state, and federal police.
A peculiar added feature of the police response involved a
squad of special policemen who guarded Mayor Hanson's office in the
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City Hall building.

It was reported that City Hall "swannedll with

special policemen and detectives and that guards were stationed at
every door. 41

Whi le the exact reason for making a fortr'ess out of

City Hall is not known, it may be that Hanson was reacting to
statements previously made by enthusiastic Wobb1ies.

Perhaps, for

instance, the words "let's hang Hanson," which were spouted in his
face at one Central Labor Council meeting, had stuck in his mind.
With regard to the policing of the city during the strike, the
maintenance of order and the apparent cessation of

repl~essive

actions

against labor radicals were two of the most remarkable aspects of
the General Strike.

It appears that the city was more orderly during

the strike than under ordinary conditions. The police court docket
sank from the nonn of about 100 cases a day to 32 cases on the first
day of the strike, 18 cases on the second, and 30 cases on the next
two days combined.
to the strike. 42

None of these cases was in any way related

What were the reasons for the maintenance of order? Mayor
Hanson argued that peace was secured by the amassing of police.

"The

knew we meant business and they started no trouble," he boasted in
one of his public statements. 43 In other words, Hanson took the
position that a tremendous increase in the city, county, state, and
federal police in Seattle had a deterrent effect on the strikers'
decisions to create disorder and to commit illegal acts.

Based on

the findings of contemporary studies on the relationship between
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increases in police manpower and crime rates, however. this position
must be deemed to be highly questionab1e.*
A more feasible explanation of the orderliness of the strike is
that labor's solidarity and organization served to instill in the
strikers a set of "inner controls" which constrained anarchistic and
criminogenic inclinations.
orientation of workers

~nder

The individualistic, self-centered
capitalist relations of production

seems to have been replaced by a class-conscious identify that
fostered self-discipline on behalf of the collective welfare of
organized labor.

In other words, the strikers abstained from behavior

that might have been injurious to labor's cause because they were
loyal to the co-operative ideals of the General Strike rather than
to the "privatism" of the capitalist order.
The effective operations of the 300-man War Veteran's Guard
supplemented these social-psychological controls. These men served
under the authority of organized labor, not under the authority of
the municipal government of Seattle.

Interestingly, labor asserted

the Mayor Hanson had offered to deputize the War Veteran's Guard.
but th at the offer was refused by the Executi ve COl111li ttee .44 The
Committee evidently realized that if the Guard was deputized, it would
take orders from the mayor and not from it. 45
*Robert J. O'Connor and Bernard J. Gilman compared the results
from seven studies of increases in police manpower and crime. They
concluded that while five of the studies showed a very small deterrent
effect, limitations in the data used in all seven studies preclude
any certainty about the deterrent effects of police manpower on crime
rates. See Robert J. O'Connor and Bernard Gilman, liThe Police Role
in Detering Crime, in James A. Cramer (editor), Preventing Crime
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 90.
II
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What did the War Veteran's Guards actually do in order to keep
the peace? Working eight-hour shifts both day and night, the labor
guards wore white armbands to designate their status.

Their crowd

dispersal tactics differed drastically from those used by the city
police.

Carrying no weapons of any sort, the Guard used "mora1

suasion" instead of force to control large groups of people.
success of this tactic is reflected in

t!'t~

The

i".bsence of any violence

during the strike.
Another notable feature of the General Strike was that the
campaign of police repression that had been directed at labor
radicals temporarily stalled during the strike.

Evidently, the
police did not dare to interfere with the A.F.L. strike. 46 Still,
the city police did initiate some actions against the more radical
elements within the labor movement.

For example, Walker C. Smith

was arrested on the third day of the strike.

He was charged

with "distributing printed matter with the intent to incite a
riot" for his part in the circulation of "Russia Did It," a pamphlet
urging shipyard workers to take control over the shipyards.
The quarters of the International Weekly, a left wing newspaper, were raided by the Seattle police on the same day as Smith
was taken into custody.

Three persons were arrested and held for

federal investigation in this raid.

Also, the police seized a

large quantity of copies of the latest edition of the Weekly along
with several thousand copies of the pamphlet "Russia Did It." A
police spokesperson explained the raid as being "in pursuance of
the police policy to suppress all forms of I.W.W. and Bolshevik
1i terature. 1148
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Despite the arrest of Smith and the police raid upon the
International Weekly, there appears to have been some decrease in
the level of the repression of the I.W.W.

This impression is based

upon the seemingly high number of raids, attacks, and other po1iceinitiated acts in the months of December and January and the near
absence of these types of police action at the time of the General
Strike.

This cannot be conclusively established, however, due

to data limitations and to the possibility of a IIregression effect.lI*
If the police were not rounding up Wobb1ies and other labor
radicals during the General Strike, \:!hat were they doing? One
thing is clear.

The Seattle police did not change their allegiance

from the authorities' side to the strikers' side.

Following the

strike Mayor Hanson, who considered himself to be an expert on
the subject of loyalty, gloated that IISeatt1e has 450 policemen of
whom every man is loyal and true ....• .49 The police, rather than
acting on the basis of the class interests they held in common with
the strikers, chose to adhere to the orders of the Mayor, the Police
Chief, and other police administrators.

By virtue of this acquiescence

to the established authority relations, the police wound up doing the
"dirty work of the shipping companies and the municipal government.
ll

Not only did the police execute the plans formulated by the Mayor
and the Chief of Police, they also were key participants in events
that hastened the end of the strike.
*If a regression effect were in operation, the abnormally
high number of police raids and other police-initiated acts against
the I.W.W. prior to the strike would be expected to decrease during
the General Strike w~rely because of the force of statistical
probability.
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The distribution of the Seattle Star under armed police guard
had an important impact on public opinion about the strike.

Whereas

before the General Strike the press as well as various community
groups seemed to be supportive of the shipyard workers' strike, the
public mood turned against the entire Seattle labor movement at
about the same time as front-page editorials in the Star urged
opposition to the General Strike. The Star's influence on the
public during the General Strike was heightened by the fact that
it was the only paper to be widely circulated during the first few
days of the strike.

The front page of the February 7th issue

of the Star, for example, may have had an especially damning effect
on the General Strike.

It carried a proclamation from Mayor Hanson

in which he threatened to forcibly intervene in the strike and
implored the citizenry to show their IIAmericanism. 1I50 It is conceivable that public sentiment would not have shifted to favor the
authorities as swiftly if this issue had not been distributed
throughout the city in trucks and cars protected by police armed
with machine guns. 51
The police were an important force in the General Strike in
a larger sense as well as in regard to the shift of public opinion.
Indeed, the tremendous imbalance in the coercive power at the
disposal of the city authorities compared to the strikers may have
been the deciding factor in ending the General Strike of February
11,1919.

The significance of both the presence of legions of

police fortified with arms, and Simultaneously the absence of any
similar body of labor supporters with the means to forcibly compel
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compliance with labor's wishes cannot be exaggerated in explaining
the termination of the strike.
An inspection of the content of Hanson's proclamation on the
second day of the strike and of the strikers' reaction to it lends
support to this perspective on the end of the strike.

The

r~ayor

flaunted the city's police power in the proclamation.
We have fifteen hundred policemen, fifteen hundred
regular soldiers from Camp Lewis, and can and will secure,
if necessary every soldier in the Northwest to protect
life, business, and property.52
Anna Louise Strong,* a member of the General Strike Committee,
made it plain in her memoirs that Hanson's threat to use coercive
means to stop the strike weighed heavily on the minds of the strike
leaders.

Strong offered this analysis of the thinking of the

committee during the strike:
All of us were red in the ranks and yellow as leaders.
For we lacked all intention of real battle; we expected
to drift into power . . • • The general strike put into
our hands the organized life of the city--all except the
guns. We could last only until they started shooting;
we were one gigantic bluff. That expert in bluffing, 53
Ole Hanson, saw this on the second day of the struggle.
Essentially, this description of the interaction between Mayor
Hanson and the committee seems to indicate that the repressive power
of the State was a definite force in determining the outcome of the
General Strike.

Care needs to be taken, however, so as not to over-

state the importance of the police in the General Strike. Other
*Anna Louise Strong was a feature editor on the staff of the
Seattle Union-Record in 1919. She had a middle class background,
earning a Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. Strong became
radicalized through her work with persons opposed to World War I.
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social forces also contributed to its termination.

Especially

consequential in this regard was the patriotic and ideological basis
of the state as it was exemplified in the anti-strike media campaign
of the Seattle Star and in the r,1ayor's pleas to the Americanism of
the public.
Post-Strike Police Repression
No sooner was the strike over than the city and county police
arrested 39 men, including 31 I.W.W. members, on February 13, 1919.
Twenty-seven of these men were held and prosecuted under Washington's
new "criminal anarchy" act. * Most of these arrests were made in
conjunction with raids on the I.W.W. headquarters.

In one raid the

police stationed a plain-clothes detective in the office of the
I.W.W. secretary; the undercover officer then arrested Wobblies as
they came into the secretary's office to pay their dues.

After

this "mission" was completed, the police closed down this headquarters
as well as the other I.W.W. offices in Seattle. 55
The Socialist Party headquarters (which served as a base of
operations for many persons who supported the General Strike) and
the Equity Printing Plant (which had printed the leaflet "Russia
Did It") were also raided by the city police soon after the General
Strike.

The police closed down the print shop, later allowing it

* Criminal anarchy was defined in a Washington state law to
consist of: lithe doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force or violence or by assassination of the executive
officials of the government or by any unlawful means. The advocacy
of such doctrine . . . is a felony." The remainder of the description
of this law is contained in Session Laws of the State of Washin ton,
Sixteenth Session, Chapter 174 January 3,
to Marc
9, pp.
518-519.
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to reopen, but placing the plant under 24-hour police surveillance.
The police opened the shop in the morning, censored its operations
during the day, and locked it up at night in the course of their
surveillance activities. 57
Harassing police raids continued through the spring and summer
of 1919.

The recurring pattern of police-I.W.W. interaction con-

sisted of a raid, closure of the I.W.W. hall, a reopening of the
hall by the I.W.W., and then another raid.

A slightly new twist

was given to this pattern after the police raided and locked up the
I.W.W. hall on June 23rd.

This time a court order forced the Seattle

police to remove the locks from the door of the I.W.W. hall. Mayor
Hanson, not one to be outfoxed by the I.W.W., procured an order
from the city Health board to
"unsanitary conditi ons. 58

clo~e

down the hall on the grounds of

11

Surprisingly, the labor radicals were not miffed by the return
of heavy police repression after the strike. Harvey O'Connor, the
editor of the International Weekly, made this point in discussing
the Wobblies' perceptions of the Seattle police .
. . . they [the Seattle police] had not perfected the
details of the "red squad" operation. Their dragnets were
large-meshed and their operations notoriously clumsy, so
much so that the Wobblies referred to them as "town clowns"
and the parody on their operations exhibited in Keystone
Kop movie comed~9s excited the resibilities of the
general public.
While O'Connor's point about the post-strike police raids not
bei ng as effecti ve as the red squad acti vi ti es whi ch \'-Iere to come
later in 1919-1920 is valid, it is a mistake to think that being
arrested for "crimina1 anarchy" and taken into custody by the Seattle
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police during the aftermath of the General Strike was a pleasant
experience.

One instance of police brutality occurred in the course

of the raid on February 13, 1919. This brutality was revealed in
testimony offered at the James Bruce tria1.* The famous I.W.W.
attorney George Vanderveer asked Seattle police Sergeant P. F. Keefe
if he had seen another officer strike a Wobbly in the jaw during the
raid on the 13th.

This exchange between Keefe and Vanderveer

ensued:
Keefe:
They had a little argument.
Vanderveer: Is that what the police call a little argument?
The man was not prompt enough in obeying the
po1iceman ' s orders and so he hauled off and
struck him in the jaw?
Keefe:
Yes . . . , [but} he didn't hit him as hard
as he ought to. 61
Another police encounter with labor radicals that was marred
by violence and brutality took place on July 21, 1919.

During an

outdoor meeting of the Workers, Soldiers, and Sailors Council,
several Seattle police attentively listened to various speakers
criticize U.S. intervention in Russia.

At the end of the meeting,

however, what had been a situation of the police simply maintaining
their presence was transformed into a small-scale police riot.

Just

as the meeting adjourned, 24 police, in groups of 6, same down
through the crowd at the meeting and commenced "sapping heads right
and left." A short time later, an automobile loaded with police
armed with long, baseba11-bat-1ike clubs, appeared on the street.
*James Bruce was one of 27 workers charged wi th "criminal
anarchy." He was tried on May 19,1919 and acquitted by a jury on
June 5, 1919. Charges against the rest of the defendants weore
dropped after the IInot guiltyll verldict was rendered in the Bruce
case. 60
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This automobile drove onto the sidewalk and with its occupants on
the running board headed into the crowd, running down everyone who
could not get out of the way.

The police on the running board hit

whomever they could reach as the automobile slashed through the
crowd.
The driver of that automobile, patrolman Frank Braillard,
recalled the incident this way ·60 years later:
And he [Chief of Police Warren] says, "11m having a
hell of a time down on Washington street . . • you take
your three men and your car and go down there.
I
sai d, "What do you want me to do?" He sai d, "Break up
that riot. I don't care. He was tough too, he was a
tough old boy . . . I took my 01 little Ford, "Lizzie,"
a Model T. I jumped the sidewalk. I run em all off
the sidewalk with the ar. I didn't care if I hit
anybody or not . . . 62
II

II

With one band of police on the streets driving the crowds onto
the sidewalks and another group of police in the automobile driving
them off again, it is easy to visualize the slaughter that must have
taken place.

Scores of injured persons, some of them knocked

unconscious, were carted away from the riot scene.

At least four

persons were arrested by the pol ice on the charge of "di sturbi ng the
peace" and one person was arrested for "resisting an officer." 63
Raiding and rioting against labor radicals was just one aspect
of police behavior during the post-strike period.
police also employed a reactive strategy.

The Seattle

On the first day of the

trial of James Bruce, for instance, the Seattle police received
a supposed tip that 35,000 Wobblies were planning to storm the
courthouse.

Responding to this tidbit of crime news, the police

stationed a body of officers in the corridor entrance to the
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to the courtroom, had a mounted squad in readiness, and held a
reserve of over 100 patrolmen and detectives at police headquarters. 64
In light of the fact that no I.W.W. rescue missions took place at
the court, this example of reactive strategy might better be termed
as "overreacting."
What was the reason for the intensification of police repression?
The information filed in the criminal anarchy cases of many of those
arrested following the strike stated that the accused had acted:
. • . in concert and in pursuance of a common unlawful
and felonious purpose and pursuant to a common understanding
among themselves did then and there willfully wrongfully,
feloniously, and anarchistically advocate, teach, and
advise the duty,. necessity, and propriety of overthrowing
the organized government of the United States of America,
the government of the state of Wash~ggton, and the government of the city of Seattle • . . •
What is striking about the criminal anarchy cases is that none
of the arrested men had any connection with either the Central
Labor Council which called the strike or the General Strike
Committee which took responsibility for the conduct of the strike. 66
Of the 27 defendants held on the charge of criminal anarchy, 22
were members of the I.W.W. and 5 were members of the Socialist
Party.67 How these men, without an iota of control over the strike,
could have overthrown the government remains a mystery.
The real leaders of the General Strike apparently were
protected from the police by virtue of their established position
in the mainstream of the Seatt1e A.F.L. labor movement.

Of the 15-

member Executive Committee of the General Strike Committee, only
two persons \'iere viewed as being radicals and they were not members
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of the I.W.W.68 No city police action was taken against any of the
members of the Executive Committee.* Of those individuals outside
the committee who played a prominent role in the strike, only
Leon Green was an avo\lled radical.

Green, who was tabbed by the

federal authorities as being a "dyed-in-the-wool Bolshevik," was
sought by the Seattle police.

A warrant was issued for his arrest

on the charge of criminal anarchy,69 but the police could trace
Greenls movements only until February 9th, after which time he
disappeared from Seattle. 70
Mayor Hanson definitely wanted to prosecute someone on account
of the strike.

Hanson devoted three pages in Americanism Versus

301shevism to caricatures of the leaders of the strike.

He then

lamented the fact that these leaders were neither arrested nor
prosecuted by any authoritative bOdy.7l

As substitutes for the

leaders, Hanson apparently targeted the Wobb1ies to be the recipients
of official vengeance.
We
have
need
just

To quote Hanson:

closed up every "Wobbly" hall in town. We di dn It
any law to do it with so we used nails . . . . We didnlt
any more law than we did to stop the red flag. We
stopped it.72

But why were the Wobblies chosen to be the "scapegoats" of
the General Strike? It appears that they received the brunt of
the post-strike repression, in part, because of a radical purge
that occurred in the Seattle labor movement.

Immediately following

the strike, the Seattle press demanded that the A.F.L. rid itself
*Un1ike the city police, the federal authorities went after
the strike leaders, arres'ting Anna Louise Strong and other editorial
staff members of the Union-Record on sedition charges. These
charges against Union-Record staff members were later dropped by
the government.
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of radicals. 73 local A.F.l. officials appeased the local media,
issuing public denouncements of radicals.

For instance, B. F. Naumann,

the chairman of the Executive Strike Committee at the Central labor
Council, declared that:

" ••• men who get up on this floor [in

the Council] and boldly declare that they are revolutiodsts will
not be tolerated here ••. "74
The withdrawal of the A.F.l. 's support for the I.W.W. placed
the Wobblies in a position that was similar to the one they occupied
prior to the strike--the status of being politically marginal in
relation to the mainstream of the labor movement.

This marginal

status left the Wobblies without a political power base.

From the

perspective of the authorities, the Wobblies' lack of power meant
that they could again be repressed with minimal costs.

In short.

the Wobblies were probably the politically safest and the most
logical scapegoats from the point of view of Mayor Hanson and the
other offi ci al s.
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CHAPTER IX
THE "RED" HUNTING MOVEMENT AND RED SQUADS
Red Hunting as a Social Movement
The response of the Seattle and Portland police to labor
radicalism in 1919-1920 consisted of a ruthless searching out and
deliberate harrassment of the members of the

I.W.~J.

and every other

radical organization that was known to exist in the municipalities
of Seattle and Portland.

The general aim of police action was to

extract the "disloyal," "subversive," and IIrevolutionary" element
from American society.

In effect, there was a "witch hunt II in

",

Seattle and Portland in 1919-1920 and the Wobblies, Socialists,
and Communists were treated as though they were witches.
Red hunting was not limited to Seattle and Portland; it was
a nationwide social movement comprised of a web of interrelationships
between businessmen's interest groups, the government, patriotic
l
societies, and police organizations. The manifest goal of this
movement was the defense of the American way of life against its
enemies, but its latent goal was the curbing of domestic radicalism.
The repressive actions of the Seattle and Portland police in 19191920 are understandable only as part of this elite-sponsored social
movement which was mainly conducted on a national level.
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The single most important feature of the setting for the police
repression of the so-called "reds" was the international manifestation
of radicalism in the form of the Bolshevik Revolution.

After the

Revolution in Russia, the U.S. government and media expressed
extreme hatred and antagonism toward the Bolshevik political party.
One of the main reasons for this anti-Bolshevism was a class consciousness on the part of the economic and political leaders in the
U.S.

Believing the Bolshevik propaganda about a world-wide over-

throw of capitalism and the abolition of private property, the U.S.
government and business-dominated media perceived that the Bolsheviks
were of and for the workers and peasants of Russia.*2 This
perception was incongruent with the dominant political and economic
interests in the U.S. and their elitest conception of the necessity
of inequality.

For this reason, it appears that there was no chance

of concil i ati on between the U.S. power hol ders who were determi ned
to preserve their privileged position and the Bolshevik party
\AJhich from its propaganda seemed to be hell bent on a "world
proletarian revolution."
Domestic class relations on the national level in the U.S.,
while not as crystallized as international class relations, were
still wracked with discord and conflict.

After World War I, a more

class conscious, more sophisticated group of economic leads,s than
existed before the war erected an anti-union front that was composed
*While history has shown that this was an incorrect perception
on the part of the political and economic leaders of the U.S., this
misperception is important because the ways in which the powers that
be defined situations in 1919-1920 had real consequences for them as
well as for other social classes.
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of welfare capitalism and Americanism. 3 The employers seem to have
understood the benefits and the necessity of making welfare-type
accommodations to labor better after the war in view of their postwar amenability to conceding shorter hours and increased wages to
workers.
Americanism provided the employers with an offensive weapon
that they utilized as the spearhead for a union-busting drive.

The

employers' basic strategy was to create the impression that labor
was "red." This strategy was implemented by organizations that
were created to eliminate labor's closed shop in cities where a
closed shop situation existed and to destroy unions in cities where
open shop conditions already prevailed.
Associated Industries and the Waterfront Employer's Association,
for example, were two organizations which led the open shop campaign
in Seattle in 1919-1920.

Roy John Kinnear, a corporate executive

and the President of the Seattle-based Associated Industries preached
that:
[labor unions had] .•• drifted into the control of
the radical, the un-American, the charlatan who . . •
was ready to direc 4 labor into paths leading to extreme
conclusions . . .
The words of Kinnear and the other leaders of the open shop
campaign were apparently heeded by the press as well as the public
since the anti-union movement soon became identified with Americanism.
In fact, together the ideas of the open shop and the refusal to
recognize unions as collective bargaining units.became known as the
"American Plan" in many cities.
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In Portland., the anti-union movenent was usually referred to
as the American Plan, although the official name of the anti-union
organization in Portland was "The League to Establish Industrial
Democracy. II

Since Portland was already an open shop city in 1919-

1920, the League's activities centered on breaking up existing
unions.

Elton Watkins, an attorney and a former special agent in

the Department of Justice's Secret Service,5 directed these
activities.

By misrepresenting himself as an official of the

federal government who held the power to deport aliens and by
using other unscrupulous tactics of labor espionage, Watkins was
able to intimidate foreign-born as well as native-born members of
the A.F.L.-affiliated Tailor's Union and Bakery Worker's Union in
Portland in 1920.

Watkins ' actions helped to bring about the
eventual destruction of these unions. 6
The subterfuge of the League for Industrial Democracy and other
IIfrontll organizations in the employer's anti-union campaign was in
sharp contrast to the highly visible actions taken by the federal
government in order to smash labor radicalism and other forms of
radicalism.

It is very useful to recognize the interdependent

relationship that existed between the federal government and the
employers in this regard.

The close connections between employers

and high-ranking governmental officials stemmed from at least two
sources.

First, the interests of political office-holders and

employers were logically linked together by virtue of the
dependence of both on the political economy of capitalism.

The

campaign contributions of business interests to politicians, the
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finances to operate the bureaucratic machinery of the state, and even
the privileged positions of the elected officials themselves were
connected to functioning of the capitalist system. To support
the Wobblies, who advocated "worker control" and other radical
reforms, must have seemed like a suicidal stance to the political
power-wielders in 1919-1920.
Second, the federal government had become very dependent upon
the large industrial corporations as a result of the government's
heavy reliance upon the factories, the technology, and the money of
major industrialists in waging World War 1.7 Even before the
war, President Wilson predicted that:
War means autocracy. The People we have unhorsed will
inevitably come into control of the country for we shall
be dependent upon the steel, ore, and financial magnates.
They will run the nation. 8
Wilson's analysis proved correct, the industrialists knew it,
and they utilized their advantageous position to secure the governmentis support in an effort to undermine the position of labor.
President Wilson himself was a key supporter of the anti-union
movement even before it was in full swing in 1919.

Wilson

identified organized labor as being among the "disloyal" groups
in the U.S. in an address on June 14, 1917.
Do you not now understand the new intrigue, the
intrigue for peace, and why the masters of Germany do
not hesitate to use any agency that promises to effect
their purpose, the decit of the nations? • . . They
are employing liberals in their enterprise. They are
using men in Germany and without as their spokesmen
••• socialists, the leaders of labor, • . . 9
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The media provided an additional means through which the
economicall,y dominant class could influence the federal government's
policy with respect to labor radicalism. The content of the
nation's major newspapers helped to establish the anti-union front
in 1919-1920. 10 A perusal of the verbiage used in the reporting
of some of the great events invol ving 1abor during the peri od
supports this point.

On the second day of the Seattle General

Strike, for instance, the Chicago Tribune
middling step from Petrograd to Seattle.

predicted~

1I

"it is only a

For the six month period

following the General Strike it was commonplace for major newspapers
to refer to labor strikes as being IIcrimes against society.,,12
Newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal went even further.

For

example, in the midst of the Boston police strike in September
1919, the Journal screamed that "Leni n and Trotsky are ri ght on
13
their way. 11
A similar tactic of linking organized labor to
Bolshevism in order to discredit labor was followed by the New York
Times,

One day after the Centralia tragedy* in November 1919 the

Times alleged that there was IIproof that Leni n himself had di ctated
Bolshevik operations in this city . . . . 1114
The major newspapers' attack upon Russian Bolshevism was even
more venomous than their bombardment of domestic labor radicals.
The New York Times seems to have been the main purveyor of antiBolshevik innuendos and misrepresentations.

The Times' distorted

*On Armistice Day 1919 four American Legionnaires in a
patriotic parade were shot down by Wobblies when the Legionnaires
attempted to raid the I.W.W. hall in Centralia, Washington.
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reporting of the Bolshevik Revolution prompted Walter Lippmann and
Charles Merz to conduct a study of the content of the Times' reportage
of the Revolution. Their concluding observations underscore the
rabid anti-Bolshevism of the New York Times.
The Russian lie is the father of lies. For lie, damned
lie, it has been. It was a lie that the people of Russia
were calling for milita~ intervention. It was lie that
they believed in Kolchak and Denikin. It was a lie that
they did not prefer the Soviet government to anything
offered them by the Allied generals and the monarchist
cliques . • .
And because these lies were the base of a policy of lawless invasion, disgraceful intrigue, bloodshed, devastation
and famine, they have had to be established by every device
known to panic and credu1ity.15
Gi ven the coi nci dence of in teres ts between the economi ca lly domi nant
class and the political leaders as well as the media's pressure
upon the political leaders, the federal government's policy toward
radicals from late 1917 through the 1920s was almost predictable in
advance solely on the basis of material interests and the dominant
powers' perceptions about those interests.

In terms of the govern-

mentis actual policy, the Wilson administration decided to crush
the I.W.W. in September 1917,16 marked the Bolsheviks in the U.S.
for suppression in November 1919, 17 and targeted the Communists in
the U.S. for raids in January 1920. 18
As for organized labor, its position vis a vis the economically
dominant class was one of retrenchment.

Although increases in the

cost of living and a desire for the institutionalization of the
principle of collective bargaining spawned 3,600 strikes in 1919 i
workers won only a few of these strikes.

Then, too, Samuel Gompers
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and other A.F.L. leaders attempted to consolidate their own power
through attacking the unorthodox weapons of radical labor such as
the general strike and through currying the favor of business and
government by supporting anti-labor radical measures both during and
after the war. 20
While the A.F.L. was retrenching, the I.W.W. was declining in
power in 1919-1920.

For a variety of reasons the I.W.W. was no

longer a presence in the national struggle between the forces of
labor and capital. 2l The power of the I.W.W. decreased markedly in
the Pacific Northwest; when the economic boom of World War I
busted in 1919-1920, logging companies, mills, and shipyards in
the Northwest began to employ fewer and fewer workers. 22 The
crushing defeats of the Wobblies and other labor radicals in both
the Great Lumber Strike of 1917 and the General Strike in 1919 also
contributed to the demise of radical labor in the Pacific Northwest.
By the spring of 1920 the last-hired, first-fired Wobblies were
largely eliminated as a force in the labor movement in Seattle and
Portland.
The Socialist party and the Socialist Labor party, like the
I.W.W., were moving in a backward direction after World War I.

In

Seattle and Portland, both Socialist parties vanished as political
factors in late 1919 and early 1920. 23 The Socialists' loss of
strength was, in part, due to factionalization within the Socialist
party.

In fact, in 1919 a substantial number of persons left the
Socialist party to join the Communist movement. 24
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The Communist movement itself

~ad

a national membership

of approximately 70,000 persons in 1919. 25

The Communist

Party and the Communist Labor Party were the two main organizations
of the Communist movement in the U.S.

The Communists' labor-

related activities mainly consisted of a great deal of propagandizing
among immigrants and groups of unskilled and unorganized workers.
Despite its efforts to IIraise the consciousness" of the American
working class, the Communist revolutionary line never mobilized
the grass roots support of working men and women in 1919 on a level
that was even comparable to the success of the I.W.W. and the
Socialist parties in earlier years. 26
Demobilization and Participation in the Red Hunt
The Communists, like other

~adica1s~

were reluctant participants

in a one-sided battle in which they assumed a defensive posture.
Although industrialists and political officials were the main
aggressors, third parties to the battle actually carried out much
of the repression in 1919-1920. These third parties were drawn
from both the working and middle classes.
To understand the role of these third parties in the
repression of the postwar years, it is first necessary to grasp the
meaning of what has been labeled as the "Great Demobilization."
The Great Demobilization involved the discharging and disbanding of
the resources that had been utilized by the U.S. government to
carryon World War I.

The historian Frederic L. Paxson described

the Great demobilization as follows:
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. . . demobilization was upon the United States, more
completely without foreknowledge than mobilization had
been nineteen months before. There are moments in the
history of mobilization in which the government of the
United States looked like a madhouse; but in demobilization there was lacking even the madhouse in which the
crazy might be incarcerated. 27
Paxton's point was simply that demobilization after the war
was largely unplanned and disorganized.

In addition, demobilization

had a destabilizing effect upon the U.S. economY.

Demobilization

affected the labor market in a general way, for example, when the
men discharged from military service and the workers laid off from
jobs in defunct war industries milled around unemployment offices
in 1919. 28 Despite the unemployment problems associated with
demobilization, large portions of both working and middle classes
seem to have fared well and continued to do so throughout 1919. 29
The harsh effects of demobilization were borne, for the most
part, by the salaried clerks, civic officials, professionals, and
the police.

The inflation produced by the rapid growth of profits

during the war and the rapid economic destabilization had an
especially devastating impact on these occupational groups. The
wages of workers in these groups kept pace neither with prices
nor the income of workers in other occupational groups.

Workers

in these groups, whose income had either not increased or minimally
increased during the war, had a very difficult time balancing a
fixed income against the rising cost of living and managing to
keep their spirits up in the face of the fact that their standard
of living was falling compared to the standard of living of persons
in other occupational groups.3D
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The police and other public employees were perhaps the hardest
hit by demobilization.

In fact, the police and municipal workers

in many cities were worse off economically after World \~ar I than
at any time since the Civil War. 31 Salaries of the Portland and
Seattle patrolmen, although increasing through gradual increments
for the period of 1912 to 1921, did not increase enough to suit the
street police in these cities. 32 Indeed, low salaries surfaced
as an acute problem within the Portland police department in 1918
when many patrolmen deserted their$lOO a month jobs and procured
33
higher paying employment in other working class occupations.
Public employees were 'precluded from much
progressive protest about their situation by their lack of organizatioo. 34 A case in point is the attempt of the Portland police to
unionize in 1919.

Demanding an increase in salaries and an inter-

change of day and night shifts, members of the Portland police
force threatened to organize a union as early as the fall of 1917. 35
The Portland City Council 'finally took action on the issue of police
unionism on April 28, 1919.
On this date, by a vote of four to one the City Council adopted
a resolution intended to prevent the police from affiliating with
the A.F.L.

The resolutioi'i provided that any police officer joining

the proposed union was to be dismissed from this job' "for the good
ofl the service.,,36 This resolution was supported by Mayor Baker and
the entire council with the exception of one commissioner who cast
the only dissenting vote. 37 Since no police union was organized in
Portland in 1919-1920, it appears that the resolution served its
purpose.
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Workers in these declining occupational groups were not
similarily constrained from participation in reactionary collective
action.

To the contrary, workers in these groups were simulated to

conservative political action in order to protect and to defend
their eroding material base.* Then too, many workers in these
declining occupations may have been inspired to participate in
right-wing politics by the Americanism ideology that was rampant
throughout the U.S.
Some persons from professional occupations, like Elton Watkins
of Portland, were power brokers in organizations which represented
a blend of anti-unionism and super-patriotism.

Organizations such

as the Better America Federation,** the American Defense Society,
and the League to Establish Industrial Democracy featured a rather
unique division of labor.

While corporate interests and individual

businessmen kept workers afloat economically by pumping money into
the organizations to fight the open shop and to defame the labor
movement,38 the professionals, in turn, facilitated the repressive
policies of the dominant economic and political interests by spying
on reds and by

t'le public on the virtues of 100
percent Americanism and on the dangers of radica1ism. 39
propagandiz~rg

*Samuel P. Huntington has made the point that declining social
forces are often galvanized into right-wing political action. For
a more complete analysis of declining and rising social forces, see
Samuel P. Huntington, "Post-Industria1 Politics: How Benign Will
It Be?" Comparative Politics, 6 (January, 1974), pp. 163-191.
**The Better America Federation, the American Defense Society,
and the League to Establish Industrial Democracy are only a few
examples of this type of organization. The American Legion and the
Ku Klux Klan, though not exclusively patriotic organizations like
those listed above, also aided in the anti-1abor/anti-radical
crusade. 40
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The police were another occupational group whose members
participated in the red hunting movement.

Federal police were

highly visible participants due to their raiding, arresting, incarcerating, and deporting of radicals.

Much of this type of activity

centered around the "Palmer Raids" of November 7, 1919 and January 2,
1920. While the Palmer Raids themselves were planned by U.S.
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, special agents of the U.S. Bureau
of Investigation actually performed the repressive acts that comprised
a "reign of terror against domestic radicals.
ll

Working under J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the Justice Departmentis General Intelligence (anti-radical) Division, these federal
police officers arrested many persons illegally, conducted illegal
searches and seizures, acted as lIagent provocateurs,1I administered
beatings to prisoners, and held many persons incommunicado in filthy,
overcrowded jails during the Palmer Raids. 4l The federal police
were usually assisted in their activities by city police.
Red Squads as Social Movement Organizations
At the same time that the federal government was displaying a
sustained drive against Wobblies and other radical types, municipal
governments were cooperating in the movement to curb radicalism.
On the state level, legislatures passed criminal syndicalism,
criminal anarchy, and red flag laws.* City police, often operating
is special units called red squads, enforced these laws.

The purpose

of these squads was to watch over, to harrass, and to intimidate
left-wing radicals and union organizers. 42
*Red flag laws prohibited the display of red flags in public.
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Seattle and Portland were two of the cities in which police
red squads were fonned to do battle with the "reds." As one might
suspect, the exact dates on which the red squads were introduced
into the Portland and Seattle police agencies are unknown.

The

creation of a red squad was officially announced to the Portland
public in a press release on January 6, 1920,43 while the existence
of a red squad was unofficially disclosed to the Seattle public in
a news story about a police raid on November 18, 1919. 44 These dates,
however, are not in accord with other data bearing on the earliest
days of red squad activity in Portland and Seattle. The activities
of a quasi-red squad in Portland, as indicated earlier, were fairly
pronounced from 1914 through World War 1. 45 As for the Seattle red
squad, it appears that certain officers within the Seattle police
department were assigned the task of handling the cases of Wobblies
as early as February 20, 1918. 46 Given the disparity between the
publicly released dates for the inception of red squads and the
actual occurrence of somewhat specialized anti-radical activities,
it appears that both city police agencies attempted to conceal the
real origins of red squads.
When the police wanted it to be known that the red squads
were in action, almost a fanfare introduction was given to the new
units.

Portland Mayor Baker called the creation of the red squad

the "most important change made" in the organi zati on of the pol i ce
department;47 the Seattle police as well as the Portland police were
conspicuously careful about providing the names of red squad members
to the press whenever the squad conducted a raid or made a major
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"pinch" on radicals.

The names of Lieutenant Harvey Thatcher and

Sergeant P. F. Keefe, the respective heads of the Portland and Seattle
red squads, appeared so many times in print from 1919-1920 that
they surely must have become household words in residences throughout the Pacific Northwest.
All of the publicity about the "patriotic" activities of the
red squad probably served the purpose of maintaining the commitment
of Thatcher, Keefe, and'the other squad members to the main goal
of the red squads which was to ferret out radicals.

The incentive

of public recognition may have reinforced the values of Americanism
which were already deeply held by some members of the red squads.
Harvey Thatcher. a former soldier and a member of the American
Legion Post No. 1 in Portland, revealed his personal anti-radical
attitudes in this note to Chief of Police Jenkins:
The Communist and other undesirable characters: Since
the drive on Communists there has been 97 of them arrested
and this move is without doubt the work of Crime Prevention.
This type of individual has no regard for our country and
any crime that they may be able to commit does not mean
anything to them. 48
As an organizational unit within the Seattle and Portland police
departments, red squads must be viewed as part of the effort of
municipal reformers to overcome the decentralization of the police
function.

The red squads in each city consisted fo a leader and

at least one other full-time member.

The permanent red squad members

were often assisted by patrolmen on a temporary, part-time basis.
Leaders, who were mere lieutenentsand sergeants, as well as the
patrolmen in red squads took orders only from the top police
administrators in Portland and Seattle.
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Portland Chief of Police Leon V. Jenkins, who was appointed
by Baker in 1920, revealed in his memoirs that the two members of
the Portland red squad worked directly out of his office. 49 Jenkins
also strongly implied that this centralization of police work that
had preciously been done by patrolmen working out of the precincts,
resulted in "keeping activities of radicals and racketeers down
to a minimum. 50 The Seattle red squad appears to have been afforded
11

a similar position within the police department. This is mainly
a surmise based on the fact that the Seattle Chief of Police had an
intimate working relationship with the Seattle red squad,
occasionally leading the squad on raids.
Sources of Influence on Red Squad Activities
To a large extent, the environment of the red squads determined
the actions and practices of squad members.

The red hunting movement

itslef comprised one segment of this environment, while the other
major segment of the environment was the society in which the movement existed.

Since the red hunting movement seems to have been

directed and supported by the dominant political and economic
interests it is useful to explore the red squads' activities vis a
vis the specific national, local, and state interests which sponsored
the movement.
National political leaders had perhaps the greatest influence
upon the functioning of the red squads.

The Department of Justice's

policy of targeting Bolshevism for special attention in November 1919 51
seems to have largely determined the volume of certain activities
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for the red squads.

Seattle's red squad, for example, was more

active in raiding and dragnet operations than Portland's red squad
in 1919-1920. One explanation of this difference between the two
is that the Workers' Union of Soviet Russia* was very active in
Seattle, at this time, whereas the Bolshevik element was not nearly
as strong in Port1and. 52
The influence of the Department of Justice was also manifested
in the tactics and procedures utilized by the red squads in both
cities.

For the most part, red squad members served as "foot soldiers"

in the raids on the radicals' secret headquarters** and in the
dragnets for specific types of radicals in Portland and Seattle.
In a typical raid the red squad would enter a hall or meeting
place accompanied by two patrolmen, a special agent of the Bureau
of Investigation, and sometimes an inspector from the Immigration
Service.

Then the red squad would arrest suspects, search the

premi ses, and sei ze property.

Fi na lly, the red squad woul d take the

suspects to jail where they were held for investigation on open
charges and later were interrogated several times by federal
authorities. 53 If the federal authorities failed to glean sufficient
information to either deport the suspects or prosecute them under
the Espionage or Sedition Acts. the suspects were turned over to
*The Workers' Union of Soviet Russia was comprised of Russianborn workers, some of whom may have b~en agents of the Bolshevik party
in Russi a.
**By April 1920 the I.W.W. had gone "underground" in Seattle.
The I.W.W.'s secret headquarters included hotel rooms, private homes,
and various other hiding places.
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the county attorney, who either proceeded against the suspects under
the criminal syndicalism, criminal anarchy, and vagrancy laws, or
released them from custody.54
Dragnets tended to be longer in duration' and more discriminating
in character than raids in 1919-1920.

In a dragnet the

norma~

procedure was to send the red squad and several patl"olmen onto the
streets for several hours or even several days in search of
particular type of radical.

~

The alleged radicals were arrested and

then treated to the same detention in jail, interrogation, and
prosecution as the radicals who were taken into custody during a
raid.

In general, dragnets seem to have been utilized more often

in 1919-1920 than in previous periods.

The increased use of

dragnets may be partially attributable to the fact that the I.W.W.
and the other radical organizations were constantly on the move in
an attempt to evade the police.

These moving targets were probably

more difficulty marks for the police than were the stationary radical
organizations which existed prior to 1919.
Although a raild and a dragnet were di fferent procedures for
the Seattle and Portland police, the two tactics became intermixed
on at least one occasion.

With Sergeant P. F. Keefe's red squad

leading the way, a small army of federal and municipal police spent
the entire night of January 19, 1920 rounding up Russians in
Seattle.

Three hundred and sixteen Russians were netted by the

armY of red hunters which included a Commissioner of the Immigration
Service, a special agent of the Bureau of Investigation, 14
imnigration inspectors, and 100 city policemen along with the red
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squad.

The army raided restaurants, hotels, and pool rooms in a
working class district in Seatt1e. 55 When 289 of the 316 suspects
were released from custody the next day by immigration authorities,
it was evident that this police mission lacked the discriminating
characteristic of many of the other dragnets conducted by red squads
in 1919-1920.

Additionally, the all night collection of police

activities on the 19th was considerably longer than the usual 15
to 20 minute raid.
Red squads also held property as well as persons for investigative purposes.

t1embership lists, address books, and letters
were seized and then utilized to track down radicals. 56 Financial
records were also taken by the police in order to find out the names
of the contributors to various prisoner's defense funds.

In

addition, thousands of I.W.W. five dollar gold pins were confiscated, presumably in order to sap the financial resources of the
I.W.W.57 Over and above all of this, the police continued their
earlier practice of seizing and destroying literature, business
supplies, and office equipment in order to disrupt the business
operations of radical organizations. 58
The real g'ems mined by the red squads, however, were neither
gold nor dollars.

"Discoveries" of sinister plots to overthrow the

government, of rival societs,59 and of secret agreements between
the I.W.W. and Lenin 60 were the most highly prized things seized by
the Portland and Seattle red squads.

Although it is true that

there was a flurry of propaganda and other related activities by
members of the Bolshevik party and by workers who sympathized with
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the principles of the Bolshevik Revo1ution,* the alleged plots and
agreements unearthed by the red squads were more 1ike "inventi ons
than "di scoveri es.

II

II

It is a mistake to cavalierly dismiss these fabricated stories
as merely hoaxes for they served a useful purpose for the red squads.
By making the radicals appear to be more powerfu1.and more organized
than they really were, the red squads, in effect, ingratiated themselves with the dominant economic and political interests that
wanted to see all varieties of radicalism stamped out.

That is, it

is assumed that the red squad members exploited the local power
wielders' concern about "reds" for personal gain and in order to
strengthen the organizational domain of the red squads within the
Seattle and Portland police departments.**
Apparently, this is precisely what happened with respect to
the Portland red squad.

Not only did it demonstrate organizational

resilience by remaining in existence long after the I.W.W. excitement
had ebbed in the city, but individual members of the red squad also
reaped personal gratuities from employers for performing labor
espionage activities.

Two of the red squad's money-making schemes

were revealed in a report on the Portland red squad by the Oregon
*It is a fact, for instance, that the Workers' Union of
Soviet Russia, a soviet-like organization, had local representatives
in Seattle in 1919. It is also true that about 400 members of the
Seattle International Longshoremen's Association (I.L.A.) tr;'ed
to stop the flow of arms from the por~ of Seattle to the "white
forces" in Siberia in September 1919. 1
**J. Edgar Hoover was one of those who was able to parlay the
concerns of propertied interests and national political leaders into
an increase in pe fsona 1 pOWf!r and an enlargement of the resource base
of the Bureau of Investi gati on. See Mi chael R. Bel knap, liThe Mechani cs
of Repression: J. Edgar Hoover, the Bureau of Investigation and the
Radicals, 1917-1925, Crime and Social Justice, 7 (Spring-Summer, 1977),
pp. 49-58.
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Chapter of the National Lawyer's Gui1d.*62

It is important to

recognize that both of these arrangements involved Portland employers
exerting direct influence over the activities of the red squad.
The first scheme consisted of the squad providing "labor spies"
for private employers.

The procedure for hiring police investigators

was for the employer to approach the head of the red squad and to
request a spy; the spy was then supplied by the red squad but paid
by the employer.

Under this arrangement those members of the red

squads who were also under the hire of businessmen, received their
usual salaries from the city of Portland as well as additional money
from industrial emp10yers. 64
Another red squad scheme was to provide employers with

'['

information on the political affiliations of the union employees
in exchange for monetary contributions to the secret coffers of
the red squad.

In the process of determi ning whether or not a person

was a "red," squad members used the squad's red files** and based
their decisions on personal definitions of what constituted "patriotic
Ameri cani sm,

II

"radi cal ism, and Communi sm.
II

II

II

Although the

consequences of this operation are not known, it is suspected that
*A1though the report covered the period of 1934-1937, one of
the authors of the report claimed t~at the same schemes discove6~d
in 1938 were in operation on an even larger scale in 1919-1920.
Even if these schemes were not utilized by the red squad until
1934-1937, the proposition that the squad's spectacular "tales"
about radicals in 1919-1920 endeared them to the local elites and
had the consequences of facilitating the acquisition of resources
for individual and organizational aggrandizement would retain its
plausibility.
**The red files listed the liberal and radical affiliations
of all persons suspected of being radical.
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the branding of union employees as Wobblies or Communists resulted
in the firing of many of them by employers.

In this respect, the

red squad's activities had the appearance of deliberate anti-unionism. 65
As for the sources of local influence, no evidence could be
found to indicate that red squad activities were shaped by other
political or economic interests.

The role of local interests in

influencing red squad functions in Seattle is unclear.

Nonetheless,

it is a reasonable conjecture that Mayor Hanson had a hand in the
activities of the Seattie red squad in view of his own self-proclaimed super-patriotism and his personal outrage about a bomb that
was delivered, allegedly by reds,1l to his office on April 28, 1919.
Il

The influence of political leaders in Washington and Oregon
on red squads was more palpable than the influence of powerful
interests at either the national or the local level.

Criminal

syndicalism laws passed by the Washington and Oregon state legislatures were the main source of the red
authority.

squads~

law enforcement

Indeed, the investigation and arrest of Wobblies,

Socialists, and Communists was a proper and legal police function
under the criminal syndicalism laws in both states.
The Washington state legislature passed its first criminal
syndicalism law in 1917, but Governor Ernest Lister's veto postponed its implementation until the next legislative session in
1919.

In 1919 the legislature adopted the law over Lister's veto

and despite the protests of labor-supported King County*
*Seattle, a bastion of labor power in the state of Washington,
is located in King County.
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representatives by a vote of 85 to 6.66 George Cotterill, a King
County state representative and a former Seattle Mayor, opposed
the bill because he felt that "criminal violence" could be prevented
by a IIl ess sweeping bil1." 67 In other words, Cotterill was concerned
that the tentacles of the criminal syndicalism law would grasp
members of the A.F.L. as well as the Wobblies.

Most of the other

representatives were apparently unaware of the implications of the
bill or were too stirred with the passions of the hunt to take a
stand against measure whose principles clearly violated the U.S.
Constitution.
Then, too, opposition to the bill would not have been IIgood
politics since the media as well as most of the predominantly
ll

rural populace in Washington supported its passage.

In this regard,

it is important to note that electoral pressures in the state in
1919 almost mandated that some type of criminal syndicalism law be
passed by the legislature.

In short, given that public opinion

was strongly in favor of a repressive policy toward radicals, the
state government was constrained to legislate that type of policy
into existence.*
As far as the Seattle red squad was concerned, the content of
the new law was more important than its origins.

The new law

defined criminal syndicalism to be an doctrine advocating:
*Andrew Hopkins made a similar point in his analysis of the
findings from five case studies of pressure groups and the law in
Australia. For a more detailed discussion of these studies, see
Andrew Hopkins, IIPressure Groups and the Law,1I Contemporary Crises
3 (January, 1979), pp. 69-82.
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crime, sedition, violence, intimadation, or
injury as a means or way of effecting or resisting any
industrial, economic, or political change. If a
person joined or associated with any organization
that had these purposes, he/she came under the
jurisdiction of the law. 68
The Washington legislature also passed another criminal
syndicalism statute which outlawed "sabotage." Sabotage was defined
as the attempt to obstruct or injure any business hiring wage
earners with the intent to impair the owner's control over the
enterprise. 69
In effect, the criminal syndicalism laws made active membership in the I.W.W. a felony punishable by incarceration in the state
penitentiary.

The same laws were used against members of the

Communist Labor Party in 1920.

Authorities in Washington utili?ed

these new laws extensively, obtaining 86 convictions under them
in the 13 years following the passage of the laws. 70
In Oregon, the state Bar Association, conservative Republicans,
the state's major newspapers supported the passage of a criminal
syndicalism law. 71 The Bar Association was most vehement in its
~nd

sponsorship of criminal syndicalism legislation, demanding that a
law be drafted which would:

". . . check and stamp out Bolshevism,

anarchism, I.W.W.ism and all other isms that are subversive of sound
and stable government. 72
The first criminal syndicalism bill to be introduced in the
Oregon legislature was presented by K. K. Kubli, a Republican representative and a politician who was backed by the Ku Klux Klan for most
of his political career.

After Kubli 's bill was tabled, a more
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stringent bill was introduced and was approved by large majorities
in the Senate and the House in February 1919. The Senate vote was
nearly unanimous in favor of the bill, although there was some minor
opposition in the House from representatives of organized labor who
argued that a criminal syndicalism law could adversely affect all
unions. 73
In terms of state-wide public opinion, the passage of the
criminal syndicalism law seems to have reflected the sentiments of
the vast majority of Oregonians.

The Oregon law defined criminal

syndicalism as follows:
The doctrine that advocates crime, physical violence,
arson, destruction of property, sabotage, or other unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or
effecting individual or political ends or as a means of
accomplishing or effecting individual or political ends
or as means of effecting individual or political revenue,
or for profit. 74
The Oregon authorities, like the Washington authorities,
vigorously enforced their criminal syndicalism law.

It has been

estimated that 184 persons, most of them members of the I.W.W., were
arrested on criminal syndicalism charges in Oregon between February
1919 and December 1920. 75 The Portland police used the law to
arrest Wobblies selling newspapers on the streets 76 and to justify
raids on the I.W.W. hall in February 1919.
The Portland red squad also made use of the criminal syndicalism
law in 1919 and through the 1920s.

Late in 1919, red squad members

played a highly visible role in the Multnomah County Deputy District
Attorney's anti-radical campaign which resulted in the arrest of
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several prominent Wobb1ies, one of whom was also the organizer of
Portland's Soldiers', Sailors', and Workingmen's Council, and three
members of the Communist Labor Party.78 The red squad assisted the
District Attorney in this campaign, arresting several of those who
later were prosecuted in court.
Organizational Maintenance and,Goa1 Transformation in Red Squads
The fear about radi ca 1ism

'tha't

apparently had moved ti1E'~

citizens in Washington and Oregon tc support the passage of criminal
syndicalism laws had ended by 1920, according to one of the foremost
experts on the period of 1919-1920. 79 Yet, the red squads in
Portland and Seattle remained in existence long after the
concern about Bolshevik invaders had passed away.

pub1ic~s

In fact, the

Portland red squad appears to have been more active in the period
of 1921-1922 than in the preceding two-year period.
This anomalous state of affairs can oniy be understood if
the red squads are viewed as organizational units within the larger
elite-sponsored red hunting movement. The existence of movement
organizations, such as red squads, is not solely determined by the
public.

Instead, these organizations appear to be greatly influenced

by the pwoerful interests which sponsor them and by internal
bureaucratic forces.

Barring the occurrence of any cataclysmic

events in the larger society, these types of movement organizations
can remain in existence so long as the organizations maintain their
internal stability and retain their utility to their sponsors.
sum, unless there are internal problems or a powerful interest

In
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withdraws its support, the organization is likely to survive at
least until the goals of the organization are reached.
In the case of the Portland red squad the goal of suppressing
radicals was not completely realized in 1920 even though the public's
fears had dissipated by that time.

In order to attain its goal, the

Portland red squad stayed in existence to suppress the I.W.W.-led
strike of longshoremen in 1922.

After the red squad and hundreds

of other Portland police had squelched this strike by arresting
the entire membership of the Marine Transport Workers local union
of the I.W.W.,* the original goal of the Portland red squad may have
been accomplished.

However, the squad was able to remain in existence

because the squad and local elites established new goals (e.g.,
spying on union employees and identifying radical employees) which
served to sustain the squad's organizational life.
The essential point to bear in mind here is that the activities
of the red squads seem to be best understood as the outcome of an
interactive process, mainly involving the dominant political and
economic interests as well as the labor radicals.

Then, too, class

relations, the functioning of the governmental apparatus and the
rationality of the processes through which resources were mobilized
and goals were transformed in response to the problem of labor
radicalism also need to be emphasized in order to explain red squad
operations.

Above all, by focusing on the social movement aspects

*For a description of the police response to this strike, see
William W. Pilcher, The Portland Lon shoremen: A Dis ersed Urban
Community (New York: Ho t, Rlne art, and Winston,
8- 9.
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of the red squads

j

it is possible to better appreciate the roots of

the repressive collective action of the Seattle and Portland police
in 1919-1920.
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CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER X
CHECKING SOME PROPOSITIONS ABOUT THE
POLICING OF LABOR WARS
The Class Base of Police Repression
The labor radicalism that developed from 1900 posed an
increasingly dangerous challenge as to the police institution which guarded

that~order.

Having described the

ways in which this challenge was met by the police in two cities,
it is now useful to examine the major findings from the study of the
Seattle and Portland police in light of the theoretical framework
that was developed in the first part of the dissertation.
Class relations, including economic as well as political
factors, are an appropriate starting point for this appraisal of how
the empirical data on police response bear upon the propositions
in the framework.

Can the response of the Seattle and Portland

police to the protest of labor'

i~adica1s

be explained by reference

to economic factors alone? The answer is IIno.1I

Economic factors

by themselves do not provide an adequate understanding of police
response in Seattle and Portland; still, these factors did exert a
great deal of direct and indirect influence upon police policies
and actions.
The indirect influence of economic factors upon police response
was far more important than their direct influence.

Indeed, the
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particular issues around which both the labor radicals and the
employers organized grew out of class relations. These issues
included free speech, exploitive working conditions, worker control
of industry, Americanism, and the open versus closed shop.

It was

in response to clashes between social classes and interest groups
over these issues that the Seattle and Portland police were
mobilized into action from 1912-1920.
One particular area where police actions may have been
indirectly shaped by economic forces is the ideology of political
officials and police authorities.

Similarities between the belief

systems of Mayors Baker and Hanson and the economically dominant
class seem to have had a decisive effect on police policy during
the Great Lumber Strike of 1917.

Although it is reasonable to posit

that the super-patriotic and anti-radical thinking of the mayors was
nurtured in an educational system whose function was to socialize
persons into the acceptance of ideas supportive of the capitalist
system and reinforced by a media whose content was largely shaped
by members of the economically domi.nant class, no hard data were
collected in this study to establish these connections between
class power, ideology, and police policy.
The direct influence of economic factors, although less
pronounced than their indirect influence, was still evident in
police-radical encounters.

For one thing, direct influence was

revealed in the employers' ability to control the actions of special
police and members of red squads.

Additionally, employers provided

direct input into the formulation of police policy by virtue of their
occupancy of policy-making roles on state labor regulatory commissions
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and to a lesser extent in municipal government.

The Oregon State

Welfare Commission, for example, was composed of persons from business
backgrounds who possessed elite social credentials.

More to the point,

the content of this regulatory agency's policies pertaining to the
cannery strike reflected the backgrounds of the Commission's
members.
The direct influence of economic interests upon the police
policies devised by city officials was less clear than in the case
of the Welfare Commission.

While all of the Seattle and Portland

mayors from 1919-1920 were drawn from business-related

oCCl.~pations,

their policies did not always benefit the economically dominant class.
Indeed, police policies under Portland r·1ayor Rushlight aild under
Seattle Mayors Gill and Cotterill at times were incongruelilt with the
immediate goals of some employers.

In order to understand the

policies of these mayors it is necessary to consider political
factors.
The more purely political aspects of class relations from
1912-1920 definitely played a part in shaping the police response.
Linkages between class power, state power, and police actions
were critical in this regard.

In fact, it seems that the two key

political facts in this study were the inability of the political
powers that be to respond to the legitimate demands of unorganized
cannery workers, unemployed persons, and striking lumber workers,
and concurrently, the willingness of the holders of political power
to mobilize repressive force against militant workers and radical
political people who dared to challenge the status quo.
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Antithetical political constituencies in the case of the
Cotterill administration, the structure of a commission form a
government in the case of the Albee mayorality, and the war aims
and international goals of the national political-economic leadership largely seem to have shaped the policy options available to
the Seattle and Portland authorities.

In general:then, these

political forces helped to forge the context in which police policy
was formulated and police strategy and tactics were carried out.
In regard to the heavy doses of repression that were administered within this context, a confluence of political and economic
forces was responsible for police actions. Speciffcally, it is
necessary to inspect two of the social processes that were in motion
during the period of 1912-1920.

One of these processes can be

referred to as the IIconsolidation of power. II

It

should be remembered

that police policies in 1912-1913 alternated between toleration of
labor radicals and repression of them.

These policy shifts do not

seem to have been due to the factor of political party affiliation
since there was no consistent relationship between a mayor's party
affiliation and the police policy under his administration.

The most

tolerant police policies, for instance, were established in 19121913 by Mayor Cotterill, who was a Democrat and by Mayor Rushlight,
who was Republican.
What explains the tolerant policies of some city authorities
in 1912-l913? This tolerance may have stemmed from the weak ties
that existed between economic and political interests in 1912-1913.
During these early years of confl i ct the 1umber IIbarons, II the
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shipping magnates, and other major economic interests were neither as
well-organized themselves nor as conscious of the necessity of protecting their interests through the control of the state apparatus as they
were in later years.

Then, too, the levels of labor unrest and inter-

national class conflict were lower in 1912 than in the post-1916
years.

Additionally, it is doubtful that these large corporate concerns

could have dominated the municipal governments of Portland and Seattle
in 1912-1913 even if they had wanted to do so.

Working class union

people, middle class merchants, and other community interests appear
to have had too tight a grip on the reins of city government in these
years to have had power wrested away by outside industrial concerns.
Evidence supporting the latter point can be found in the way that
the 1913 power struggle was resolved between the Seattle Times, representing the interests of both the legal and illegal business entrepreneurs, and Mayor Cotterill, representing organized labor, middle class
Progressives, and the municipal government itself.

The final resolu-

tion was actually a stalemate with neither side emerging as the winner.
The implications to be drawn from this political clash are two-fold.
First, the police policy of minimal intervention during this power
struggle is in line vlith the proposition that a conflict between class
and state interests promotes a policy of toleration for labor radicalism.

Second, in regard to the point at hand about the process of

consolidating power, it is obvious that class and state interests were
not firmly united in Seattle in 1912.
economic power of those who owned the

Stated in another way, the
forests~

the mills, the shipping

companies, and the vice operations had not yet been translated into
political power.
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What happened to change the power relations between 1912 and
1917? A series of events at the local, state, national, and
international levels altered the power arrangements in both Seattle
and Portland.

Some of these events such as the Great Lumber Strike

of 1917 heightened the class consci.ousness of employers and other
businessmen, impelling them to pressure municipal officials to use
the police to blunt the radical threat.

Other events such as World

War I made governmental authorities more susceptible to these
pressures because of the extreme dependence of the state upon major
industrial and business concerns.

Still other events like the

Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 tended to increase the awareness of the
state authorities and the major business and industrial firms insofar
as the necessity of protecting the capitalist system from the
reovlutionary currents of international radicalism was concerned.
Taken together, these events fostered a consolidation of power by
the

eco~omically

dominant class.

Another social process that figured into the shaping of police
actions might be called the IIdecomposition of power. II The IIdecomposition seems appropriate because radical labor's power separated
ll

into its constituent parts after 1917.

More to the point, the moves

of third parties fueled the process through which the labor radicals
lost power in Portland and Seattle.

To be specific, the media,

A.F.L. unions, and other community interests in Seattle and Portland
shifted their positions vis a vis the employers and the labor
radicals in response to many of the same events that served to
consolidate power for the dominant economic interests.

The war was
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sufficiently powerful by itself to push the Seattle Star and the
Portland News from one side of the class confrontation to the other.
For the A.F.L. affiliates in Seattle, the collapse of the General
Strike and the fear of reprisals in the strike's aftermath sufficed
to drive a wedge between the labor radicals and them.

The police,

who were themselves somewhat divided over the issue of how to
handle labor unrest in 1912-1913, were clearly on the side of the
economically dominant class by 1920.

Federal intervention into

police affairs and postwar demobilization were two forces \'/hich served
to insure that the allegiances of police .workers did not vacillate
between the capitalist class and the working class.
The intersection of the power consolidation and power decomposition processes was marked by extreme police repression.

The key

point here is that the working class did affect police policy from
1912-1920. The working class, acting through coalitions consisting
of the A.F.L., the I.W.W., and other organizations, provided an
impetus toward a police policy of toleration of labor radicals in
1912-1913 and during the Seattle General Strike.

Conversely, the

working class affected police policy in a way that was detrimental
to the Wobblies, Socialists, and Communists when the working class
power coalitions decomposed, leaving the labor radicals isolated
from the rest of the working class and thus subject to repression.
The fact that heavy police repression tended to occur during the
times when there was a decline in radical labor power supports the
proposition that a sudden decrease in labor power leads to a policy
of repression or a "Thermidorian reaction."
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As for the repression itself, it was produced by social processes
that operated in a zigzagging fashion rather than in a slow, evolutionary manner.

Police repression did not exist continuously

through all stages of the conflict between the dominant political
and economic interests and the labor radicals.

Instead, the rhythms

of repression were spasmodic, not running in any natural order of
sequence.

For example, after a steady period of repression in

Seattle and Portland from 1917-1918, repression subsided during the
Seattle General Strike.

In fact, the proposition that toleration

is likely to be adopted as a police policy in a revolutionary situation
was borne out by the data on police actions during the General
Strike.
A related observation on the discontinuity of repression is
that the authorities were compelled by the labor radicals to suspend
repressive police acts during the General Strike.

This fact seems

to indicate that the power of the economically dominant class was
not monolithic even after its' consolidation of political and economic
resources.

Stated in another way, militant workers were able to

exert influence over police policy even though the employers and
industrialists had achieved high levels of organization and power
in 1919.
Following the General Str'ike the level of repression zoomed
up in both cities, reaching its zenith in 1919-1920.

The high level

of repression also was partly attributable to the leaders of police
red squads who exploited the concerns of the employers about
radicalism in order to promote their own organizational and

•
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self-interests.

Red squad leaders used repression as a political

resource.* What happened was that the dramatic "revelations" produced by the raids and other more sordid adventures of the red
squads activated employers into the role of benefactors who then
provided direct assistance to red squad members in the form of
monetary contributions.

As a consequence, the repression seems to

have literally fed on itself in a self-perpetuating fashion.
The Structuring of Police Mobilization and Collective Action
While an examination of the class base of repression points
out the general contours of the police response, it does not resolve
the issues of why and how the police are mobilized to act collectively
against the labor radicals.
issues at this point.

It is appropriate to address these

When specifically considering the matters of

police mobilization and collective action, the findings from the
comparative study of Seattle and Portland are somewhat striking.
They are striking because most of the propositions regarding the
relationships between police actions and various social factors were
supported by the data in Chapters IV-IX.
The data on police mobilization indicate that high levels of
labor unrest as measured by strike activity tended to be related to
increases in the size of the Seattle and Portland police departments
and to the modification of organizational arrangements in order to
more effectively police labor wars and to suppress radicals.

In terms

*Michael Lipsky conceptualized some of the ways in which protest
may be used as a resource in IIProtest as a Political Resource,"
American Political Science Review, 62 (December, 1968), pp. 1144-1158.
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of the effect of labor unrest on size, it appears that most of the
increases in police manpower that occurred because of strikes were
due to the hiring of special police on a temporary basis.

Hence,

the effects of labor unrest on departmental size were short-term in
nature.

As for changes in organizational arrangements, it was almost

customary for the Seattle and Portland police to alter deployment
practices in precincts in accordance with the exigencies of labor
unrest. Then, too, reserve forces, war emergency squads, and red
squads were created for the purpose of dealing with the labor
radicals.
One proposition about police mobilization that was not supported
was the proposition that a high level of labor power calls forth a
greater emphasis on commitment mechanisms in police departments.
While there were minor increments in police salaries from 1912 to
1920, it does not appear that wage increases for the police were
spurred on by the acquisition of power by the labor radicals.

Other

commitment mechanisms, however, were utilized as substitutes for
financial incentives by the police.

For instanCE, public recognition

for patriotic service in the pages of the daily newspapers may have
boosted the morale and loyalty of red squad members.

Still, this

public recognition was accorded to the "red hunters" at a time
when the level of labor's power was low rather than high.
Turning to the propositions on collective action, the data
indicate that increases in the level of labor unrest were related
to increases in the amount of emphasis placed on proactive police
strategies.

More specifically, police riots and attacks tended to
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decline in importance over the period of 1912-1920, while police
raids became more frequent and prominent during this same period.
While it must be acknowledged that police riots and attacks were
to some extent police-initiated events, these phenomena largely
were precipitated by things such as a wagon passing by with a red
flag attached to it and free speech fighters refusing to obey police
orders.

Conversely, the raids involved a more planned, deliberate

type of police action than did the riots and attacks.
The data are less clear with respect to preventive strategies.
In fact, since the resources devoted to preventive activity were
not compared over time, there is no way to evaluate the proposition
that

preventiv.~

of unrest.

strategies were stressed when there were low levels

However, one important finding emerged in regard to

preventive strategies.
divisions

bet~~en

It was discovered that there were no sharp

proactive strategies which have been typically

associated with repression and preventive strategies which have
usually been thought to be associated only with reform and pacifism.
Indeed, it appears that the utilization of both proactive and
preventive strategies reaped repressive outcomes in the case of the
Portland police.
The significance of this finding resides more in the questions
that it raises than in the answers it provides to the social
scientist.

If there was no fundamental difference between the out-

comes of these two strategies, what choice did the police have in
terms of their response to the labor radicals? If there was no
choice to be made with regard to strategic outcomes, then was the
element of choice present with respect to the types of political
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action possible for the police? Did the police have a choice between
reactionary collective action and progressive collective action?
The data in this study give the impression that the answer to all
th ree of these ques ti ons is aqua 1i fi ed "no.

II

The query about the political cast of police actions seems to
be the pivotal question.

During the entire period of 1912-1920

the outstanding instance of progressive action on the part of the
city police was the attempt of rank and file police in Portland
to start a union in 1919. This ende;wor was promptly smashed by
Hayor Baker and other city authorities.

In a somewhat different

manner, the sympathies of Guy Fuller and other street police for the
plight of the striking fruit-sorters in Portland became submerged
in the bureaucratic machinery of a reform administration.

Moreover,

is it difficult to imagine how the police could have behaved
differently than they did in their encounters with the labor radicals,
given their own position in the class structure.

As the data on the

years 1919-1920 seem to indicate, the police occupation was in a
declining position relative to other occupations.

This structural

condition probably further propelled the police to participate in
reactionary political action.
Some other propositions that were supported by the findings
were those on the scope, size, and intensity of police action.
Specifically, the evidence showed that when the LW.W. broadened
its scope of mobilization efforts by organizing the unemployed,
the police also enlarged the scope of their actions by "vagging"
unemployed persons.

No data were collected on the relationship
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between labor unrest and changes in police arrest practices pertaining
to the regular labor force.

However, it would be surprising if the

proportion of laborers arrested did not increase during the Great
Lumber Strike of 1917.
As for the intensity of police action, one rather interesting
observation can be gleaned from the data on the violence exhibited
by the Seattle and Portland police. in 1919-1920. This observation
is that the proposition about the relative levels of police violence
under a condition of public hysteria versus a condition of high labor
unrest may be inappropriate since police violence in 1919-1920
apparently was neither begat by allred scare ll not caused by labor
unrest.

Instead, police actions vis a vis radicals in 1919-1920

must be regarded as part of a broad red-hunting movement that was
mainly sponsored by national political and economic interests.
Another finding in regard to police violence is that the riotous
behavior of the Portland police in handling the cannery strike in
1913 did seem to radicalize some middle class persons who had
previously been uncommitted to either side in the labor dispute.
This finding is consistent with the proposition that the use of
excessive force is likely to radicalize third parties to the class
struggle.*
Besides breaking down police response into the above-discussed
parts, it is useful to take a holistic view of the police response
to the labor radicals.

When police response is considered as a

*Due to data limitations, th~ other propositions about police
violence were not explored in the dissertation.
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single entity, one can not help but be struck by the impression that
the police response to labor radicalism in 1919-1920 was characterized
by an incredible amount of structuring.

Even the people who controlled

the police seemed to be controlled at times; even the reforming of
the structure of municipal government failed to produce a more humane,
tolerant police response; the only way out for the individual officer
seemed to be permanent, e.g., quit the department and procure better
work elsewhere.

In sum, the individual police officer's freedom of

choice in terms of the policy, strategy, and tactics for dealing
with labor radicals was drastically constrained by structural forces.
The Police Function Revisited
This dissertation began with a statement on the importance of
understanding the police function in terms of economic interests,
power relations, and class conflict within particular communities.
Then, too, it has been asserted that linkages between the economically
dominant class, political leaders and law enforcement officers must
be regarded as dynami c phenomena whi ch are in moti on, shi fting
their course and altering the context in which the police policy is
formulated and carried out by patrolmen and detectives.

Above all,

it has been argued that the interrelatedness of class, state, and
police power is a central fact in police mobilization and
collective action.
The criminal law is one of the concrete points at which an
analysis of the police must commence in order to fully capture the
interlocking nature of economic and political phenomena in shaping
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the police response.

In the case of the Seattle and Portland police,

data on the origins of the criminal syndicalism laws underscored the
mutual and sometimes reciprocal relations between these social
phenomena.

It was shown that these laws in Oregon and Washington

emerged in an environment that was large"ly formed by national economic
and political interests and by international and national, and
regional class conflict.

The actual process of making it a crime

to be a member of the I.W.W. was managed by state political leaders
who appear to have been supported by public opinion.

Both the state

politicians and the Oregon and Washington publics, in turn, probably
were influenced by the ebb and flow of the national red hunting
movement.

The result of these ties between international, national,

and state level forces was legislation which rendered the hunting
of Wobblies, Socialists, and Communists to be a legitimate police
function.
Another necessary point of concentration in the analysis of
the police function is the application of criminal law.
differences in power must be taken into account.

Here

Police actions in

regard to the enforcement of criminal syndicalism and vagrancy laws
in Poy·tland and Seattle amplified the theme that law enforcement
policy and practices are to some extent influenced by the power of
labor radicals in relation to the power of the economically driminant
class,
With respect to the application of the criminal syndicalism
laws, the "spy for hire" scheme of Portland police exceeded the
legal boundaries of the syndicalism statute.

This excess was not
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due solely to the abuse of police discretion.

Rather these extra

curricular police activities were the result of the employers'
direct influence over the police as well as the bureaucratic and
financial interests of red squad members.

At the same time, it

must be recognized that the Wobblies and the other radi:cals lacked
the power and status to be able to enter into a similar relationship with the authorities.
Similarly, the manner in which vagrancy laws were enforced
protected the most powerful interests in the community.

Since

labor lacked any representation in Portland's commission form
of government, there was little chance of the lumber barons being
"vagged" by the Portland police. This was true even though the
behavior of many of the mill owners and logging company entrepreneurs
may have been little different from the behavior of those who
were arrested for vagrancy.

Indeed, the lumberman and the typical

unemployed protestor in 1913-1915 seem to have shared the status of
being one who wandered about idly and performed little or no work!
The important difference between the lumberman and the unemployed
person, of course, was that the former possessed considerably more
power than the latter.
Power relations also affected the application of the law in
the aftermath of the Seattle General Strike.

The municipal author-

ities in Seattle displayed a great deal of selectivity in choosing
the "whipping boys' for the strike. They sent a hail of repression
down on the politically marginal and powerless

~/obblies

instead of

attacking the stronger forces that were responsible for the strike.
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As important as power differences were in determining the
response of the Seattle and Portland police, they do not suffice
alone as an explanation of police repression.

It is important to

see that the conflict between the capitalist and the working class
provided the backdrop for the day-to-day maneuvers of the police.
This conflict was not a static phenomenon;* instead it was a social
formation, arising from processes which evolved over a period of
time.
The police function was enlarged or

di~inished,

strengthened

or weakened, and stressed or downp1ayed depending upon the relations
between these classes (and to a lesser extent upon the actions of
other classes and groups such as the middle class and the unemployed).
In 1912-1913, for instance, the Seattle and Portland police on
occasion filled the role of a neutral arbiter in skirmishes under
the conditions of a division between the dominant power interests
and relatively

10';1

levels of conflict and unrest.

By contrast, the

role of the Seattle and Portland police in 1917-1919 often was that
of a military warrior, raiding and attacking all opposition to the
established social order under a different set of social conditions
than existed in 1912-1913. Gains in cohesion and consensus among
the dominant political and economic interests, along with much
higher levels of unrp.st, were reflected in the tendency of the police
to retain a repressive policy toward labor radicals throughout most
of this period.
*Parts of this analysis derive from the thinking of E. P.
Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage
Books, 1966).
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Care needs to be taken, however, not to pigeonhole police
response as being totally repressive or tolerant or to stop history
at a given point and assert that the police function was "thus and
such" in a given year.
function is not a thing.

It must be recognized that the police
Instead it is a sociological phenomenon

whose nature can be inferred by observing police actions in the
context of specific class relations over a period of time.

Taking

this long view of police-radical encounters in Seattle and Portland
from 1912-1920, it appears that the main continuity in these relations
was that the police tended to invoke force and violence whenever
class conflict became irreconcilable.*
The anti-radical police violence in Portland in 1913 and the
refusal of the Seattle police to protect the property of Socialists
in the same year car: be viewed as expressions of the police functioning
to perpetuate the class system in the specific situations where the
cannery workers, the free speech fighters, and the Socialists
refused to accept the pattern of social relations that made up
their lives.

During the period, 1917-1919, the contradictions and

differences between the capitalist and working

cla$~::

became even

more apparent to both sides to the point where the relations between
the two became highly conflict-laden.

Again, the basic rationale

of police work in Seattle and Portland under these sorts of conditions
was the use or potential use of force.

This observation is supported

*Paul Takagi offered this observation in IILEAA's Research
Solicitation: Police Use of Deadly Force," Crime and Social Justice
(Spring-Summer, 1979), p. 55.
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by the existence of raids, dragnets, and gargantuan displays of
police firepower that characterized this period.
Back to Social Theory
As a concluding addendum to this discussion of the police
function, it seems fitting to offer several observations on the
apparent as well as the real weaknesses of the present study.

First,

a statement about the generalizeability of the findings is in order.
An obvious criticism of this research is that police behavior in
Seattle and Portland from 1912-1920 may not have been representative
of police behavior in other cities and in other times.
valid point to make in regard to this study.

This is a

A closely related,

yet not entirely appropriate criticism is that this study lacks
external validity because of the crises that occurred in the period
that was under investigation.
The latter criticism is s0mewhat inappropriate because wars
and massive unemployment are integral parts of the capitalist system
wTIich have recurred on a fairly regular basis throughout the twentieth
century in the U.S-

Crises in parts of the capitalist system are

often produced by the system itself in 'order to restore equilibrium
in other parts of the system. l Specifically, the unemployment
crisis of 1913-1915 seems to have been precipitated by overproduction,
while U.S. involvement in World War I was due, in part, to the
perception that the survival of the capitalist system depended upon
overseas economic expansion. 2
Suffice it to note here that crises serve to galvanize class
conflict in

gener~l

and to stimulate the police in particular to perform
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the function of preserving the class system.

To support this claim,

it can be noted that the Portland police employed force against the
IIHungry Hundred in an effort to blunt the thrust of the unemployed
ll

army's protest during the crisis of 1913-1915. Additionally, World
War I served as a proximate force that led to a quasi-nationalization
of the Seattle and Portland police in 1917-1918. The national
influence that was exerted over the city police and the manifestations
of this control benefitted the dominant political and economic
interests in the U.S.

While it is clear that the unemployment and

war crises affected police response in important ways, it is still
necessary to keep in mind that these crises and the outcomes wrought
by them were part and parcel of larger conflicts and contradictions
within the capitalist system in 1912-1920.
Another possible criticism of this dissertation is that the
analysis is somewhat mechanical and features an over-socialized
conception of reality.

This is a criticism that is to be expected

given the limitations of the framework that has been constructed.
Inasmuch as the mobilization perspective that has been integrated
into the framework is a purposive model, it is not a surprise that the
analysis in this dissertation depicts the Seattle and Portland police
as acting with some sort of design in mind.* Neither is it a shock
that police actions were seen as serving a specific function in a
capitalist society in view of the emphasis on Marxian social theory.
*Much of the commentary in this section is drawn from the
observations made by Charles Tilly in From Mobilization to Revolution
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 229231.
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It is hoped that other studnets of police collective action
will be able to IIbring human beir.gsll into their analysis.* It should
be pointed out, however, that if accounting for individual differences
and personality characteristics is a perplexing task in contemporary
social scientific studies, it is even more difficult in historical
research.

Diaries, scrapbooks, and other similar documents are

required in order to even begin to measure these types of factors
in historical studies.

There was a paucity of this type of data

available for the investigation of police response in Seattle and
Portl and.
Another problem with the present study of the police response
to labor radicalism is that there has been no clear delineation
between the descriptive and causal explanations of police actions.**
For the most part, the observations about the police response in
Seattle and Portland were $orted into the categories of interests,
organization, mobilization, repression, power, and collective action
itself.

This ordering of categories led to the view that the police

attempted to achieve their interests with the resources available
to them within the limits set by their class position, their function
as part of the state apparatus, and so on.

A causal explanation

also implicitly figured into this analysis of police response.

In

*For an argument in favor of bringing human beings back into
social research, see George C. Homans, IIBringing Men Back In,1I
Americal Sociol0 ical Review,. 29 (December, 1964), pp. 809-818.
Also see Dennis Wrong, liT e Oversocialized ·Conception of Man in
Modern Sociology,1I .~merican Sociological Review, 26 (April, 1961),
pp.183-l93.
**This is a general problem of historical interpretation.
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adhering to Marxian social theory, it was stressed that large scale
social changes affected the interests of organizations contending
for power and, as a consequence, affected their mobilization and
collective action.
Two points must be understood with respect to both types of
explanation.

First, the descriptive and causal types of explanation,

as they were utilized in this study, involved two different levels
of analysis.

Whereas the descriptive form mainly operated at the

organization level, the causal form operated at a social structural
level.

Second, the level of explanation achieved in this dissertation

reflects a very primitive stage in the development of a theoretical
perspective on police collective action.

Again, however, this is

a result that is to be expected given the exploratory nature of the
study.

Should students of police response choose to move beyond

this primitive stage, the tasks of explicating the major dimensions
of causation, identifying the role of other etiological processes
such as the proletarianization of police labor, and then specifying
the linkages bewteen the different levels of analysis remain to be
accomplished.

In addition, the problem of integrating descriptive

and causal models must bE! resolved in order for knowledge to develop
cumulatively in this area of police studies.
With this great amount of unfinished business left for those
interested in studying police collective action, what should be the
overarching goal of future research in regard to this area of study?
This question brings the dissertation around full circle from the
heights of social structural forces down to the level of the individual
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social scientist.

The best reserach agenda for future police studies

would seem to be one that includes problems that are relevant to
the contemporary urban crises.

IIRelevant" problems refer, in

particular, to topics and episodes of police collective action that
might shed light upon how individual human beings can effectively
resist some of the large-scale structural transformations of the
past and present which rob individuals of their power and hope.
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VI.

NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES
A.

Seattle

Dai 1y Times

Sun

Post-Inte11igencer

Union-Record

Star
-_.
B.

Portland

News

The Portland Telegram

Oregonian

Oregon Journal
C.

New York

New York Times

Wall Street Journal
D.

Other Cities

Bremerton News (Bremerton, Washington)
Industrial Worker (Seattle and Spokane, Washington)
Solidarity (Chicago)
Spokane Spokesman Review (Spokane, Washington)
The Evening Telegram (New Bedford, t4assachusetts)
Tribune (Chicago)
VII.
A.

INTERVIEWS
In Person

Frank Brai11ard, former Seattle police officer, interviewed by
Bruce Rayborn, Portland police officer, in Seattle,
Washington, March 10, 1979.
Julia G. Ruutti1a, labor activist, interviewed by Dennis E.
Hoffman, in Portland, Oregon, on July 1,1979.
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B.

By Phone

Unidentified Member of Civil Liberties Committee interviewed by
Dennis E. Hoffman in Portland, Oregon, on July 2, 1979.

APPENDIX A
POLICE - IWW ENCOUNTERS SHEET
Source:
Type of Report:

Page_ Col umn
News article

Editorial

Advertisement Notice

Other
General Description (1-3 sentences describing encounter)

Type of Event:
Demonstrations
Parades
Assemblies, crowds, mobs=:
Gatherings
Rall i es
Strikes

General Strikes
Meetings between police & IWWIWW meetings
Special celebrations
Police raids
Other (speci fy)

Police Actions:
Isolate and ignore
Mass arrests (+10)
Deny workers access to an area
Arrests
Seizure of property
Searches
Order to disperse
No. Police Shootings:
Victim precipitated
No. Police Killings:

Yes

No
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No. Police Assaults:
Harrassment (verbal)
Harrassment (physical)
Number of Personal Injuries
Property Damage
Objective of Police Action:
Police Strategy:
Reactive (IWW initiated)
Proactive (police/mayor or council-initiated)
Preventive
Numbers at Scene:
City Pol ice
Other Pol i ce
IWW
Names of Leaders:
City Pol ice
Geographical Location:
Type of Building:
Warehouse
Auditorium
Private Residence
Municipal Bu11Jing
Union Meeting Hall
Police Headquarters
Other (specify)

APPENDIX B
POLICE INTERVIEW GUIDE
1.

How much contact did you have with the I.ILlL when you were
a police officer? (If respondent answers "a lot," ask:
What do you mean by "a lot"?)
a)

2.

3.

Do you recall any particular police cases involving the
IJ~.~J. in which you were a participant? If so, please
describe one or two of these cases.

To what extent, if at all, did you feel that you had to pay
attention to city politicians or busienssmen in your job?
a)

Did either city politicians or businessmen influence
how you handled labor disputes involving the I.W.W.?

b)

As far as you know, were there any differences in what the
Republican politicians wanted the police to do with the
I.W.W. compared to what the Democrats wanted them to do?

Would you say there was much corruption in the police department when you were on the force? If so, what kinds of
corrpution were there?
a)

Were there any efforts to get rid of some of the corruption
when you were on the force?

b)

Did any of the reform activities have anything to do with
the I.W.W.?

4.

Did you feel free to administer the law on the street in
situations involving the I.W.W. as you saw fit? If not, why
didn't you feel free to do things as you wanted to?

5.

Did you notice any changes in the police department that were
made because of the I.W.W.? (Examples of changes: increases
in size of force, increases in salary, more training, more
specific plans for handling labor problems, etc.)

6.

What tactics did the police use to handle strikes, riots, street
meetings, and other types of I.H.W. gatherings?
a)

Did the police use things such as "red" files or "plants"
(i.e., undercover police officers)?
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7. What tactics, if any, did the police use to "prevent" I.W.W.
organizing activities?
a)

8.

9.

10.

11.

Did the work that the police were doing with juveniles
(e.g., supervising juvenile activities in skating rinks,
shooting galleries, and the like) have anything to do with
the loW. w. ?

Were you ever involved in a police raid on an
so,
a-)

What happened?

b)

What was the purpose of the raid?

I.t~.W.

hall? If

Do you think most of the general public supported the way that
the police handled the Wobbly situation?
a)

Were there certain groups in the city that were very
supportive of the police? Were there any groups that were
critical of the way that the police handled the labor
disputes involving the I.W.W.? Did any of these groups
have an important influence on police behavior?

b)

Did the newspapers have any influence on police response
to the I.W.W. difficulties?

Today, 'jn 1979, professionalism is a very popular idea. Was
there much emphasis on "professionalizing" the police when you
were on the force?
a)

What was done to professionalize the force?

b)

Do you think that these changes (related to professionalism)
made a difference in how the police responded to the I.W.W.?

Many books have been written about the loW.W. What was the
I.W.W. really like? What were the goals and objectives of the
I .W.W.?
a) Some people have argued that the loW.W. posed a challenge
to the institution of private property and to the entire
"free enterprise" system in the United States. How do you
feel about this statement? Is this the way you felt when
you were a police officer?

12.

As you know, there was quite a bit of violence in places like
Everett and Centralia, Washington. Was there much police
violence against the I.W.W. in (Seattle/Portland)?
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a) Were there certain events, periods, or years in which you
think that police violence against the I.W.W. was especially
high? When? Why?
b)

Did you ever "rough up" or shoot a Wobbly? If so, why
did you do it?

